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In this thesis I study collective bargaining, wage inequality, firm dynamics and the ways
in which they interact. In the first chapter I investigate the extent to which wages vary
across different industries after controlling for detailed worker and job characteristics and
how this is related to the wage setting institutions of a given country. In the second chapter
I study the drivers of the growth in earnings and wage inequality in Italy between 1985
and 2018 and compare them to the USA. In the third chapter I build a large-firm search
model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous firm entry in order to compare the aggregate
implications of firm-level and sector-level wage setting.
Chapter 1: Informal Coordination of Wage Bargaining and the Size of Sec-
tor Wage Premiums I use the Eurostat’s Structure of Earnings Survey which is a unique
data set containing microdata harmonised across European countries in order to investigate
the relationship between wage setting institutions and wage dispersion. First, I find that
in countries where the main level for wage bargaining is the sector, the dispersion of wages
across sectors after controlling for detailed worker and job characteristics is substantially
smaller than in countries where wage bargaining occurs predominantly at the firm level.
This is surprising given that sector-level bargaining implies equalising wages only for each
worker type within industries. The result points towards strong informal coordination of
wages across sectors achieved via pattern bargaining. Second, I find that the overall wage
dispersion is larger in the countries with firm-level wage setting. As a result, the relative
share of the overall wage inequality that can be attributed to the sector that a worker is
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employed in is not generally larger in the countries with firm-level wage setting. Third, I find
that in countries with sector-level wage setting observable worker characteristics explain a
larger fraction of the overall wage variance. This is likely because wages are not individually
bargained, but are based on a collectively bargained formula that includes characteristics
such as worker occupation, education, years of experience and tenure.
Chapter 2: It’s the Sectors, not the Firms: Accounting for Earnings and
Wage Inequality Trends in Italy 1985-2018 Using administrative data for the entire
universe of private-sector employment in Italy for the period 1985-2018 we investigate the
drivers of the growth in earnings and wage inequality and compare them with other countries,
in particular the USA. First, we find that the majority of the increase in earnings inequality
in Italy (62%) is due to an increase in the variance of average earnings between firms and
only about 38% is due to increased variance within firms. This is very similar to the results
found for the US (Song et al. (2019)). Second, we decompose the between-firm variance into
the between-sector variance and the between-firms-within-sector variance. Whereas in the
US, the contribution of the between-sector variance to the overall growth in earnings disper-
sion is minimal and the majority of the growth of inequality is a between-firm-within-sector
phenomenon, in Italy the rising between-sector variance explains approx. 42% of the overall
increase in earnings dispersion, with the between-firm-within-sector component playing only
a small role. The most likely explanation for the different patterns of rising earnings inequal-
ity between Italy and the USA seems to be differences in wage-setting institutions. Wage
bargaining in the US is at the firm level whereas in Italy over 90% of workers are covered
by sector-level collective agreements that specify wage floors for each occupation. This does
not necessarily mean that sector wage premiums became larger in Italy. It is much more
likely that the sector-level negotiators simply allowed increases in the relative demand for
high skilled workers driven by technological changes to be reflected in the minimum wages
for different occupations. This in combination with the fact that occupational composition
of the workforce differs hugely between the narrowly defined industries, but arguably much
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less within them can potentially explain why the growth of earnings (and wage) dispersion
between sectors accounted for such a large share of the overall growth of inequality in Italy.
Finally, we find that the pattern found in the USA, the UK and Brazil, that changes in the
dispersion of average earnings between firms within the same narrowly defined industries
explain the majority of the changes in earnings dispersion, is not universal.
Chapter 3: The Aggregate Implications of Sector-Level vs Firm-Level Wage
Setting in a Frictional Labour Market I compare a setting where a firm negotiates
wages with each worker separately with a two-tier collective bargaining framework. In the
latter case a sector-wide union and an employer organisation first bargain over the tariff
wage that applies to all the homogeneous workers and then additional wage premiums are
bargained collectively at firm-level. The model can vary the extent of centralisation of wage
bargaining by adjusting the ability of workers to organise industrial actions at firm-level.
The modelling framework is a search model with multi-worker firms that are heterogeneous
in productivity. As a result of fixed costs of production there is a threshold firm productivity
level and thus a firm-selection mechanism. Under firm-level bargaining (either individual or
collective) there is wage dispersion across firms driven by rent sharing and the wage is an
increasing function of the firm’s output per worker. Because of convex hiring costs firms
only gradually grow towards their target size. Given that firm productivity is constant over
the life of the firm and there are decreasing returns to scale, wage is declining in firm age.
Firms with higher permanent productivity face higher wages along their entire growth path.
My main finding is that reducing wage dispersion across firms while keeping average wage
constant leads to a higher total value added. I provide two novel arguments in favour of
sector-level bargaining. Firstly, centralised wage setting can reduce the young firm wage
premium and thus encourage more firm entry. Secondly, it can weaken the link between firm
size and wages and thus reduce the inefficiencies associated with the over-employment effect




In this thesis I investigate the economic implications of trade unions, the possible drivers
of the growth in wage inequality, the mechanisms affecting incentives for firm creation and
firm closures and the interactions between these three broad areas. In the first chapter I
investigate the extent to which wages for workers with the same education, years of experience
and tenure performing the same occupations vary across different industries and how this is
related to the predominant way in which wages are set in a given country. Wages can be
negotiated individually between each worker and the firm; between a firm-level trade union
and the firm or between a sector-level trade union representing all the employed workers in
that industry and an organisation representing all the employers in that industry. In the
second chapter I study the drivers of the growth in earnings and wage inequality in Italy
between 1985 and 2018 and compare them to the USA. In the third chapter I build a model
of the labour market in order to compare the implications of firm-level and sector-level wage
setting for the quantity of goods produced, the level of employment and other economic
outcomes.
In the first chapter I use the Eurostat’s Structure of Earnings Survey which is a unique
data set containing information on worker and firm characteristics that is harmonised and
thus comparable across European countries in order to investigate the relationship between
wage setting institutions (the way that wages are set) and wage inequality. First, I find that
in countries where the main level for wage bargaining is the sector, wages for workers with
the same characteristics performing the same occupation vary less across industries than in
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countries where wage bargaining occurs predominantly at the firm level. This is a surprising
result. Given that under sector-level collective wage bargaining certain standard wage rates
are set for each occupation and these tariff wages then apply to all the firms in the industry
we would expect that wages are equalised for each type of worker within industries, but it
is not obvious that wages should be equalised across industries. I find that the European
countries where wages for each worker type are most similar across industries tend to have
strong informal coordination of wages where one sector agrees on wages first and the resulting
pay rise becomes a benchmark for the other sectors. Second, I find that the share of the
wage inequality that can be explained by the sector that a worker is employed in is not
systematically different between countries with sector-level and firm-level wage bargaining.
While countries where wages are mostly set at firm level have larger sector wage premiums,
their overall wage inequality is also larger because they have more inequality coming from
other sources as well. Third, I find that in countries where wages are mostly set by collective
bargaining at the level of industry, observable worker characteristics can explain a greater
share of the total wage inequality. This is likely because wages are not individually bargained,
but are based on a collectively bargained formula that includes characteristics such as worker
occupation, education, years of experience and tenure.
In the second chapter I use social security data that covers all private-sector employment
in Italy for the period 1985-2018 in order to investigate the drivers of the growth in earnings
and wage inequality and compare them with other countries, in particular the USA. First,
we find that the majority of the increase in earnings inequality in Italy (62%) is due to an
expansion of the differences in average earnings across firms and only about 38% is due to
increased inequality within firms. This is very similar to the results found for the US (Song
et al. (2019)). Second, we decompose the pay inequality between firms into two components,
the differences in average earnings across sectors and the differences in average earnings
across firms within the same sector. Whereas in the US, the contribution of the between-
sector inequality to the overall growth in earnings inequality is minimal and the majority of
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the growth of inequality is a between-firm-within-sector phenomenon, in Italy the expanding
differences in average earnings across sectors explain approx. 42% of the overall increase in
earnings inequality, with the between-firm-within-sector component playing only a small role.
The most likely explanation for the different patterns of rising earnings inequality between
Italy and the USA seem to be differences in the way wages are set. Wage bargaining in the US
is at the firm level whereas in Italy over 90% of workers are covered by sector-level collective
agreements that specify wage floors for each occupation. This does not necessarily mean that
some sectors were increasingly paying higher wages than other sectors for workers with the
same characteristics performing the same occupations. It is much more likely that the sector-
level negotiators simply allowed increases in the productivity of high skilled workers relative
to low skilled workers driven by technological changes to be reflected in the minimum wages
for different occupations. This in combination with the fact that occupational composition
of the workforce differs hugely between the narrowly defined industries, but arguably much
less within them can potentially explain why the growth of earnings (and wage) inequality
between sectors accounted for such a large share of the overall growth of inequality in Italy.
Finally, we find that the pattern found in the USA, the UK and Brazil, that changes in the
dispersion of average earnings between firms within the same narrowly defined industries
explain the majority of the changes in earnings inequality, is not universal.
In the third chapter I build a model of the labour market in order to investigate the
economic implications of different degrees of centralisation of wage bargaining, i.e. whether
wages are negotiated between each firm and its workforce (the decentralised case) or wages
are negotiated by a sector-wide trade union representing all the employees in the industry
and an employer organisation representing all the firms in the industry (the centralised case).
In particular, I compare a setting where a firm negotiates wages with each worker separately
with a two-tier collective bargaining framework. In the latter case a sector-wide union and an
employer organisation first bargain over the tariff wage that applies to all the homogeneous
workers and then additional wage premiums are bargained collectively at firm-level. The
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model can vary the extent of centralisation of wage bargaining by adjusting the ability of
workers to organise industrial actions at firm-level. In my model matching of unemployed
workers to empty vacancies is a costly and time-consuming process. When a firm is created
the owner learns the firm’s productivity which is fixed over the life of the firm. There is
a certain minimum level of productivity that firms need to have in order to be profitable
and choose to produce in the industry. Firms only gradually grow towards their target
size. As the number of workers a firm has increases, the amount that each worker produces
declines. Under firm-level wage bargaining, the higher the amount of the good produced
per worker at the firm, the higher the wage rate that the firm has to pay to its workforce.
Therefore the wage declines as the firm grows larger. This encourages firms to grow larger
than would otherwise be optimal. Additionally, because younger firms had less time to grow
their workforce, the wage that they face is higher, there is a young firm wage premium.
My main finding is that in the context of this model, reducing wage dispersion across firms
while keeping average wage constant leads to a larger amount of the goods that can be
consumed. I provide two novel arguments in favour of sector-level bargaining. Firstly, by
making wages more similar across firms the centralised wage setting can reduce the young
firm wage premium which encourages more firms to be created. Secondly, it can weaken
the link between firm size and wages and thus reduce the inefficiencies associated with the
over-employment effect which has been identified by the existing literature.
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Chapter 1
Informal Coordination of Wage
Bargaining and the Size of Sector
Wage Premiums
1.1 Introduction
In a competitive labour market all firms face the same price for labour of a given type.
However, a long literature in labour economics has shown that some industries systematically
pay substantially higher wages than other industries to workers with similar observable skills
performing the same occupations (Dickens (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988)). The two
main explanations are either differences in wage policies across sectors (some sectors paying
wage premiums because of rent sharing), or sorting into sectors based on unobservable worker
ability (Gibbons and Katz (1992)). These conditional inter-industry wage differentials are
persistent across time, present in every country, but to varying degrees.
One country characteristic that has proven to be a good predictor of the dispersion
of inter-industry wage differentials is centralisation of wage bargaining. Wage bargaining
between representatives of unions and employers can take place at the level of the firm (the
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most decentralised case), at the level of the industry, or at the level of the entire private
sector. The main effect of centralisation is to equalise wages for each occupation across
heterogeneous firms within the bargaining unit which is either a particular industry or the
entire private sector (Barth, Moene, and Willumsen (2014)).
Zweimuller and Barth (1994), Teulings and Hartog (1998) and Kahn (1998) found that in
1980s the countries with the most centralised wage bargaining at the time, Sweden, Norway
and Austria, had 3-4 times smaller differences in wages across industries conditional on
observables than countries with the least centralised (firm-level) bargaining, the USA and
Canada. Given that at that time Sweden, Norway and Austria had wage setting at the level
of the entire private sector this is perhaps not a surprising result.
However, there has been a dramatic shift towards decentralisation of wage bargaining in
Europe since 1980s. These days the main level at which wage bargaining takes place is either
the sector or the firm. I investigate whether the negative relationship between the degree of
centralisation of wage bargaining and the size of sector wage premiums still exists1. Given
that sector-level bargaining only implies equalizing wages for each worker type within the
sector it is not immediately obvious that the relationship should still hold.
I use the Eurostat’s Structure of Earnings Survey which is a unique data set in that it
contains linked employee-employer data that is harmonised across the European countries.
This enables me to run the same regression model across all the countries and obtain com-
parable estimates. I use the 2006, 2010 and 2014 issues of this cross-sectional establishment
survey2.
I regress log hourly wages on worker and job characteristics (education, age, gender,
1I use sector and industry interchangeably in this chapter. When using terms industry or sector wage
differentials I always mean conditional on worker and job characteristics.
2Gannon, Plasman, et al. (2007), Caju, Lamo, et al. (2010) and Magda et al. (2011) also use the Structure
of Earnings Survey (either 1995 or 2002 issue) and estimate industry wage differentials for multiple countries.
However, their focus is different from mine. Gannon, Plasman, et al. (2007) examine the interaction between
the inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap. Caju, Lamo, et al. (2010) correlate industry
wage differentials with industry characteristics in order to understand the fundamental cause of industry
wage differentials. Magda et al. (2011) focus on East-West comparison of the dispersion of industry wage
differentials in Europe.
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tenure, occupation, full time vs part time work, permanent vs temporary contract) and a set
of dummy variables, one for each industry category. The OLS coefficients on these industry
dummy variables, after some standard transformations3, become the inter-industry wage
differentials. They tell us the wage premium that a sector pays relative to the economy-wide
average conditional on worker and job characteristics. For each country-year pair I calculate a
measure of dispersion of the inter-industry wage differentials following the standard approach
in the literature.
I find that there is a very large variation in wages across sectors even after controlling for
detailed worker and job characteristics and that the size of this dispersion varies significantly
across the European countries. For example in 2014 the dispersion of inter-industry wage
differentials was almost 3 times larger in Bulgaria than in Belgium and it was twice as large
in Romania than in Finland.
My first major result is that countries with sector-level wage setting have substantially
smaller dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials than countries with predominantly
firm-level wage setting. I also find that countries that are ranked as having a larger degree
of coordination of wage bargaining have smaller sector wage differentials4. Coordination
measures the extent to which unions and employer organisations reflect wage increases in
other sectors in their own negotiations (Ibsen (2016)). Hence it seems that sector-level wage
bargaining enables more coordination of wage-setting across different parts of the economy.
While there is no longer formal or enforced coordination of wage setting across industries
(as was the case for a number of countries up to 1980s), there is often a certain degree of
informal coordination. An example of this is the pattern bargaining system where wage
bargaining takes place in one sector first, typically in the export-oriented manufacturing
sector, and the resulting wage increase becomes the benchmark for negotiators in other
sectors (Ibsen (2015)). Because of a widely shared concern about maintaining international
3Details in the Methodology section.
4The ranking comes from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting,
State Intervention and Social Pacts.
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competitiveness the wage increase in the trend-setting tradable sector represents an upper
bound on possible wage increases in the sheltered industries (Barth and Moene (2013)).
Interestingly, I find that the dispersion of industry wage differentials is much larger in
the UK and in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western European countries. Hence
I corroborate the finding of Magda et al. (2011)5. This sharp geographical divide can be
explained by the difference in wage setting institutions. While wage bargaining in Western
Europe is predominantly at the sector level, in Eastern Europe and the UK it is mainly at
the firm level.
In addition to estimating industry wage differentials I also apply a regression-based de-
composition of variance of the dependent variable proposed by Fields (2003). This way I can
find what fraction of the variance of log hourly wages can be explained by each explanatory
factor. This allows me to contrast the relative importance of sector that a worker is employed
in for explaining wage dispersion in different countries.
My second major result is that there is no significant difference between countries with
sector-level and firm-level wage setting in the relative share of the overall wage inequality
that can be attributed to the sector. This is because the overall wage dispersion is much
larger in the countries with firm-level wage setting. These countries have larger sector wage
premiums, but they also have greater wage inequality coming from other sources.
My third result is that in countries with sector-level wage setting observable worker
characteristics explain a larger fraction of the overall wage variance. Additionally, in these
countries a greater fraction of workers is covered by collective bargaining. Countries with
firm-level wage setting tend to have little collective bargaining and instead wages are bar-
gained between each individual worker and the firm. Hence the result above is likely due to
the fact that wages under collective bargaining are typically set using a formula that takes
into account various observable characteristics of the worker i.e. occupation, tenure, years of
5However, Magda et al. (2011) include a number of firm characteristics such as firm size among the control
variables. I consciously only control for worker and job characteristics, because the core idea of centralised
wage setting is to equalise wages across heterogeneous firms. Thus I want all of the wage variation across
sectors that is due to differences in average firm characteristics to be picked up by the sector dummy variables.
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experience and education, whereas under individual wage bargaining other factors can also
affect wages. These can be individual worker ability observed by the employer, but not by
the econometrician, productivity of the firm and idiosyncratic productivity of the match.
This chapter is closely related to the literature on the relationship between centrali-
sation of wage setting and the conditional dispersion of wages across sectors (Zweimuller
and Barth (1994), Teulings and Hartog (1998)). I contribute to the literature in three ways.
First, I highlight that sector-level wage setting combined with informal coordination of wages
across sectors seems to be sufficient to obtain a relatively compressed distribution of (con-
ditional) inter-industry wage differentials. In the past this was observed only for countries
with formal, enforced coordination of wages across all private sector industries. Second, in
addition to using the traditional method of estimating industry wage differentials I also per-
form regression-based variance decomposition to assess the relative importance of sector for
explaining wage inequality. Third, I provide a novel result that observable worker charac-
teristics have greater predictive power for explaining wages in countries that have collective
wage bargaining at the sector level.
1.2 Literature on Inter-Industry Wage Differentials
The idea that employers are important for explaining variation in wages has very long roots
in labour economics. One of the earliest studies to document differences in wages across
sectors for similar workers was Slichter (1950). In the late 1980s the interest in the topic was
revived in a series of papers that focused on the US and estimated conditional industry wage
differentials. The authors suggested that the structure of wages in the US was not consistent
with a perfectly competitive labour market (Dickens (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988),
Katz and Summers (1989), Thaler (1989)). According to the neo-classical model wage differ-
ences between sectors or firms are the result of either differences in worker quality (workers
in the high paid sectors being more productive) or by the differences in the desirability of
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different workplaces - the so called compensating wage differentials. Dickens (1987) and
Krueger and Summers (1988) showed that some sectors were systematically paying higher
wages than other sectors to workers with the same observable characteristics facing the same
working conditions.
Since then similar results have been found for other industrialised countries. Ben-
ito (2000) for the United Kingdom, Hartog, Opstal, and Teulings (1997) for Netherlands,
Gannon and Nolan (2004) for Ireland, Edin and Zetterberg (1992) for Sweden, Vainiomaki
and Laaksonen (1995) for Finland, Hartog, Pereira, and Vieira (2000) for Portugal and
Casado-Diaz and Simon (2008) for Spain. The existence of inter-industry wage differentials
has become a stylised fact in labour economics. Furthermore, these sector wage differentials
are persistent across time (Gittleman and Wolff (1993), Caju, Rycx, and Tojerow (2011))
and the ranking of sectors tends to be similar across countries (Caju, Lamo, et al. (2010)),
but the size of the sector wage premiums varies a great deal across countries (Teulings and
Hartog (1998).
One country characteristic that has proven to be a strong predictor of the dispersion of
industry wage premiums is the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining (Kahn (1998),
Rycx (2002), Gannon, Plasman, et al. (2007)). Centralisation of wage bargaining captures
the level at which wages are determined. Wage bargaining between representatives of unions
and employers can take place at the level of the plant or the firm (the most decentralised
case), at the level of the sector, or wages for each type of worker can be equalised across
the entire private sector (the most centralised case). The sentiment behind centralisation of
wage setting is equal pay for equal work and the main economic effect is to equalise wages
across firms heterogeneous in productivity and profitability (Barth, Moene, and Willum-
sen (2014)). Zweimuller and Barth (1994) use data for the early 1980s and find 3-4 times
smaller conditional inter-industry wage differentials in Austria, Norway and Sweden (coun-
tries at the time ranked as 1, 2 and 3 in the world in terms of centralisation of wage-setting)
than in Canada and the USA where wage setting is completely decentralised. Teulings and
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Hartog (1998) use data covering late 1980s and again find that from the most to the least
centralised country the dispersion in conditional inter-industry wage differentials increases
roughly at a ratio of 1:4. Similar result is found by Kahn (1998).
However, there is still no consensus on what is the fundamental economic force gen-
erating sector wage differentials. The first explanations is that the wage differentials are
simply a reflection of differences in average worker quality across sectors, but we just can-
not capture them because a significant portion of worker quality is unobservable (Murphy
and Topel (1987)). Within each education, experience and occupation subgroup workers are
going to vary in productivity. The high wage sectors are paying a premium because they
are trying to attract the best workers. The equilibrium models of sorting imply that if there
are complementarities in production between worker and firm quality then there will be
positive assortative matching where the most skilled workers sort themselves into the most
productive firms (Becker (1973), Shimer and L. Smith (2000)).
The second explanation is that the sector wage premiums are the result of differences in
wage policies across firms, i.e. some firms are paying higher wages for identical workers than
other firms. Firstly, this could be because of rent sharing. Firms differ in profitability due
to variation in technical efficiency (TFP) and differences in the extent of monopoly power.
Workers have a certain degree of bargaining power because they are costly to replace (due
to search frictions) and because they could go on a strike and they use this power to extract
rents from firms. Secondly, the sector wage premiums could be the result of efficiency wages,
firms in some sectors paying more than the market rate in order to reduce the labour turnover
costs or to motivate workers and make them more productive.
A natural way of controlling for the worker unobservable ability is to use panel data
and to examine changes in wages as workers switch between industries. However, there is
a problem that transitions between different sectors might not be exogenous. Gibbons and
Katz (1992) deal with this issue by limiting their attention to workers who lost their job
because of a plant closure. They show using the US data that the dispersion of the inter-
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industry wage differentials does not significantly decrease when estimating wage equations in
first differences rather than in levels. This challenges the view that industry wage differentials
are driven by differences in unmeasured ability.
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) use French linked employee-employer panel data
to decompose the total variance of log wages into the contribution of time-invariant worker
ability (worker fixed effects) and the time-invariant firm productivity (firm fixed effect).
They find that the person effects explain about 90% of the inter-industry wage differentials.
Similar result with French data is found by Goux and Maurin (1999). However, applying the
same methodology to the administrative data for the US state of Washington Abowd and
Kramarz (1999) found that inter-industry wage differentials are in equal proportions due to
worker and firm heterogeneity.
The rent sharing hypothesis is supported by the fact that in industries in which one
occupation is highly paid (conditional on worker and job characteristics), all occupations
tend to be highly paid (Katz and Summers (1989)). It is unlikely that the high paying
sectors would be choosing the best quality workers in every occupation group, including
low-skilled occupations like cleaners or janitors and that is why they pay a wage premium
for every occupation category. It is more likely that these wage premiums are due to wage
policies that apply to all employees.
Martins (2004) uses Portugese data and employs quantile regressions technique to esti-
mate industry wage differentials at the 90th, 50th and 10th percentile of the wage distribution
while controlling for worker, job and employer characteristics. Martins (2004) suggests that
if the industry wage differentials are driven by differences in unobservable ability then indus-
tries with high average premia will have even higher wage premia for workers at the top of
the conditional wage distributions, which is precisely where the highest unobserved ability
workers would be expected to be found. Therefore sectors with high mean premiums should
have very large differences in the premia between the top and the bottom of the conditional
wage distribution. Instead Martins (2004) finds that the high wage sectors have approxi-
30
mately equally large premia at all points in the conditional wage distribution, challenging
the unobservable ability narrative.
Caju, Lamo, et al. (2010) also estimate quantile regressions using the 1995 and 2002 issues
of the Structure of Earnings Survey and find that in a sample of 8 European countries ”in
most instances the (sector) wage differentials are higher at the lower end of the distribution
(10th percentile) than at the top end of the distribution (90th percentile), which goes against
the unobserved quality hypothesis”.
Furthermore, it has been shown that sector wage premiums are positively correlated
with average firm profitability which is consistent with the rent sharing narrative (Katz
and Summers (1989), Gannon, Plasman, et al. (2007)). Caju, Lamo, et al. (2010) find
that sector wage premiums are positively correlated with a measure of sector rents, with a
measure of monopoly power or market concentration in the industry and also with the share
of firms covered by firm-level wage collective agreements. This evidence again supports the
rent-sharing explanation of inter-industry wage differentials.
In conclusion, there seems to be a great deal of evidence in support of the rent-sharing
hypothesis, but the role of unobservable worker quality differences between sectors cannot
be completely ruled out.
1.3 Institutional Background: Coordination of Wage
Bargaining Across Industries
Barth and Moene (2013) show that highly centralised wage bargaining emerged in a number
of small, open European economies (the best examples being Sweden, Norway and Austria)
in the post-war period due to a widely shared concern about maintaining international com-
petitiveness. While wage increases in the sheltered industries can be passed on to higher
prices, in the export-oriented manufacturing prices are set at international markets. There-
fore the cost of higher wages in terms of decline in employment is much larger in the tradable
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sector. Both employers and unions in the tradable sector understood that wages can only
rise in line with productivity and growth in prices of internationally-traded goods. How-
ever, an unchecked growth in wages in the sheltered sectors imposes a negative externality
on both firms and workers in the tradable sector: higher prices of domestic goods increase
the general cost of living and also increase the cost of domestic inputs in the production
of exports (Swenson (1991)). For this reason a cross-class coalition of unions in the manu-
facturing sector and employers in all sectors emerged and imposed centralised national-level
wage setting in order to ensure that wage growth in the sheltered industries is never above
the one in the tradable sector (Due et al. (1994), Ibsen (2015)). As part of this framework
wages for each occupation were set for the entire private sector. Unions in the sheltered
industries were prevented from leaving the centralized negotiations by the threat of lockouts
(Barth and Moene (2013)).
However, the period of national-level wage bargaining came to an end in 1980s when
several countries moved to sector-level wage bargaining (Ortigueira (2013)). There was con-
cern at the time that this would lead to the worst of both worlds, as sector-level unions are
powerful enough to push for wage increases, but not all-encompassing enough to internal-
ize the resulting negative externalities (Calmfors and Driffil (1988)). Hence, according to
this argument, either completely decentralised or the most centralised wage bargaining are
better in terms of efficiency. What emerged in response to the need for wage moderation
was a system of pattern bargaining where the export-oriented manufacturing sector under-
takes wage bargaining first and the resulting pay increase becomes the norm for the rest of
the economy (Ibsen (2016)). This informal institutional set-up helps countries limit wage
growth in the sheltered industries and maintain international competitiveness (Johnston,
Hancke, and Pant (2014)). Furthermore, wage bargaining that is more coordinated across
sectors is associated with lower unemployment and greater labour market resilience in the
face of an economic downturn (OECD (2019)). Pattern bargaining is prominent in Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Germany and Austria. On the other hand, coor-
32
dination of wages across industries is achieved via state intervention in the case of Belgium
(OECD (2019)).
Unlike the old national-level wage setting system, the pattern bargaining does not have
obvious forms of enforcement (Traxler, Brandl, and Glassner (2008)). Nergaard (2014) finds
that in Norway ”the trend setting model is based on voluntary measures, tradition and
common agreement among the labour market parties and the government”. Ibsen (2015)
suggest that while in Denmark the national-level confederation of unions can effectively veto
agreements negotiated by the sector-level unions, in Sweden ”the only sanctions against
defections are naming and shaming and symbolic fines”. Ibsen (2016) suggests that the
internal stability of pattern bargaining cannot be explained solely through the rational self-
interest of the different players and the resulting alliances. Instead Ibsen (2016) highlights
the role of public mediation institutions that once established tend to sustain themselves
and are useful in solving collective action problems. The ongoing existence of such informal
coordination of wage setting across industries is a fascinating phenomena warrantying future
research. What I show in this chapter is that the combination of wage setting at sector level
with some form of informal coordination of wage setting across sectors seems to be sufficient
to maintain small inter-industry wage premiums.
1.4 Data
I use the Eurostat’s Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) which is a unique dataset in that it
contains harmonised multi-country linked employee-employer data and thus enables me to
obtain estimates that are consistent and comparable across the European countries. I use
the 2006, 2010 and 2014 issues of this cross-sectional establishment survey.
The SES contains harmonised data on worker gross earnings (annual, monthly and
hourly), characteristics of workers (age, gender, the highest level of education, tenure, oc-
cupation), characteristics of jobs (permanent vs temporary contract, part time vs full time)
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and characteristics of the firms (e.g. size of the firm). Descriptions of all the variables that
I use in my estimations are in Table 1.1.
In each country a sample of plants is selected by stratified random sampling (stratifi-
cation is done by economic activity, size and region) and within plants a random sample
of employees is chosen. The data is representative of all establishments with at least 10
employees operating in all areas of the economy except public administration.
The first advantage of the SES is that it is standardised across countries, so that it
contains the same variables that are defined in the same way. Secondly, it is a survey of
establishments and thus should have a smaller measurement error than household studies.
Thirdly, the sample sizes are very large, ranging from 100 000 to over a million.
The SES collects information about sector affiliation of the plants at two-digit level of the
NACE classification (The Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Community). However, during the anonymisation process the data on sector is aggregated
so that no individual employee or firm could be identified from the data. Therefore the
sector categories that I have access to are in between 1- and 2-digit in terms of aggregation.
Overall there are 30 industry categories. I remove three of them for the reasons explained
below and thus I am left with 27 sector categories. An advantage of these more aggregated
categories is that they are consistent across time. The underlying data on industry affiliation
follows NACE Rev 1.1 specification in 2006 and Nace Rev.2 in 2010 and 2014. However, the
2-digit categories are grouped into the more aggregated categories in the same way in all
three years. The sector categories that I employ in my estimations are listed in Table 1.2.
The focus of this chapter is on the relationship between the type of wage bargaining in the
private sector and the dispersion of wages across sectors. It is quite common that the public
sector pays lower wages than the private sector for workers with the same characteristics
performing similar jobs in exchange for better job security and more generous pensions. I do
not want this to affect my comparison of the importance of sector for wage dispersion across
countries. Therefore I remove all observations relating to Public Administration, Education,
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Health and Social Care sectors from my analysis. I am still left with some establishments with
public sector ownership in my sample, e.g. in the manufacturing industry or in electricity
and water supply. I control for the possible effects of the difference in ownership of the
establishment on wages by including a dummy variable for public sector ownership.
1.5 Methodology
1.5.1 Estimating Conditional Industry Wage Differentials
In estimating conditional industry wage differentials I follow the standard methodology first
proposed by Krueger and Summers (1988). First, I estimate the following Mincer-type wage
equation (Mincer (1974)) for each country-year pair.






λmIm,i + εi (1.1)
where wi is the hourly wage of worker i, X contains worker and job characteristics:
education (6 categories in 2006 and 4 categories in 2010 and 2014), age (6 categories),
gender, tenure (continuous variable), occupation (approx 23 categories in 2006 and approx
50 categories in 2010 and 2014), full time vs part-time employment, permanent vs temporary
contract. Additionally, I also control for whether the establishment is privately owned or it is
owned by the state. This is to control for differences in wage policies in the public vs private
sector. I comprises dummy variables relating to the sector affiliation of the establishments.
More detail on all of the variables above is in Table 1.1. α is intercept, βj and λm are
parameters to be estimated and εi is an error term.
The parameters of interest are the λm where m=1 ... M denotes the industry category.
There are 27 sector categories, one omitted, so I obtain 26 OLS coefficients. Following
Krueger and Summers (1988) the estimated industry dummy coefficients λm are normalized
as deviations from the employment-weighted mean industry coefficient. The advantages of
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this approach are twofold: Wage differentials become independent of the arbitrarily chosen
omitted industry category and therefore can be directly compared across studies using dif-
ferent base industries. Second, the normalized industry differentials express wage differences
with respect to the average employee in the whole economy, rather than relative to some
arbitrary group of employees and thus are easier to interpret.
dm = λm − π for m = 1 ... M
dM+1 = λM+1 − π = −π
(1.2)
In (1.2) dm is the normalized wage differential for industry m, λm is the estimated coefficient
for dummy variable of industry m, M=26 is the number of included industry dummy variables




smλm for m = 1 ... M (1.3)
where sm is the employment share of sector m in the observed sample.
dm tells us the wage premium for a worker employed in sector m compared to the economy-
wide average for a worker with the same characteristics employed in a job with the same
characteristics.
I follow the standard practise in the literature and for each country-year pair I calculate
the Employment-Weighted Adjusted Standard Deviation (WASD) of inter-industry wage
differentials given in (1.4).
WASD(dm) =
√

















where var(dm) is the square of the standard error of industry wage differential for industry
m.
The reason why I do not use a simple standard deviation, but instead each deviation from
the mean is weighted by the employment share of that sector, is to take into account the fact
that some sectors are much larger than others. We want to have a measure that is a good
summary of the extent to which wages vary across sectors in the economy after controlling
for worker and job characteristics. If a certain sector pays very large wage premium, but
is extremely small in terms of employment, we do not want that to excessively inflate the
measure of dispersion.
WASD also contains a correction term for sampling error. The need for this was first
suggested by Krueger and Summers (1988). Although for each industry m = (1,..., M) the
estimated wage differential (β̂m) is an unbiased estimate of the true wage differential βm, the
standard deviation of β̂ is an upwardly biased estimate of the standard deviation of β. This
bias occurs because β̂m = βm + ε̂m where ε̂m is a least squares sampling error. However,
in my regressions the sample sizes are very large, so the sampling error is insignificant.
Still, I calculate the measure of dispersion of sector wage premiums in the usual way to be
maximally comparable with the previous literature.
1.5.2 Regression-based Variance Decomposition
I follow a regression-based variance decomposition approach proposed by Fields (2003). We
start with the income-generating function in which the log of income is function of a number
of explanatory factors.
ln y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + ...+ βJxK + ε (1.5)
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This can be rewritten as:
ln y = β0 + z1 + z2 + ...+ zJ + ε (1.6)
where each zj is a ”composite variable”, equal to the product of a regression coefficient and
its variable. We can estimate the model using OLS and decompose the inequality in log
wages into the contribution of each composite variable and the residual term.








Sj gives the fraction of the log-variance of wages that is attributable to the j’th explana-
tory factor. By definition the relative shares must sum to 1.
J+2∑
j=1
Sj(ln y) = 1 (1.8)
When excluding the last composite variable, which is the residual, the sum of the relative
shares is equal to R2:
J+1∑
j=1
Sj(ln y) = R
2(ln y) (1.9)
We can also decompose the predicted values (variance of the log wages explained by
the regression model) into the contribution of each explanatory factor. The share of the






In my estimations the income generating function is given by (1.1) where the explanatory
variables are worker and job characteristics and sector categories. I apply the methodology




1.6.1 Dispersion of conditional industry wage differentials
I estimate Mincer wage regression given by (1.1) for each country-year pair and obtain OLS
coefficients on the industry dummy variables. Because my sample sizes are very large these
coefficients are estimated very precisely, overwhelming majority of them are statistically
significant at 5% level. Next I normalise them, as shown in (1.2), to obtain inter-industry
wage differentials. These tell us the wage premium for a worker employed in the given sector
compared to the economy-wide average for a worker with the same characteristics employed
in a job with the same characteristics. These conditional industry wage differentials can be
positive or negative. Some sectors pay higher and some sectors pay lower wages than the
economy-wide average conditional on worker and job characteristics.
For each country-year pair I calculate a measure of the conditional dispersion of wages
across different industries within the country. I follow the usual practise in the literature and
obtain the Employment-Weighted Adjusted Standard Deviation (WASD) of inter-industry
wage differentials given by (1.4). The number of included countries is 16 in 2006, 13 in 2010
and 15 in 2014. Unfortunately the variables I use are not available for all countries in all the
years and hence the sample of countries varies slightly from year to year.
The weighted adjusted standard deviation of inter-industry wage differentials, the degree
of centralisation and of coordination of wage bargaining and collective bargaining coverage
for each country for the years 2014, 2010 and 2006 are displayed in Table 1.3, Table 1.4 and
Table 1.5 respectively. Countries are ranked in terms of the size of the dispersion. We can
see that at the top of the rankings with the greatest dispersion of sector wage premiums
are the Central and Eastern European (CCE) countries, i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia,
Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, but also the United Kingdom. At the bottom of the
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rankings are countries in Western Europe, such as Belgium, France, Sweden and Finland.
This East-West contrast in Europe is also found by Magda et al. (2011). The ranking of
countries seems to be very persistent across time. The differences between countries in terms
of the importance of industry for wages are substantial. For example in 2014 the dispersion
of industry wage differentials was almost 3 times larger in Bulgaria than in Belgium and it
was twice as large in Romania than in Finland.
This sharp geographical divide in terms of the dispersion of wages across sectors can be
explained by differences in wage setting institutions. We can see from Tables 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5
that the countries with the smallest dispersion tend to have wage bargaining that is highly
centralised and also highly coordinated across the economy6. They also tend to have high
levels of collective bargaining coverage.
In the Western European countries the main level at which wage bargaining takes place
is the sector and there is typically also informal coordination of wages across sectors. In
contrast, the CCE countries and the UK have wage setting mostly at the firm-level and there
is very little coordination of wages across sectors. While over 90% of workers in Belgium,
Finland or France are covered by some type of collective wage agreement, in the CCE
countries and the UK only a minority of workers have their wages collectively negotiated.
From Table 1.6 we can see that the dispersion of industry wage differentials is strongly
negatively correlated with indexes of centralisation and coordination of wage bargaining and
with collective bargaining coverage (all three measures come from Visser (2016)). Depending
on the year the correlation coefficient between WASD and the degree of centralisation varies
between -0.64 and -0.76. For the degree of coordination the correlation coefficient varies
between -0.64 and -0.71. Finally, for collective bargaining coverage it varies between -0.82
and -0.90.
This inverse relationship between the degree of centralisation and coordination of wage
bargaining and collective bargaining coverage on one hand, and the dispersion of industry
6The rankings come from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting,
State Intervention and Social Pacts by J. Visser.
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wage premiums on the other, can also be seen in the scatter plots shown in Figures 1.1(a)-
1.3(c).
1.6.2 Regression-based Variance Decomposition
In addition to evaluating the dispersion of sector wage premiums I employ regression-based
variance decomposition proposed by Fields (2003) in order to understand the relative im-
portance of sector for wage dispersion7. This chapter is the first in the literature on industry
wage premiums to use this method. The full results for the years 2014, 2010 and 2006 are
displayed in Table 1.15, Table 1.16 and Table 1.17 respectively.
Following Fields (2003) I decompose the variance of the dependent variable, the log of
hourly wages, into the share accounted for by each explanatory variable and by the residual.
My first new measure of the importance of sector in a given country is the percentage share
of the inequality of log hourly wages that can be accounted for by the sector categories given
by (1.7). I calculate this relative share for each country-year pair.
I find that this measure, while moderately correlated with the dispersion of industry wage
differentials (WASD), is no longer clearly inversely related to the degree of centralisation and
coordination of wage setting and with the collective bargaining coverage (see Table 1.7). The
correlation between this relative share and WASD ranges between 0.5 and 0.74 depending
on the year. Correlation coefficient for centralisation ranges between -0.21 and -0.35. For
coordination it is between -0.03 and -0.27. Finally, for bargaining coverage it varies from
-0.26 to -0.54.
Hence I find that while the absolute dispersion of wages across different sectors of the
economy is much smaller in the countries with more centralised and coordinated wage setting,
the share of the overall inequality of wages that can be attributed to sector is not necessarily
smaller. The two measures are conceptually different and therefore it is not completely
surprising that they give a different picture.
7I use Stata module INEQRBD developed by Fiorio and Jenkins (2010) that applies Fields’s regression-
based inequality decomposition.
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I find that the countries with less centralisation and coordination of wage setting generally
have much larger total dispersion of wages (see Table 1.10). Therefore these countries have
larger sector wage premiums, but they also have more inequality coming from other sources.
Additionally, the countries with decentralised wage setting tend to have very large residual
wage dispersion, wage variance that is not explained by worker and job characteristics or by
industry categories (see Table 1.11(a)).
In response to the findings above I also consider an alternative measure of the relative
importance of sector for wage dispersion which is the percentage share of the explained
variance (variance explained by the regression model) that can be attributed to industry
categories. This measure is equal to the relative inequality share from above divided by the
R2 of the regression (see 1.10). It captures the importance of industry relative to the other
explanatory factors, i.e. worker and job characteristics.
Table 1.8 shows that the share of the explained variance attributable to sector and the
dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials are very strongly correlated. The correlation
coefficient ranges between 0.71 and 0.96 depending on the year. Furthermore, this measure
of the relative importance of sector is also moderately negatively correlated with the degree
of centralisation and coordination of wage setting and with collective bargaining coverage.
The correlation coefficients are typically twice as large as for the previous measure of the
relative role of sector for wage dispersion.
Next, I use the estimates from the regression-based variance decomposition of log hourly
wages to derive a measure of the absolute variance of wages that is accounted for by sector.
I use this measure as an alternative to the standard deviation of industry wage differentials,
to check my findings. I calculate it as the product of the share of the variance of log hourly
wages accounted by sector and of the standard deviation of log hourly wages. We can see
from Table 1.9 that this measure is very closely associated with the dispersion of industry
wage differentials, the correlation coefficient ranges between 0.76 and 0.92. This measure of
the absolute importance of sector for wage dispersion is also strongly inversely related to the
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degree of centralisation and coordination of wage setting and collective bargaining coverage.
Thus I confirm my result from Section 1.6.1.
Finally, I find that in countries with more centralised and coordinated wage setting where
greater share of workers are covered by collective bargaining, worker characteristics explain
a greater share of the wage dispersion. I run regression for the same countries as before
where the dependent variable is log hourly wages and explanatory variables are only those
worker characteristics that are likely to be part of collective wage agreements: education, age
(proxy for years of work experience), tenure and occupation. Correlations between R2 from
this regression and wage setting institutions are displayed in Table 1.11(b). Depending on
the year the correlation coefficient between R2 and the degree of centralisation varies between
0.6 and 0.66. For the degree of coordination the correlation coefficient varies between 0.6 and
0.76. Finally, for collective bargaining coverage it varies between 0.59 and 0.7. R2 of both
the baseline and the worker-characteristics-only regressions for all the countries are shown
in Table 1.12-1.14.
1.6.3 Discussion of the results
My first result is that the degree of centralisation of wage setting and the dispersion of
industry wage premiums are negatively correlated across the European countries. This is in
line with the previous studies that used data for 1980s (Zweimuller and Barth (1994),Teulings
and Hartog (1998)). However, there has been a substantial move towards decentralisation of
wage bargaining in almost all European countries since 1980s (Ortigueira (2013)). Whereas
between 1950s and 1980s, in a number of countries, most notably in Sweden, Norway and
Austria, trade union and employer confederations representing all the workers and firms
in the private sector were setting standardised wages for each occupation across all the
industries, these days the main level at which wages are set is either a particular industry
or a particular firm (Calmfors (2001), Ortigueira (2013)). Countries in my sample that
came closest to having national-level wage setting between 2006 and 2014 were Belgium,
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Finland and Greece (Visser (2016)). However, in these countries only a certain average level
of wage growth is determined at national-level whereas actual wages for each occupation
are set predominantly at sector-level. Thus the inverse relationship between the degree of
centralisation and the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials seems to hold even when
comparing medium and low levels of centralisation.
In other words I find that in countries where the main level for wage bargaining is
the sector the dispersion of wages across sectors after controlling for detailed worker and
job characteristics is substantially smaller than in countries where wage bargaining occurs
predominantly at the firm level. This is a priori not obvious given that sector-level wage
setting implies only equalising wages for each worker type across heterogeneous firms within
the same sector.
However, I find that the size of sector wage premiums in a given country is also negatively
correlated with an index that captures the degree of coordination of wage bargaining in that
country. In my sample the countries that have the lowest dispersion of inter-industry wage
differentials across all the years are Belgium, France, Sweden, Finland and Netherlands.
All of these except for France have very high degree of coordination of wage setting across
industries. In the case of Belgium this is achieved via state intervention where wages are
indexed to increases in living costs, but at the same time wage increases are not allowed
to exceed a weighted-average of the wage growth in the country’s main trading partners
(OECD (2019)). In the case of Sweden, Finland and Netherlands, high degree of coordination
of wage setting across industries is the result of more informal, almost voluntary system called
pattern bargaining.
Under pattern bargaining one sector, typically export-oriented manufacturing, under-
takes wage bargaining first and the resulting wage increase acts as an upper bound for wage
increases in other sectors (Traxler, Brandl, and Glassner (2008)). There is no legislation
or government regulation enforcing pattern bargaining. Instead it is supported by a shared
understanding of the need to maintain international competitiveness, the existence of tra-
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dition and of public mediation institutions (Ibsen (2016))8. This suggests that sector-level
wage bargaining in combination with informal coordination of wages across sectors is of-
ten sufficient to maintain a relatively compressed distribution of (conditional) inter-industry
wage differentials. This is a novel result, the previous studies only found small industry
wage premiums for countries that had wage setting at the level of the entire private sec-
tor and thus had formal, enforced coordination of wages across industries (Zweimuller and
Barth (1994), Kahn (1998)). However, a certain degree of centralisation of wage setting
(sector-level bargaining) seems to be necessary, as there are no examples of countries with
firm-level bargaining that would be ranked as having a high degree of coordination of wage
setting across different parts of the economy. It seems that coordination only works once the
number of bargaining units has been reduced via centralisation9.
My second result is that the relative share of the overall wage inequality that can be
attributed to the sector that a worker is employed in is not generally larger in the countries
with firm-level wage setting. This is because the overall wage dispersion is larger in the
countries with firm-level wage setting. While countries with decentralised and uncoordinated
wage bargaining tend to have larger industry wage differentials, they also have more wage
inequality coming from other sources. For this reason I introduce a new measure of the
relative importance of sector for wage dispersion which is the share of the explained variance
accounted for by sector categories. With this measure I do find that sector is a relatively
more important explanatory factor in countries with firm-level bargaining.
Thirdly, I find that worker observable characteristics, specifically education, age, tenure
and occupation, explain a greater fraction of the overall wage dispersion in countries with
more centralised (sector-level) wage setting. This is because these countries also tend to have
a larger share of the workers covered by collective bargaining. On the contrary, in countries
with predominantly firm-level wage setting individual bargaining tends to dominate and
8More detailed discussion is in Section 1.3.
9The bargaining unit under individual wage bargaining is the match between the worker and the firm.
With collective bargaining at firm-level the bargaining unit is the firm. Under sector-level wage setting the
bargaining unit is the sector.
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collective bargaining plays only a very small role. Wages under collective bargaining are
typically calculated using a formula that takes into account various observable characteristics
of the worker i.e. occupation, tenure, years of experience and education, whereas under
individual wage bargaining other factors (e.g. worker ability observed by the employer, but
not by the econometrician, productivity of the firm, idiosyncratic productivity of the match)
can also affect wages.
1.7 Conclusion
I find that in countries where wage setting is more centralised (the main level for wage
bargaining is the sector) the dispersion of wages across sectors after controlling for worker and
job characteristics is substantially smaller than in countries where wage bargaining occurs
predominantly at the firm or plant level. This is surprising given that sector-level bargaining
implies only equalising wages for each worker type within industries. I find that countries
with smaller dispersion of (conditional) inter-industry wage differentials also tend to have
higher degree of coordination of wage setting across different parts of the economy. Thus
it seems that sector-level wage bargaining combined with coordination of wage bargaining
across sectors is sufficient to maintain a compressed distribution of sector wage premiums.
This is a novel result given that the previous studies only found small dispersion of inter-
industry wage differentials in countries that had the most centralised (national-level) wage
setting (Zweimuller and Barth (1994), Kahn (1998)).
Some countries (e.g. Belgium) achieve high degree of coordination via state intervention,
but others (Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Norway) do so via more informal setup of pattern
bargaining. Under pattern bargaining one sector negotiates the rate of wage increases first
and this becomes a benchmark for negotiators in the other sectors. However, having sector
as the main level at which wage bargaining takes place seems to be a necessary precondition
for effective coordination of wage setting and for limiting the size of sector wage premiums.
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There are no countries with firm-level wage bargaining that would be ranked as having a
high degree of coordination of wage setting across industries. Coordination only works once
the number of bargaining units has been reduced via centralisation.
While countries with sector-level wage setting tend to have smaller sector wage premiums,
the share of the overall wage inequality that can be attributed to the sector that a worker is
employed in is not generally smaller in the countries with more centralised wage setting. This
is because countries with decentralised and uncoordinated wage setting have larger overall
earnings inequality. Thus they also have greater wage inequality coming from other sources.
Finally, I find that worker characteristics explain a greater share of wage variance in countries
with sector-level wage setting. This is intuitive as these countries also have greater share of
the employees covered by collective wage agreements where wages are usually a function of
characteristics such as occupation, tenure, education and years of work experience.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Description of the variables
Variable Description
Gross hourly wage Gross earnings for the reference month
(before taxes and social security contributions) are divided
by the number of paid hours during the month
Industry categories NACE Rev.2, 27 categories
Education the highest completed level of education,
following International Standard Classification of Education,
6 categories in 2006 and 4 categories in 2010 and 2014
Age 6 categories
Gender dummy variable
Tenure the number of years in the same firm, continuous variable
Occupation following International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO-08), approx 23 categories in 2006,
approx 50 categories in 2010 and 2014
Working full-time dummy variable
Type of employment contract 3 categories: permanent, temporary, apprentice
Ownership of the establishment public or private, dummy variable
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Table 1.2: Sector Categories
1 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products
2 Manufacture of textiles
3 Manufacture of wearing apparel, leather and related products
4 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork
5 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
6 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products, chemicals, rubber and plastic products
7 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
8 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
9 Manufacture of basic and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
10 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
11 Manufacture of machinery and equipment
12 Manufacture of motor vehicles and other transport equipment
13 Other manufacturing




18 Transport and warehousing
19 Postal and courier activities, telecommunications, computer programming, travel agencies
20 Financial services
21 Real estate, leasing, research and development, advertising
22 Business support activities
23 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
24 Activities of membership organisations e.g. Church
25 Mining
26 Construction
27 Hotels and Restaurants
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Table 1.3: The dispersion of industry wage differentials (2014)
Country WASD Centralisation Coordination Bargaining
Coverage
Bulgaria 0.133 2 2 29
Romania 0.119 1.8 2.4 35
United Kingdom 0.106 1 1 30
Slovakia 0.106 2 2.4 25
Czech Republic 0.103 1 2 47
Poland 0.103 1 1 15
Norway 0.101 3 4 67
Latvia 0.092 1 1 15
Italy 0.08 3 3 80
Spain 0.076 3 3 78
Netherlands 0.074 3 4 85
Sweden 0.063 3 4 89
France 0.063 3 2 98
Finland 0.062 4.2 4.6 93
Belgium 0.046 4.8 5 96
WASD is the employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of inter-industry wage dif-
ferentials. All three measures of wage setting institutions come from Visser (2016). The
centralisation and coordination indexes both take values from 1 to 5, 5 being the most cen-
tralised (the most coordinated). The bargaining coverage gives the share of all workers in
the country that are covered by some type of collective agreement.
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Table 1.4: The dispersion of industry wage differentials (2010)
Country WASD Centralisation Coordination Bargaining
Coverage
Bulgaria 0.138 2 2 33
United Kingdom 0.121 1 1 31
Slovakia 0.119 2 2.2 38
Latvia 0.105 1 1 18
Czech Republic 0.101 1 2 51
Norway 0.091 3 4 68
Spain 0.079 3 3.4 77
Greece 0.078 4.8 4.2 64
Netherlands 0.076 3 4 90
Finland 0.069 3.3 3.4 78
Sweden 0.057 3 4 88
France 0.057 3 2 98
Belgium 0.045 4.6 5 96
WASD is the employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of inter-industry wage dif-
ferentials. All three measures of wage setting institutions come from Visser (2016). The
centralisation and coordination indexes both take values from 1 to 5, 5 being the most cen-
tralised (the most coordinated). The bargaining coverage gives the share of all workers in
the country that are covered by some type of collective agreement.
51
Table 1.5: The dispersion of industry wage differentials (2006)
Country WASD Centralisation Coordination Bargaining
Coverage
Bulgaria 0.17 2.6 2.4 35
Slovakia 0.163 2 1.4 40
Latvia 0.149 1 1 18
Lithuania 0.143 1 1 12
Poland 0.13 1 1 16
Czech Republic 0.119 1 2 50
United Kingdom 0.114 1 1 33
Estonia 0.093 1 2 25
Greece 0.089 4.6 4 82
Norway 0.088 3 4 70
Sweden 0.076 3 4 93
Netherlands 0.075 3.6 4 67
Spain 0.071 3 4 76
Finland 0.067 4.4 5 88
Belgium 0.06 4.6 5 96
France 0.053 3 2 98
WASD is the employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of inter-industry wage dif-
ferentials. All three measures of wage setting institutions come from Visser (2016). The
centralisation and coordination indexes both take values from 1 to 5, 5 being the most cen-
tralised (the most coordinated). The bargaining coverage gives the share of all workers in
the country that are covered by some type of collective agreement.
Table 1.6: The link between the dispersion of industry wage differentials and wage setting
institutions
Correlation of WASD with:
2006 2010 2014
The degree of centralisation -0.64 -0.72 -0.76
The degree of coordination -0.71 -0.70 -0.64
Collective bargaining coverage -0.82 -0.90 -0.84
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Table 1.7: The relative importance of sector for wage dispersion and wage setting institutions
DEPSHARE (% share of the variance of the log of hourly
wages that is explained by industry categories) correlated
with:
2006 2010 2014
The dispersion of industry wage differentials (WASD) 0.74 0.71 0.50
The degree of centralisation -0.23 -0.35 -0.21
The degree of coordination -0.27 -0.22 -0.03
Collective Bargaining Coverage -0.39 -0.54 -0.26
Table 1.8: The relative importance of sector for wage dispersion and wage setting institutions
EXPSHARE(% share of the variance explained by the re-
gression model that is due to industry categories) correlated
with:
2006 2010 2014
The dispersion of industry wage differentials (WASD) 0.96 0.87 0.71
The degree of centralisation -0.47 -0.53 -0.45
The degree of coordination -0.53 -0.47 -0.31
Collective Bargaining Coverage -0.68 -0.79 -0.53
Table 1.9: The absolute importance of sector for wage dispersion and wage setting institu-
tions
SD(ln hourly wage) * DEPSHARE (The absolute value of
the dispersion of the log of hourly wages that is explained by
industry categories) correlated with:
2006 2010 2014
The dispersion of industry wage differentials (WASD) 0.92 0.89 0.76
The degree of centralisation -0.45 -0.54 -0.48
The degree of coordination -0.55 -0.48 -0.36
Collective Bargaining Coverage -0.67 -0.73 -0.54
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Table 1.10: Earnings inequality and wage setting institutions
STDEV of log hourly wages correlated with:
2006 2010 2014
The degree of centralisation -0.66 -0.63 -0.67
The degree of coordination -0.76 -0.73 -0.77
Collective Bargaining Coverage -0.82 -0.68 -0.66
Table 1.11: Fit of regression model and wage setting institutions
(a) Baseline regression
R2 of the regression correlated with:
2006 2010 2014
The degree of centralisation 0.53 0.56 0.62
The degree of coordination 0.55 0.73 0.69
Collective Bargaining Coverage 0.64 0.65 0.55
(b) Worker characteristics only
R2 of the regression correlated with:
2006 2010 2014
The degree of centralisation 0.60 0.62 0.66
The degree of coordination 0.60 0.76 0.72
Collective Bargaining Coverage 0.69 0.70 0.59
The dependent variable is log of hourly wage. Baseline regression includes education, age,
gender, tenure, occupation, full-time status, type of contract, type of ownership of the plant
and industry categories as explanatory variables. Worker characteristics only regression
includes education, age, tenure and occupation.
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Table 1.12: Fit of regression models (2014)
Country R2 baseline model R2 worker characteristics only
Belgium 0.81 0.79
Bulgaria 0.49 0.44












United Kingdom 0.59 0.54
The dependent variable is log of hourly wage. Baseline regression is given by (1.1) and in-
cludes education, age, gender, tenure, occupation, full-time status, type of contract, type of
ownership of the plant and industry categories as explanatory variables. Worker character-
istics only regression includes education, age, tenure and occupation.
55
Table 1.13: Fit of regression models (2010)
Country R2 baseline model R2 worker characteristics only
Belgium 0.71 0.6747
Bulgaria 0.47 0.4198










United Kingdom 0.55 0.4938
The dependent variable is log of hourly wage.Baseline regression is given by (1.1) and includes
education, age, gender, tenure, occupation, full-time status, type of contract, type of own-
ership of the plant and industry categories as explanatory variables. Worker characteristics
only regression includes education, age, tenure and occupation.
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Table 1.14: Fit of regression models (2006)
Country R2 baseline model R2 worker characteristics only
Belgium 0.56 0.5089
Bulgaria 0.47 0.4023













United Kingdom 0.57 0.5225
The dependent variable is log of hourly wage. Baseline regression is given by (1.1) and in-
cludes education, age, gender, tenure, occupation, full-time status, type of contract, type of
ownership of the plant and industry categories as explanatory variables. Worker character-
istics only regression includes education, age, tenure and occupation.
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Table 1.15: Regression-based Variance Decomposition (2014)
Country DEPSHARE σ σindustry EXPSHARE
Belgium 2.87 0.368 0.011 3.54
Bulgaria 7.21 0.587 0.042 14.71
Czech Republic 5.01 0.473 0.024 8.55
Spain 4.07 0.489 0.020 8.10
Finland 5.16 0.357 0.018 8.09
France 2.81 0.516 0.015 5.67
Italy 4.03 0.542 0.022 8.20
Latvia 3.50 0.559 0.020 9.79
Netherlands 5.48 0.507 0.028 7.87
Norway 10.84 0.401 0.043 17.80
Poland 5.59 0.560 0.031 10.88
Romania 3.81 0.622 0.024 8.60
Sweden 4.70 0.335 0.016 8.85
Slovakia 5.39 0.499 0.027 10.74
United Kingdom 8.25 0.531 0.044 14.02
DEPSHARE is the % share of the variance of the log hourly wages that can be ex-
plained by industry categories. σ is standard deviation of log hourly wages. σindustry =
(DEPSHARE/100) ∗ σ, it is the absolute value of the dispersion of the log hourly wages
that is explained by industry categories. EXPSHARE is the % share of the variance explained
by the regression model that is due to industry categories.
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Table 1.16: Regression-based Variance Decomposition (2010)
Country DEPSHARE σ σindustry EXPSHARE
Belgium 2.84 0.365 0.010 4.01
Bulgaria 7.51 0.594 0.045 15.83
Czech Republic 5.47 0.493 0.027 9.53
Greece 5.69 0.456 0.026 10.41
Spain 4.55 0.490 0.022 8.63
Finland 4.83 0.382 0.018 8.13
France 2.44 0.476 0.012 4.86
Latvia 4.14 0.610 0.025 11.95
Netherlands 5.08 0.550 0.028 7.72
Norway 9.89 0.386 0.038 16.38
Sweden 4.01 0.331 0.013 7.54
Slovakia 7.13 0.489 0.035 13.76
United Kingdom 8.92 0.555 0.049 16.20
DEPSHARE is the % share of the variance of the log hourly wages that can be ex-
plained by industry categories. σ is standard deviation of log hourly wages. σindustry =
(DEPSHARE/100) ∗ σ, it is the absolute value of the dispersion of the log hourly wages
that is explained by industry categories. EXPSHARE is the % share of the variance explained
by the regression model that is due to industry categories.
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Table 1.17: Regression-based Variance Decomposition (2006)
Country DEPSHARE σ σindustry EXPSHARE
Belgium 5.10 0.356 0.018 9.16
Bulgaria 12.86 0.588 0.076 27.11
Czech Republic 9.38 0.472 0.044 17.05
Estonia 4.26 0.615 0.026 9.66
Greece 7.69 0.474 0.036 14.01
Spain 4.54 0.462 0.021 9.41
Finland 5.80 0.350 0.020 9.72
France 2.19 0.492 0.011 4.24
Latvia 7.12 0.621 0.044 23.17
Lithuania 5.31 0.700 0.037 20.49
Netherlands 4.68 0.589 0.028 9.15
Norway 9.72 0.343 0.033 16.43
Poland 8.60 0.580 0.050 17.02
Sweden 6.12 0.330 0.020 11.54
Slovakia 12.73 0.513 0.065 24.31
United Kingdom 8.68 0.553 0.048 15.18
DEPSHARE is the % share of the variance of the log hourly wages that can be ex-
plained by industry categories. σ is standard deviation of log hourly wages. σindustry =
(DEPSHARE/100) ∗ σ, it is the absolute value of the dispersion of the log hourly wages
that is explained by industry categories. EXPSHARE is the % share of the variance explained
by the regression model that is due to industry categories.
60
Figures
(a) WASD and Centralisation (b) WASD and Coordination
(c) WASD and Collective Bargaining Coverage
Figure 1.1: WASD and Wage Setting Institutions (2014)
61
(a) WASD and Centralisation (b) WASD and Coordination
(c) WASD and Collective Bargaining Coverage
Figure 1.2: WASD and Wage Setting Institutions (2010)
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(a) WASD and Centralisation (b) WASD and Coordination
(c) WASD and Collective Bargaining Coverage




It’s the Sectors, not the Firms:
Accounting for Earnings and Wage
Inequality Trends in Italy 1985-2018
Note: This chapter is based on my work with my supervisors, Cristina Tealdi and José V.
Rodŕıguez Mora who agreed that the essay can appear within this thesis, and that it represents
a substantial contribution on my part. In particular, I carried out all of the empirical work,
coding, analysis of the results and writing of the paper. Prof Tealdi and Prof Mora provided
guidance and direction for the project and were instrumental in securing access to the data.
2.1 Introduction and Related Literature
There has been a substantial increase in pay inequality in many industrialized economies
since 1980s (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011)). The majority of explanations have tended
to focus on market-level changes in returns to different skills and on the role that technology
has played in shaping these trends (Katz and Autor (1999), Acemoglu and Autor (2011)).
This has been influenced by the assumption of competitive labour markets where the rule
of one price applies and thus a worker of a certain type is paid the same wage irrespective
of her employer. However, there is a long literature in labour economics showing that some
employers pay substantially higher wages than others for workers with the same observable
skills performing similar jobs (Dickens (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988)). Furthermore,
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it has been established that firm productivity varies massively within very narrowly-defined
industries (Syverson (2011). It is therefore natural to ask whether some of these productivity
differences spill over to wages. A number of studies have found that trends in aggregate wage
dispersion closely follow trends in the dispersion of productivity across employers (Barth,
Bryson, et al. (2016)).
The availability of matched employee-employer longitudinal data, typically coming from
social-security or tax records, combined with the reasons above, has led to an explosion of
interest in the role that firms play in shaping cross-sectional distribution of earnings as well as
its changes over time. One strand of literature focuses on estimating rent-sharing elasticity,
that is elasticity of earnings of incumbent workers with respect to changes in the firm’s value
added (Card, Cardoso, et al. (2018), Lamadon, Mogstad, and Setzler (2019)). Another set
of studies use information on earnings of workers switching between firms to decompose
the cross-sectional variance of earnings into the contribution of worker heterogeneity, firm
heterogeneity and sorting of workers into firms (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999),
Card, Heining, and Kline (2013)).
Another approach is to decompose the log variance of earnings into the between-firm and
the within-firm variance and to track these components over time. Song et al. (2019) use a
longitudinal data set covering workers and firms for the entire U.S. labor market from 1981
to 2013. They find that the between-firm variance of earnings accounts for two thirds of
the rise in total variance of earnings, with the within-firm variance accounting for one third.
The result that the majority of the increase in pay inequality is accounted for by increasing
variance of average pay across firms is also found by Faggio, Salvanes, and Reenen (2010)
for the UK and Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) for West Germany. Alvarez et al. (2018)
document a decline in earnings inequality in Brazil and find that a decrease in between-firm
variance of earnings accounts for the majority of the fall in overall inequality. Hence there
seems to be a general trend where either a rise or a fall in overall pay inequality is driven by
the between-firm component.
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We contribute to this literature by using a social-security administrative data set covering
the universe of private-sector employment in Italy to decompose the total variance of log
annual earnings into the between-firm and the within-firm component for every year from
1985 to 2018. This is the first study to do such variance decomposition for Italy. The total
variance of log annual earnings rose from 0.486 in 1984 to 0.723 in 2018. We find that 61.77%
of the rise in earnings inequality occurred between firms, with the remaining 38.23% taking
place within firms. This is very similar to the findings of Song et al. (2019) for the USA.
Furthermore, just as in the US, the result that the majority of the earnings dispersion increase
occurred between firms holds for all firm size categories. We also find that the dispersion
of average earnings across firms increased as a share of total variance from 44.98% in 1985
to 50.49% in 2018. Additionally, we investigate the association of the between-firm variance
share and total variance of earnings across Italian provinces and within provinces over time.
Firstly, we find that the provinces where the between-firm variance represents a greater share
of the total variance tend to have a larger total variance of earnings. Secondly, we find that
provinces where the total earnings dispersion became larger generally experienced an increase
in the share of the earnings variance accounted for by the between-firm component. On the
other hand, provinces where earnings inequality declined generally had a falling between-firm
share.
In contrast to other studies in the literature, the data set that we use includes not
only information on earnings, but also on the quantity of labour supplied by workers. For
each employment relationship in each year we have information on the number of weeks
worked and on whether the employment was full-time or not. Therefore we can study the
contribution of firms to wage inequality in Italy. We perform the between vs within-firm
variance decomposition using the weekly wages of full-time workers for every year from 1985
to 2018. We find that total variance of log weekly wages rose from 0.240 in 1985 to 0.447
in 2018 and that the rise in the between-firm variance represented 83.84% of the overall
increase in wage inequality. Thus the between-firm variance is an even more important
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component of the rise in wage inequality than the rise in earnings inequality in Italy. The
dispersion of average wages across firms represented 48.85% of the total wage dispersion
in 1985, but that rose to 65.03% by 2018. The between-firm component accounts for the
majority of the growth in wage inequality for all firm size categories and there is again a
positive association of the between-firm share and total variance across provinces in Italy as
well as within provinces over time.
Next we show that the between-firm variance is actually composed of two parts: the
dispersion of average earnings (or wages) across sectors (between-sector variance) and the
dispersion of average earnings (or wages) across firms within the same sector (between-
firm-within-sector variance). Thus total variance is composed of between-sector variance,
between-firm-within-sector variance and within-firm variance. We calculate the separate
contribution of each factor to the overall growth of earnings and wage inequality in Italy.
First, we do between vs within sector variance decomposition of both earnings and wage
variance in Italy for every year from 1985 until 2018. We find that 41.59% of the rise in
earnings inequality in Italy occurred between (4-digit) sectors while 58.41% took place within
sectors. We find very similar numbers for wage inequality. However, a careful inspection of
the results in Song et al. (2019) reveals that only 3.09% of the increase in total variance of
earnings in the USA between 1981 and 2013 took place between (4 digit) sectors. Therefore
rising dispersion of average earnings across sectors is a much more important component of
the total earnings inequality increase in Italy than in the USA. The between-sector variance
as a share of total variance declined in the USA from 20.71% in 1981 to 16.67% in 2013.
Thus the importance of sector in accounting for earnings dispersion actually fell in the USA.
This is in contrast to Italy where the share increased significantly, from 22.94% in 1985 to
29.06% in 2018.
Second, we identify the separate contribution of the between-firm-within-sector variance
to total variance by controlling for the sector of the firm (either by sector fixed effects or by
demeaning) and then performing the between vs within firm variance decomposition. We
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find that the rise of the between-firm-within-sector variance accounts for 20.17% of the total
increase in earnings dispersion in Italy between 1985 and 2018, the rise of the within-firm
variance accounts for 38.23% and as stated above, the growth of the between-sector variance
accounts for 41.59%. Therefore in Italy the dominant driver of the rising earnings inequality
is the increasing dispersion of average earnings across sectors, whereas the rising dispersion
of average earnings across firms in the same sector plays only a small part. This is very
different from the USA where the dominant driver of the rising earnings dispersion is the
between-firm-within-sector component. Song et al. (2019) find that the between-firm-within-
sector variance accounts for 65.98% of the total rise in earnings variance in the USA between
1981 and 2013, the within-firm variance accounts for 30.93% and as mentioned above, the
between-sector variance accounts for just 3.09%. Also the work of Faggio, Salvanes, and
Reenen (2010) for the UK and Alvarez et al. (2018) for Brazil shows the dominant role of the
between-firm-within-sector component in driving changes in the overall earnings dispersion.
The most likely explanation for the different patterns of rising earnings inequality between
Italy and the USA are differences in wage-setting institutions. Wage bargaining in the US
is at the firm level whereas in Italy it is at the level of the sector. In Italy industry-level
country-wide collective agreements specify obligatory minimum wages for each occupation or
job title (”livelli di inquadramento”). These occupation and sector-specific wage floors are the
result of bargaining between sector-level unions and employer organisations (Boeri, Ichino,
et al. (2019)). All workers in the industry irrespective of the union membership status are
covered by the industry’s collective agreement (Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida (2019)). Over
90% of workers in Italy are covered by some kind of collective agreement (Visser (2016)).
There are no opt-out clauses, a firm facing low demand or reduced profitability cannot
reach a firm-level agreement with its workforce that would undercut the centrally negotiated
terms (Fanfani (2019)). Therefore firms in Italy have very limited flexibility in wage setting.
Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida (2019) use a data set that contains information on worker
wages as well as collective bargaining agreements for the region of Veneto. They show that
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from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s the growth in wage dispersion in the Veneto region
occurred entirely between the ”livelli di inquadramento”. There was no growth in wage
dispersion within job titles.
This does not necessarily mean an increase in sector-specific pay premiums, some sectors
paying higher wages for the workers with the same skills performing the same occupations.
As Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida (2019) argue, this suggests that the underlying market
forces driving growth in pay dispersion have been directed by the centralized system of
wage setting. Skill-biased technological change increases the relative demand for high skilled
workers. It seems quite likely that the sector-level negotiators simply allowed these market
forces to be reflected in the minimum wages for different occupations. Sectors differ in the
mix of occupations that they employ, some being more skill-intensive. Therefore a rise in pay
differences between workers of different skill levels could have resulted in a growing dispersion
of average earnings and wages across sectors that we observe in the data. The firm-level
wage bargaining in the USA is likely to lead to a stronger link between firm productivity
and worker pay than in Italy. This can explain why the between-firm-within-sector variance
is a larger component of the increase in total earnings variance in the US than in Italy.
Finally, we investigate the role of sector-level collective wage bargaining in driving the
growth of Italian earnings and wage inequality. The ideal approach would be to calculate
how much of the increase in inequality took place between vs within job titles. This is be-
cause a good measure of wage inequality that takes place outside of the collective bargaining
system is the size of the wage dispersion among workers in jobs that have the same associ-
ated wage floor (within job title wage variance). Unfortunately, the Italian social-security
database does not contain information on the job title (or the associated minimum wage)
of employment contracts. However, it does contain a unique identifier for each collective
agreement. Therefore we decompose the total variance of log weekly wages of full-time em-
ployees into the between and the within collective agreement components. The growth in
the between-collective-agreement variance accounts for 29.75% of the total increase in wage
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inequality in Italy between 1985 and 2018. Furthermore, if the dispersion of minimum wages
for different occupations inside of each collective agreement grew over time then also some
of the within-collective-agreement variance can actually be accounted for by the collective
bargaining system (in a descriptive sense). Finally, based on the evidence presented here
and on the results of Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida (2019), it seems that the centralised
collective bargaining system is an important factor in shaping trends in wage inequality in
Italy, but due to data limitations it is not possible to precisely quantify its importance at
the national level.
2.2 Data
We use a matched employer-employee administrative data set by INPS1 which contains the
universe of Italian social security records for private-sector employees. The records include
employment relationships between 1975 and 2018. We focus on the period 1985-2018, as
it is the period of rise of wage inequality in Italy. Given that the information is collected
for the purpose of paying social security contributions, the reporting is likely very accurate.
The data includes information on labour earnings (no upper limit), the number of weeks
worked, unique worker and firm identifiers, location of the firm, whether the contract is
full-time and on gender and year of birth of the worker. Uniquely, the database also includes
information on sector of the worker. If a firm operates in multiple sectors e.g. a car company
that produces cars (manufacturing) and also sells them to customers (retail), then it receives
multiple identifiers from the social security institute, one for each sector that it engages in.
Social security contributions of workers are registered under this sector-specific firm identifier
and thus the sector of economic activity of each worker is known. In contrast administrative
data from other countries typically only includes the primary sector of the firm. To ensure
comparability with other studies we calculate the primary sector of a firm as the one that
most of the firm’s workers belong to.
1Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, National Institute for Social Insurance
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In this paper we aim to investigate the drivers of the growth in pay inequality in Italy
and to compare them with other countries, especially the USA. The other papers in the
literature, Song et al. (2019), Faggio, Salvanes, and Reenen (2010) and Alvarez et al. (2018),
undertake variance decomposition of annual earnings. This is because their data does not
contain information on the quantity of labour supplied by workers. In contrast, we know for
each employment contract in each year how many weeks an individual worked and whether
the employment was full-time or part-time. Hence we can study inequality of wage rates,
in addition to inequality of earnings. We employ two different samples, one with annual
earnings and one with weekly wages of full-time workers.
The annual earnings sample is drawn to be maximally comparable to Song et al. (2019).
We follow their approach and sum income across all employment spells in a given year for
each worker. The worker is linked with the firm that accounts for the largest share of his
income. The papers that study inequality with annual earnings always impose some threshold
level of annual earnings where all the observations below it are dropped. The purpose of
this is to ensure that the estimates are not influenced by individuals who are not strongly
attached to the labour market (e.g. someone working only for 2 weeks in a given year and
thus having extremely small annual earnings). The level of this cutoff is quite arbitrary and
varies across studies. Song et al. (2019) define this threshold level of earnings as the value
of working full-time for one quarter for the minimum wage2. Unfortunately, Italy does not
have a statutory national minimum wage. Instead we drop the observations that are below
5th percentile in every year. This ensures that the total variance of annual earnings is not
inflated by a few extremely small values. Following Song et al. (2019) we restrict the sample
to only individuals between the age of 20 and 60. Additionally, we restrict the sample to only
firms (and workers in firms) with at least 10 workers (at least 10 observations per firm)3.
This is to ensure that there are enough observations to calculate within-firm variance.
2Their results are robust to varying the level of the threshold.
3Song et al. (2019) use a higher cutoff of 20 workers per firm. However, Italy has an extremely high
percentage of workers employed in small firms and thus we use a lower cutoff.
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The weekly wages sample is drawn to enable study of wage inequality in Italy. In the INPS
data set every observation is one employment contract in a given year. A firm-worker pair
might have multiple employment contracts in a given year. First, for each firm-worker match
we sum all income, as well as the number of weeks worked, across employment contracts in
a given year. Next, for each match we divide the total income by the total number of weeks
to obtain the weekly wage. For this sample we restrict the selection to only full-time workers
aged 20 to 60 and to firms and workers in firms with at least 10 such workers.
We can see from Table 2.1 that the original INPS data set (the entire universe) contains
about 640.000 unique firms and approx 6.9 million unique workers in 1985 and 1.4 million
firms and 14.8 million workers in 2018. The rise in the number of employed workers is mainly
due to higher employment rate of women as well as population growth and immigration. The
earnings sample contains approx 90,000 firms and 4.7 million workers in 1985 and approx
200,000 firms and 9.9 million workers in 2018. The weekly wages sample has about 100,000
firms and 5 million workers in 1985 and 170,000 firms and 7.8 million workers in 2018. Hence
the sample restrictions that we make, especially the requirement of at least 10 workers per
firm, mean that we only keep about 15% of the total number of firms. However, in terms of
employment the two samples are still very large, keeping about 67% of the total number of
workers.
Table 2.2 presents a comparison of firm size distribution in the universe of social-security
data, earnings sample and weekly wages sample for 1985 and 2018. Unsurprisingly, firms
are on average much larger in the two samples due to a higher minimum level. The median
number of workers per firm in 2018 is 3 in the universe, 16 in the earnings sample and 18 in
the weekly wages sample. The mean firm size in 2018 is 10,02 in the original data, 46.72 in
earnings distribution and 50.07 in the weekly wages distribution.
Furthermore, the mean annual earnings are slightly higher in the earnings sample than
in the original data set (Table 2.3). This is again unsurprising given that we drop the 5%
lowest observations of annual earnings. The mean weekly wages are also slightly higher in
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the wages sample than in the universe of social-security records (Table 2.4). This is most
likely because full-time workers tend to earn higher wages on average.
Finally there has been a very large rise in both earnings and wage inequality in Italy
between 1985 and 2018, as can be seen from Table 2.5. Variance of log annual earnings rose
from 0.486 in 1985 to 0.723 in 2018, representing 49% increase. Variance of log weekly wages
of full-time employees rose even more, from 0.240 in 1985 to 0.447 in 2018 which represents
86% increase.
2.3 Methodology
We study the role of firms in accounting for both earnings and wage inequality in Italy
between 1985 and 2018. Hence we perform the following variance decomposition for both
annual earnings and weekly wages of full-time employees. We decompose the total variance

























where wij denotes the log annual earnings (log weekly wage) of worker i at firm j in a
given year, N denotes the total number of workers (firm-worker matches) in the data, nj is




∀i|i∈j wij is the value of average annual
earnings (average weekly wage) at firm j and w̄ = 1
N
∑
∀iwij is the economy-wide value of
average annual earnings (average weekly wage).
Additionally, we decompose total variance of annual earnings (weekly wages) into between-

























where wis denotes the log annual earnings (log weekly wage) of a worker i in sector s in a
given year, ns is the number of workers employed in sector s and w̄s gives the average annual
earnings (average weekly wage) of sector s.
Next, we want to investigate separately the contribution of sector and of the firms within
the sector to the rise in earnings and wage inequality in Italy. Thus we want to first control
for the sector and then undertake between vs within firm variance decomposition. There are
two equivalent ways of doing this.
The first method is to regress the dependent variable (log annual earnings or log weekly





βsDs + εijs (2.3)
where wijs denotes the log annual earnings (log weekly wage) of a worker i in firm j in
sector s in a given year, S is the total number of sectors in the data, Ds is a dummy variable
that takes value 1 if the observation is for sector s and 0 otherwise, βs is the OLS coefficient
on the fixed effect for sector s, and εijs is the residual.
Next we take the residuals from the above regression and perform the between vs within
























where εij is the residual from (2.3) for worker i in firm j, N still denotes the total number






∀i|i∈j εij is the firm j’s average value of either log annual earnings or log weekly
wages after controlling for sector fixed effects and ε̄ = 1
N
∑
∀i εij is the economy-wide average
of either log annual earnings or log weekly wages after controlling for sector fixed effects.
The total variance of residuals from (2.3) is equal to the within-sector variance given that
controlling for sector fixed effects removes the between sector variance. Performing between
vs within firm variance decomposition on the residuals from (2.3) then actually produces
between-firms-within sector variance and within-firm variance.
The second method of controlling for sector is to demean each observation by the sector of
the worker i.e. for every observation subtract the average of the sector that the observation
belongs to. This method also removes the between-sector variance and it is equivalent to
(2.3). The demeaned observations are then used to calculate (2.4).
In addition to the two methods above it is also possible to perform the full variance
decomposition directly where total variance is broken down into between-sector variance,




































In conclusion, all three methods above generate the same outcomes and are equivalent.




In this section we review the results of variance decompositions that shed light on the im-
portance of firms as drivers of pay inequality in Italy. First, we use log annual earnings as a
measure of inequality and we investigate how much of the rise in inequality between 1985 and
2018 is a between-firm phenomena (section 2.4.1). Then we consider how much of the rise
in earnings inequality occurred between sectors as opposed to within sectors (section 2.4.2).
In section 2.4.3 we undertake all of the analysis again, but with weekly wages of full-time
workers instead of earnings. Thus we study the role of firms and sectors in accounting for
wage inequality growth in Italy. In section 2.4.4 we contrast our results with annual earnings
with the findings of Song et al. (2019) for the USA (who also use annual earnings). In section
2.4.5 we discuss some potential explanations for the very different results. Finally, in section
2.4.6 we investigate how much of earnings and wage inequality in Italy between 1985 and
2018 occurred between vs within collective agreements.
2.4.1 Between vs within firm variance
We perform the between vs within-firm variance decomposition given by (2.1) using the
annual earnings sample for every year from 1985 until 2018. We find that the majority
(61.77%) of the rise in earnings inequality in Italy occurred between firms.
We can see from Table 2.6(a) that total variance of log annual earnings rose from 0.486
in 1985 to 0.723 in 2018 and that the rise in between-firm variance represented 61.77% of the
overall increase in inequality. Within-firm variance also increased and it contributed 38.23%
of the increase in total variance. Furthermore, the between-firm variance also became a
larger relative component of the total variance of log annual earnings (Table 2.6(b)). The
dispersion in average earnings across firms represented 44.98% of the total variance in 1985,
but that rose to 50.49% in 2018. Earnings inequality within firms rose over time, but at
a slower rate than between firms and thus the within-firm share of total variance fell from
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55.02% to 49.51%. We can also see these patterns on Figure 2.1.
Furthermore, these same patterns hold up for all firm size categories. The between-firm
component of variance accounts for 65.04% of the rise in total variance for small firms, 69.50%
for medium-sized firms and 58.88% for large firms (Table 2.7)4. We can see from Figure 2.2
that the between-firm variance grows at a faster rate than the within-firm component for
firms of all sizes.
In addition to exploring the relationship between firms and earnings inequality in Italy
over time we also investigate the nature of this relationship across Italian regions. There-
fore we perform the between vs within firm variance decomposition given by (2.1) for ev-
ery province in every year in Italy (there are just over 100 provinces). Thus we obtain
between-firm variance, within-firm variance and total variance of log annual earnings for
every province-year pair. This results in a panel data set of just over 3000 observations.
Next we calculate the between-firm share for every province-year observation by dividing
the between-firm variance by the total variance.
For each year we correlate the between-firm share with the total variance across provinces.
Figure 2.3(a) shows how the correlation coefficient evolves over time. We can see that the
correlation coefficient is always positive and very large. It varies between 0.7 and 0.9. This
shows that provinces where the dispersion of average earnings across firms represents a
greater share of total earnings dispersion tend to have larger earnings inequality.
Next, we assess the relationship of the between-firm share with total inequality in a
different way. First, we regress total variance of log annual earnings for each province-year
pair on year fixed effects. This way we are controlling for time trends and focusing on the
variation across geography. Figure 2.3(b) displays a scatter plot of the resulting residuals
and the between firm share, as well as the line of best fit. We can see that there is a clear
positive relationship where province-year pairs with larger residuals (total variance of log
annual earnings after controlling for year fixed effects) tend to have larger between-firm
4The definitions of firm size categories come from OECD and are: small firm: 10-49 employees; medium-
sized firm: 50-249 employees; large firm: over 250 employees.
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share. This is confirmed by a regression of the residuals on the between-firm variance share
which delivers an OLS coefficient of 0.009. This means that a one percentage point rise
in the between-firm share of a province is associated with the total variance of log annual
earnings of the province rising by 0.009, controlling for year fixed effects. Therefore we find
that there is a robust positive association between the share of the earnings inequality that
occurs between firms and the overall earnings inequality across regions in Italy.
We also examine the association of the between-firm share with the total variance within
provinces over time. The first way that we do this is to regress total variance of log annual
earnings for each province-year pair on province fixed effects. The residuals from this regres-
sion contain only the within-province variation as the between-province variation is captured
by the fixed effects. Figure 2.3(c) displays a scatter plot of these new residuals and the be-
tween firm share. There is again a clear positive relationship, province-year pairs with larger
residuals (total variance of log annual earnings after controlling for province fixed effects)
tend to have larger between-firm share. Regression of these residuals on the between-firm
variance share delivers an OLS coefficient of 0.0027. Therefore we find that a rise in the
between-firm share of a province over time is associated with a rise in the total variance of
log annual earnings of that province.
Finally, for each province we calculate the change in the between-firm share and in the
total variance over time (between 1985 and 2018) and we plot them in Figure 2.3(d). We can
see that provinces where the total earnings dispersion became larger generally experienced an
increase in the share of the earnings variance accounted for by the between-firm component.
On the other hand, provinces where earnings inequality declined generally had a falling
between-firm share. This demonstrates that the positive association of the between-firm
share with the total variance over time holds not only on the level of the whole country, but
also within provinces.
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2.4.2 Between vs within sector variance
We perform the between vs within sector variance decomposition given by (2.2) using the
annual earnings sample for every year from 1985 until 2018. We find that 41.59% of the rise
in earnings inequality in Italy occurred between (4-digit) sectors while 58.41% took place
within sectors5. Therefore the rising dispersion of average earnings across sectors plays a
very important role in accounting for the growth of earnings inequality in Italy.
We can see from Table 2.8(a) that the between-sector variance rose from 0.111 in 1985
to 0.210 in 2018, accounting for 41.59% of the rise in total variance. The within-sector
variance increased from 0.374 to 0.513, representing 58.41% of the overall rise of variance
of log annual earnings. Furthermore, Table 2.8(b) shows that the dispersion of average
earnings across sectors became a larger share of the total dispersion of earnings over time.
The between-sector variance share was 22.94% in 1985 and 29.06% in 2018. The within-
sector share declined from 77.06% to 70.94% in the same time period. While both types of
earnings dispersion were rising over time, the between-sector variance was rising faster and
thus became a larger relative component of earnings inequality. We can see these patterns
on Figure 2.4.
Next, we investigate the nature of the relationship between sectors and earnings inequality
across Italian regions. We perform the between vs within sector variance decomposition
given by (2.2) for every province in every year. Thus we obtain between-sector variance,
within-sector variance and total variance of log annual earnings for every province-year pair.
We calculate the between-sector share for every province-year observation by dividing the
between-sector variance by the total variance.
We assess the relationship of the between-sector share with total inequality across Italian
provinces in two different ways. First, we correlate the between-sector share with the total
variance across provinces for each year. We can see from Figure 2.5(a) that the correlation
coefficient is always positive and very large. It varies between 0.6 and 0.85. This shows that
5There are approx 600 sectors at 4-digit level in the data.
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the provinces where the dispersion of average earnings across sectors represents a greater
share of total earnings dispersion tend to have larger earnings inequality.
Second, as in the section 2.4.1, we regress total variance of log annual earnings for each
province-year pair on year fixed effects. This way we are controlling for time trends and
focusing on the variation across geography. Figure 2.5(b) displays a scatter plot of the
resulting residuals and the between-sector share, as well as the line of best fit. We can see
that there is a clear positive relationship where province-year pairs with larger residuals
(total variance of log annual earnings after controlling for year fixed effects) tend to have
larger between-sector variance share. A regression of the residuals on the between-sector
share delivers an OLS coefficient of 0.0089. Thus a one percentage point rise in the between-
sector share of a province is associated with the total variance of log annual earnings of the
province rising by 0.0089, after controlling for year fixed effects. To sum up, we find that
there is a robust positive association between the share of the earnings inequality that occurs
between sectors and the overall earnings inequality across regions in Italy.
Following this, we explore the association of the between-sector share with the total vari-
ance within provinces over time. We run two different exercises. First, we regress total
variance of log annual earnings for each province-year pair on province fixed effects. The
residuals from this regression represent the within-province variation in the dependent vari-
able, as the between-province variation is captured by the fixed effects. Figure 2.5(c) displays
a scatter plot of these new residuals and the between-sector share. The relationship is posi-
tive, the province-year pairs with larger residuals (total variance of log annual earnings after
controlling for province fixed effects) tend to have larger between-sector share. Regression of
these residuals on the between-sector variance share produces a coefficient of 0.0019. Hence
we find that a rise in the between-sector share of a province over time is associated with a
rise in the total variance of log annual earnings of that province.
Finally, for each province we calculate the change in the between-sector share and in
the total variance between 1985 and 2018 and we plot them in Figure 2.5(d). We can see
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that provinces where the total earnings dispersion became larger generally experienced an
increase in the share of the earnings variance that occurs between sectors. On the other
hand, provinces where earnings inequality declined generally had a falling between-sector
share. To sum up, we find that the positive association of the between-sector share with the
total variance over time holds not only at the level of the whole country, but also within
provinces. This is in addition to the fact that the relationship holds across geography.
Next, we want to investigate separately the contribution of sector and of the firms within
the sector to the rise in earnings inequality in Italy. Therefore we control for the sector as
explained in the Methodology section (2.3). Table 2.9(a) and Figure 2.6(a) show the results
of the between vs within firm variance decomposition applied to the data after controlling
for the primary sector of the firm. In this case the growth of the between-firm variance
contributed 34.54% of total variance increase while the growth of the within-firm variance
contributed 65.46% of the total increase. Therefore once we control for the sector that the
firm belongs to, most of the earnings increase is due to rising inequality within firms, not
between firms within sector. Given that we are controlling for the sector of the firm, the
between-firm variance here is actually the between-firm-within-sector variance and the total
variance is equal to the within-sector variance. The within-firm variance is unaffected by
whether we control for the sector or not.
In section 2.4.1 we find that the majority (62%) of the rise in earnings inequality in Italy
between 1985 and 2018 took place between firms. In this section we show that the between-
firm variance is actually composed of two parts: between-sector variance and between-firm-
within-sector variance6. Table 2.10(a) shows the full variance decomposition over time. We
can see that the growth of the between-sector variance accounts for 41.59% of the total
variance increase, the rise of the between-firm-within-sector variance accounts for 20.17%
and the rise of the within-firm variance accounts for 38.23%. Thus the most important
factor is the rising dispersion of average earnings across sectors. Figure 2.6(b) shows that all
6Also within-sector variance is composed of two parts: between-firm-within-sector variance and within-
firm variance.
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three types of earnings dispersion were growing over this time period. However, we can see
from Table 2.10(b) that while the between-sector component grew as a share of total variance
from 22.94% in 1985 to 29.06% in 2018, the shares of both the between-firm-within-sector
and the within-firm components fell during this period.
Additionally, we also exploit a unique aspect of the Italian social-security data which is
that the sector of economic activity is measured at the level of the individual worker. In the
analysis above we were using the primary sector of the firm which is the economic activity
that the largest group of the firm’s workers are engaged in. Now we control for the sector of
the worker. Thus if a firm operates in multiple sectors then for the purpose of this analysis it
is effectively broken up into the different sector-specific parts. Table 2.11 displays the results
of the between vs within firm variance decomposition after controlling for the sector of the
worker. The main finding is that the results differ only marginally from the ones where we
control for the primary sector of the firm. Table 2.12 shows the full variance decomposition.
The between-sector variance accounts for 42.20% of the total variance increase, the between-
firm-within-sector component accounts for 19.58% and the within-firm component accounts
for 38.22%. The growing dispersion of average earnings across sectors is still the main driver
of the rising earnings inequality and it increases as a share of total variance while the other
two components decline as shares of total variance. In conclusion, we find that controlling
for the primary sector of the firm or for the sector of the worker produces almost identical
results.
2.4.3 Wage inequality vs earnings inequality
In this section we compare the results of variance decomposition using log weekly wages of
full-time employees with the results using log annual earnings that we discussed in sections
2.4.1 and 2.4.2.
First, we perform the between vs within-firm variance decomposition given by (2.1) using
the weekly wages (of full-time workers) sample for every year from 1985 until 2018. We find
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that the between firm variance is an even more important component of the rise in total wage
variance than of the rise of total earnings variance. The vast majority, specifically 83.84%,
of the rise in wage inequality in Italy occurred between firms (61.77% for earnings).
We can see from Table 2.13(a) that total variance of log weekly wages rose from 0.240 in
1985 to 0.447 in 2018 and that the rise in between-firm variance represented 83.84% of the
overall increase in inequality. Within-firm variance also increased, but it contributed only
16.16% of the increase in total variance. Furthermore, the between-firm variance also became
a larger relative component of the total variance of log weekly wages (Table 2.13(b)). The
dispersion of average wages across firms represented 48.85% of the total variance in 1985,
but that rose to 65.03% by 2018. Wage inequality within firms rose over time, but at a much
slower rate than between firms and thus the within-firm share of total variance fell (just as
in the case of annual earnings) from 51.15% to 34.97%. These patterns can also be seen on
Figure 2.7.
Furthermore, as was the case for annual earnings, these same patterns hold up for all firm
size categories. However, the importance of the between firm dispersion in accounting for
the growth in inequality seems to be increasing in firm size. The between-firm component of
variance accounts for 75.55% of the rise in total variance for small firms, 78.85% for medium-
sized firms and 93.52% for large firms (Table 2.14)7. We can see from Figure 2.8 that the
between-firm variance grows at a faster rate than the within-firm component for firms of all
sizes, but particularly for large firms.
We also explore the relationship between firms and wage inequality across Italian provinces
and within provinces over time. To do this we perform exactly the same analysis as for an-
nual earnings in section 2.4.1. The outcomes are displayed in Figures 2.9(a)-2.9(d). We find
broadly the same results as for annual earnings. There is a positive association between the
share of the wage inequality that occurs between firms and the overall wage inequality across
provinces in Italy. However, this relationship is weaker than in the case of earnings. For
7The definitions of firm size categories come from OECD and are: small firm: 10-49 employees; medium-
sized firm: 50-249 employees; large firm: over 250 employees.
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example, we can see from Figure 2.9(a) that the correlation coefficient of the between firm
share and the total wage variance across provinces varies depending on the year between 0.2
and 0.8 (for annual earnings it varies between 0.7 and 0.9).
Furthermore, we find that the provinces where the total wage dispersion became larger
generally experienced an increase in the share of the wage variance accounted for by the
between-firm component. On the other hand, the provinces where wage inequality declined
generally had a falling between-firm share. This is the same pattern as in the case of annual
earnings. However, the association of the between-firm share and the total variance within
provinces over time is actually stronger for wages than for earnings. For instance, we can see
from Figure 2.9(d) that the correlation of the change in the between-firm share of a province
between 1985 and 2018 with the change of the total variance of wages of a province over the
same time period produces a coefficient of 0.76 (the correlation coefficient is 0.52 for annual
earnings).
Next, we turn my attention to the importance of the differences in average wages across
sectors for explaining wage inequality. We perform the between vs within sector variance
decomposition given by (2.2) using the weekly wages (of full-time employees) sample for
every year from 1985 until 2018. The main finding is that the importance of sectors in
accounting for the growth in inequality is very similar for wages and for earnings. The rising
dispersion of average wages across sectors plays a very important role in accounting for the
growth of wage inequality in Italy.
We can see from Table 2.15(a) that 44.23% of the rise in wage inequality in Italy occurred
between (4-digit) sectors while 55.77% took place within sectors (for earnings it was 41.59%
vs 58.41% split). Furthermore, Table 2.15(b) shows that the dispersion of average wages
across sectors became a larger share of the total wage dispersion over time. While both
the between and the within sector wage variance were rising over time, the between-sector
variance was rising faster and thus became a larger relative component of wage inequality.
This is the same as for earnings. We can see these patterns on Figure 2.10.
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Next, we investigate the nature of the relationship between the share of wage variance
that takes place between sectors and the total wage variance across Italian provinces and
within each province over time. We repeat the same analysis as for annual earnings in
section 2.4.2. The results are shown in Figures 2.11(a)-2.11(d). We find that there is a
positive association between the share of the wage inequality that occurs between sectors
and the overall wage inequality across provinces in Italy. This is the same result as for
annual earnings. Additionally, we find that just as in the case of annual earnings, a rise in
the between-sector variance share of a province over time is associated with a rise in the
total variance (of log weekly wages of full-time employees) of that province.
We continue by investigating the separate contribution of sector and of the firms within
the sector to the rise of wage inequality in Italy. Therefore we control for the sector of
the firm as explained in the Methodology section. Table 2.16(a) and Figure 2.12(a) show
the results of the between vs within firm variance decomposition applied to the data after
controlling for the primary sector of the firm. The results are very different to the ones for
annual earnings. About two thirds of the rise in total wage variance between 1985 and 2018
after controlling for the main sector of the firm occurred between firms, with the remaining
one third occurring within firms. For the annual earnings it was approximately one third
between firms and two thirds within firms.
Given that we are controlling for the sector of the firm, the between-firm variance here
is actually the between-firm-within-sector variance and the total variance is equal to the
within-sector variance (as discussed in detail in the Methodology section). The within-firm
variance is unaffected by whether we control for the sector or not. Table 2.17(a) shows the
full variance decomposition over time. We can see that the most important driver of rising
inequality is still the between-sector component accounting for 44.23% of the overall increase
(very similar to the case of annual earnings). The rise of the between-firm-within-sector
variance accounts for 39.60% of the overall increase and the rise of the within-firm variance
accounts for 16.16% of the total wage variance increase. We can see that compared to the
86
variance decomposition of annual earnings, the between-firm-within-sector variance plays a
much more important role and the within-firm variance is less important in accounting for the
overall rise in inequality. A likely reason why the within-firm variance is a more important
component of the growth of earnings inequality than the growth of wage inequality is the
existence of short-term contracts which were much more common in 2018 than they were
in 1985. A rising prevalence of short-term employment likely increased variance of earnings
within firms because it expanded the differences in the number of weeks worked among the
workers at the same firm. Variance of wages within firms was less affected by the increasing
prevalence of short-term employment because the differences in wages between the firm’s
permanent and temporary workers are likely to be much smaller than the differences in
labour supply. Figure 2.12(b) shows that all three types of wage dispersion were growing
over this time period. However, we can see from Table 2.17(b) that while the between-sector
and the between-firm-within-sector components grew as a share of total variance, the share
of the within-firm component fell during this period.
Additionally, we exploit the unique feature of the Italian social security data that the
sector of economic activity is measured at the level of the individual worker. Thus we repeat
the analysis above (controlling for sector) while using the sector of the worker instead of the
primary sector of the firm. We find that the estimates change only marginally, there are no
major differences. The results are displayed in Tables 2.18 and 2.19.
Finally, we summarise the main results of this section. We find that the between-firm
variance is an even more important component of the rise in total variance for wage inequality
than for earnings inequality. Approximately 84% of the rise in wage variance in Italy between
1985 and 2018 took place between firms. The share of the increase in total variance that
took place between sectors is very similar for both wage and earnings inequality (44.23%
for wages, 41.59% for earnings). In both cases the rise in the between-sector variance is
the largest component of the total variance increase. However, the rise in the between-firm-
within-sector variance is a much more important driver of the overall inequality increase for
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wages than for earnings. On the other hand, the rise in the within-firm variance is much more
important for explaining the growth of earnings inequality than for wage inequality. Finally,
for both wage and earnings dispersion, there is a positive association of the between-firm
variance share and the between-sector variance share on one hand, and the total variance on
the other, across provinces as well as within provinces over time.
2.4.4 Comparison with the USA
In this section we compare our findings for Italy using the annual earnings sample with
the results of Song et al. (2019) who use US social security data and also perform variance
decomposition using annual earnings. Firstly, we quickly summarise our findings for annual
earnings. We find that the rise in the between-firm variance represented 61.77% of the overall
increase in earnings inequality in Italy between 1985 and 2018. Furthermore, we find that
as total earnings dispersion grew, the between-firm component became a larger share of the
total variance. The between-firm share grew from 44.98% in 1985 to 50.49% in 2018. We
find that this positive association of the between-firm share with the total variance holds
also within provinces over time. Additionally, we find that provinces where a larger share of
earnings inequality takes place between firms tend to have larger overall earnings dispersion.
Considering the importance of sectors, we find that the rise in the between-sector vari-
ance represented 41.59% of the overall increase in earnings variance. We also find that the
between-sector variance as a share of the total variance increased from 22.94% in 1985 to
29.06% in 2018. Furthermore, we find that, as in the case of the between-firm share, there
is a robust, positive association between the share of the earnings inequality that occurs
between sectors and the overall earnings inequality, both across provinces in Italy and over
time within provinces. Finally, we divide the between-firm variance into two components,
the between-sector variance and the between-firm-within-sector variance, and find that the
dominant driver of the rising earnings dispersion in Italy is the growth in the dispersion of
average earnings across sectors, and not the rise in the dispersion of average earnings across
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firms within the same sector.
The results of the between vs within firm variance decomposition in Song et al. (2019)
are displayed in Table 2.208. The rise in the between-firm variance accounted for 69.59%
of the increase in the overall earnings dispersion in the USA between 1981 and 2013, with
the remaining 30.41% being accounted by the within-firm component of the total variance.
Hence in this respect my results for Italy are in line with the results of Song et al. (2019)
for the USA. Furthermore, Song et al. (2019) also find that the share of the total earnings
inequality that occurs between firms increased. In their case the between-firm share rose
from 34.05% to 42.20%.
Table 2.21 summarise the results of between vs within sector variance decomposition for
the USA. The results for the USA are starkly different from our results for Italy. Only 3.09%
of the increase in total variance of earnings in the USA between 1981 and 2013 was accounted
for by the between-sector (4 digit) component. 96.91% of the increase in inequality there was
a within-sector phenomenon. The between-sector variance share in the USA declined from
20.71% in 1981 to 16.67% in 2013. Thus the relative importance of sector actually fell in the
USA. This is in contrast to Italy where the share increased significantly. We can see from
Table 2.22 that the massive increase in the within-sector earnings dispersion in the USA is
mainly due to increasing dispersion of earnings across firms within sector (68.09%) and to a
lesser extent due to increasing dispersion in earnings within firms (31.91%). Table 2.23 shows
the full sector versus firm variance decomposition for the USA. As said above, the growth
in the between-sector variance accounts for just 3.09% of the rise in the total variance of
log annual earnings in the USA, the between-firm-within-sector variance accounts for 65.98%
and the within-firm variance accounts for 30.93%. Whereas in the US the dominant driver of
the rising earnings dispersion is the between-firm-within-sector component, in Italy it is the
between-sector component. There are also significant differences when looking at levels. In
Italy the between-sector variance represented 29.06% of the total variance in 2018, whereas
8This and the other tables in this chapter summarising the results of Song et al. (2019) come from ”Table
2: Robustness checks on variance decomposition” in their paper.
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in the USA the between-sector variance share was just 16.67% in 2013. Therefore sector
plays much more important role in Italy than in the USA in terms of both explaining the
rise in earnings inequality over time and in accounting for cross-sectional distribution of
earnings in recent years.
2.4.5 Possible explanations
Empirical findings in the previous section raise two questions. First, why does the rising
dispersion of average earnings across sectors explain so little of the increase in inequality in
the US, but so much in Italy? Second, why is the dispersion of earnings across firms within
the same narrowly-defined sectors such an important component of the rising total variance
of earnings in the US, but not in Italy?
The most likely explanation for the different patterns of rising earnings inequality are
differences in wage-setting institutions. Wage bargaining in the US is at the firm level
whereas in Italy it is at the level of the sector. In Italy industry-level country-wide collective
agreements specify obligatory minimum wages for each occupation or job title (”livelli di
inquadramento”)9. The job titles are defined by collective bargaining agreements and are
based on the complexity of the employee’s tasks, qualifications and seniority levels (Fan-
fani (2019)). Each collective agreement specifies minimum wages for 5-10 different job titles
(Fanfani (2019)). The minimum wages for each job title in each industry are the outcome
of negotiations between sector-level unions and employer organisations (Boeri, Ichino, et
al. (2019)). However, the mapping of collective agreements to industries is not perfect, some
industries have multiple collective agreements and sometime a single collective agreement
covers multiple industries (Fanfani (2019)). Over 90% of workers in Italy are covered by col-
lective agreements (Visser (2016)). Collective agreements apply to all workers in the covered
firms irrespective of the union membership status (Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida (2019)).
Additionally, there are no opting-out clauses in the Italian system of industrial relations
9There are hundreds of collective agreements, but approx 150 of the largest ones cover over 90% of
workers in the INPS social-security data set.
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(Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida (2019)). A firm facing low demand or reduced profitability
cannot reach a firm-level agreement with its workforce that would undercut the centrally
negotiated terms. Furthermore, firms cannot downgrade workers to lower paid job titles,
as workers can only move up in the firms’ hierarchy (Fanfani (2019)). Thus firms in Italy
have very limited flexibility in wage setting and as a result the relationship between wages
and firm productivity and local labour market conditions is much weaker in Italy than in
Germany or the USA (Boeri, Ichino, et al. (2019)).
While firms in Italy cannot pay below the wages set at the sector level, they are completely
free to pay above the minimum levels specified for each occupation. The most productive
firms in each industry could still pay above the standard rate in order to attract the best
workers. The fact that the dispersion of earnings across firms within an industry is quite
small is likely due to two factors: 1. the minimum wages are set quite high, so there is little
scope to pay above them and many firms would prefer to pay below them, but cannot; 2.
firms have little incentive to pay above the minimum and poach the best workers from other
firms.
Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida (2019) use a data set that contains information on worker
wages as well as collective bargaining agreements for the region of Veneto. They show that
from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s the growth in wage dispersion in the Veneto region
occurred entirely between the ”livelli di inquadramento”. There was no growth in wage
dispersion within job titles. It is quite likely that the pattern at national level will be quite
similar10. This suggests that the growth in wage inequality in Italy has been mainly the
result of the rising dispersion of occupation-specific minimum wages.
This does not necessarily imply that there was an increase in sector-specific pay premiums
in Italy, i.e. some sectors paying higher wages for the workers with the same skills performing
the same occupations. As Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida (2019) argue, their result suggests
that the underlying market forces driving growth in pay dispersion have been channelled by
10Although this has so far not been studied due to data limitations.
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the centralized system of wage setting. Skill-biased technological change increases the relative
demand for high skilled workers. It seems quite likely that the sector-level negotiators simply
allowed these market forces to be reflected in the minimum wages for different occupations.
Sectors differ in the mix of occupations that they employ, some being more skill-intensive.
Therefore a rise in pay differences between workers of different skill levels could have resulted
in a growing dispersion of average earnings across sectors that we observe in the data. If
firms within narrowly-defined sectors in Italy differ much less in their occupational mix then
this would explain why the between-firm-within-sector variance did not grow as much.
Furthermore, given that wage bargaining is at the firm level in the USA, there is likely
a stronger link between firm productivity and worker pay in the US than in Italy. Rusinek
and Rycx (2013) show that firm-level wage bargaining is associated with greater rent-sharing
than centralised wage setting. In the recent decades there has been a trend in the USA of
a few ”superstar firms” in each industry pulling out from the rest of the firms in terms of
productivity and market share (Autor et al. (2020)). It is quite likely that under firm-level
wage setting this pattern spilled over into wages. This can partially explain why the between-
firm-within-sector variance is such a large component of the increase in total earnings variance
in the US, but not in Italy.
There is also another possible explanation of the patterns of rising earnings and wage
dispersion that we identify in the Italian data and it involves a government intervention in the
economy before 1985 via a policy called Scala Mobile. Scala Mobile was a wage indexation
mechanism granting the same absolute wage increase to all employees as prices rose, thereby
compressing wage differentials between workers of different skill types. Manacorda (2004)
shows that as a result of the pay-indexation scheme there was a substantial compression
of nominal wage dispersion from late 1970s until 1985 (when the policy was abandoned).
It could be argued that the rise in inequality after 1985 was simply a correction for the
previous policy, a return to some ”normal” wage dispersion. The increase in the variance
of average earnings across sectors could be driven by the fact that some sectors are more
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skill-intensive than others and that the wage differential between workers of different skill
level and occupation was rising back to some natural level. However, while this story can
partially explain the rise in earnings inequality in the second half of 1980s and in 1990s, it
cannot explain the continuing rise of pay inequality in the 2000s, many years after the policy
ended. We can see from Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.7 that the total variance of log annual
earnings and of log weekly wages, respectively, continued rising between 2000 and 2018.
2.4.6 Between vs within collective agreement variance
In this section we investigate the role of sector-level collective wage bargaining in driving the
growth of Italian earnings and wage inequality. The ideal approach would be to calculate how
much of the increase in inequality took place between vs within job titles, the occupational
categories that each have an associated minimum wage. This way we could see whether
the result of Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida (2019) for the Veneto region, that all the wage
inequality growth occurred between job titles, holds up at the level of the whole country.
Unfortunately, the Italian social-security database does not contain information on the job
title (or the associated minimum wage) of employment contracts. However, it does contain
a unique identifier for each collective agreement.
Therefore we decompose the total variance of log annual earnings and of log weekly wages
(of full-time employees) into between-collective-agreement variance and within-collective-
agreement variance. The results for log annual earnings can be seen on Figure 2.13. The ris-
ing dispersion of average earnings across different collective agreements accounts for 42.64%
of the total increase in earnings inequality between 1985 and 2018 (Table 2.24(a))11. The re-
maining 57.36% of the growth in earnings inequality occurred among workers covered by the
same collective agreement. This within-collective-agreement variance can be further broken
down into two components: between-firm-within-collective-agreement variance and within-
11This number is extremely close to the total increase of log annual earnings that can be accounted for
by the between-sector variance (41.59%, Table 2.8(a)). However, for weekly wages the two figures are very
different. This highlights the fact that the between-collective-agreement variance and the between-sector
variance are not the same thing, because sectors and collective agreements do not overlap perfectly.
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firm (within collective agreement) variance. The rising dispersion of average earnings across
firms covered by the same collective agreement accounts for 17.90% of the overall increase
and the rising dispersion of earnings within firms (within the same collective agreement)
accounts for 39.45% of the increase (Table 2.25). Between-collective-agreement variance rep-
resented 21.24% of total earnings variance in 1985, but this went up to 28.27% by 2018
(Table 2.24(b)). On the other hand, the between-firm-within-collective-agreement variance
and the within-firm variance fell as a share of the total variance.
The variance decomposition of log weekly wages is displayed in Figure 2.14. We can see
that for weekly wages the between-collective-agreement variance is a much weaker driver
of the growth of the overall variance than for annual earnings. The rising dispersion of
average wages across different collective agreements accounts for 29.75% of the total increase
in wage inequality in Italy between 1985 and 2018 (Table 2.26(a)). 70.25% of the growth
in wage inequality occurred among workers covered by the same collective agreement. The
rising dispersion of average wages across firms covered by the same collective agreement
accounts for 53.15% of the overall increase and the rising dispersion of wages within firms
(within the same collective agreement) accounts for 17.11% of the increase (Table 2.27).
Between-collective-agreement variance share went up only very slightly from 27.61% in 1985
to 28.60% in 2018 (Table 2.26(b)). However, the between-firm-within-collective-agreement
share increased dramatically from 26.55% in 1985 to 38.85% in 2018 (Table 2.27(b)). On
the other hand, within-firm variance fell as a share of the total variance.
Given that sector-level collective bargaining sets wages and not earnings, it makes sense
to focus on the variance decomposition of wages. An interesting question to ask is what
share of the rise in wage inequality between 1985 and 2018 in Italy occurred inside vs out-
side of the centralised system of wage setting. A good measure of wage inequality that takes
place outside of the collective bargaining system is the size of the wage dispersion among
workers in jobs that have the same associated wage floor (within job title wage variance). On
the other hand, the part of the wage inequality that can be accounted for by the collective
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bargaining system is the wage dispersion between job titles (between units that each have a
wage floor set by collective bargaining). There are multiple job titles within each collective
agreement. Therefore the between-job-title variance can be further broken down into the
between-collective-agreement variance and the between-job-title-within-collective-agreement
variance. We are unable to measure the between-job-title-within-collective-agreement vari-
ance, but we do calculate the between-collective-agreement variance. Hence we can conclude
that at least 29.75% of the total increase in wage inequality in Italy between 1985 and 2018
can be accounted for by developments inside of the centralised system of wage setting (in a
descriptive sense). Furthermore, if the dispersion of minimum wages for different occupations
inside of each collective agreement grew over time then also some of the within-collective-
agreement variance can actually be accounted for by the collective bargaining system. Fi-
nally, based on the evidence presented here and on the results of Devicienti, Fanfani, and
Maida (2019), the centralised collective bargaining system seems to be an important factor
shaping trends in wage inequality in Italy, but due to data limitations it is not possible to
precisely quantify its importance at national level.
2.5 Conclusion
Studies covering the USA, the UK and Brazil have found that the majority of the growth in
earnings inequality in the recent decades occurred between firms as opposed to within firms.
We confirm this pattern for Italy. However, we focus attention on the fact that the between
firm variance is composed of two parts: the dispersion of average earnings across sectors and
the dispersion of average earnings across firms within sectors. We find that the dominant
driver of the growth in earnings inequality in Italy between 1985 and 2018 was the growth
in the between-sector variance. In contrast, the results of Song et al. (2019) reveal that in
the US the rise in the between-sector variance was only a tiny component of the increase in
total earnings variance and instead the dominant factor was the growth in the between-firm-
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within-sector variance. One of the explanations put forward by Song et al. (2019) for the
patterns of earnings inequality increase in the US is that some universal market forces related
to technology were driving increased differentiation of firms in the same narrow industries in
terms of pay. These could be increased positive complementarity in production between high
productivity firms and high ability workers or productivity gains from high ability workers
clustering in the same firms. We demonstrate that the patterns they identify for the US
are far from universal. Furthermore, we argue that the very different drivers of earnings
inequality growth (in a descriptive sense) are most likely the result of the differences in
wage setting institutions. Wage bargaining in the US is at the firm level whereas in Italy
there is a centralised system of sector-level collective bargaining where a minimum wage is
set for each occupation in each industry. This highlights the importance of cross-country




Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Number of firms Number of workers Number of matches
entire universe 1985 643,152 6,934,287 7,291,934
earnings sample 1985 92,171 4,748,716 -
wages sample 1985 102,524 4,979,445 5,178,157
entire universe 2018 1,480,225 14,836,334 17,341,308
earnings sample 2018 211,879 9,899,139 -
wages sample 2018 173,521 7,789,788 8,688,064
Table 2.2: Firm size distribution
mean standard deviation 10th percentile 50th percentile 90th percentile
entire universe 1985 10.78 164.58 1 3 15
earnings sample 1985 51.52 403.97 10 18 76
wages sample 1985 50.51 404.56 10 18 75
entire universe 2018 10.02 213.71 1 3 14
earnings sample 2018 46.72 487.66 10 16 66
wages sample 2018 50.07 547.94 11 18 73
Table 2.3: Annual earnings distribution
mean standard deviation 10th percentile 50th percentile 90th percentile
entire universe 1985 7,582 6,163 1,278 7,456 12,838
earnings sample 1985 8,989 6,336 2,690 8,510 14,078
entire universe 2018 21,729 22,253 2,697 19,135 41,050
earnings sample 2018 25,419 23,189 5,634 22,587 45,464
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Table 2.4: Weekly wages distribution
mean standard deviation 10th percentile 50th percentile 90th percentile
entire universe 1985 172.67 159.58 82.02 157.50 255.71
wages sample 1985 189.94 167.19 104.88 170.37 335.06
entire universe 2018 452.38 476.29 129.75 392.15 789.63
wages sample 2018 586.81 546.23 276.97 496.33 955.33
Table 2.5: The rise in earnings and wage inequality in Italy 1985-2018
total variance
log annual earnings log weekly wages
1985 0.486 0.240
2018 0.723 0.447
% increase 48.87 86.05
Table 2.6: Between vs within firm variance decomposition (Italy, annual earnings)
(a) Change over time
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.218 0.267 0.486
2018 0.365 0.358 0.723
change 0.147 0.091 0.237
% of total increase 61.77 38.23 100.00
(b) Shares
between firm share within firm share total
1985 44.98 55.02 100.00
2018 50.49 49.51 100.00
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Table 2.7: Between vs within firm variance decomposition for different firm sizes (Italy,
annual earnings)
(a) Small firms
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.214 0.267 0.482
2018 0.359 0.345 0.703
change 0.144 0.077 0.221
% of total increase 65.04 34.96 100.00
(b) Medium-sized firms
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.202 0.276 0.479
2018 0.352 0.342 0.694
change 0.150 0.066 0.215
% of total increase 69.50 30.50 100.00
(c) Large firms
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.162 0.261 0.423
2018 0.329 0.378 0.707
change 0.167 0.117 0.284
% of total increase 58.88 41.12 100.00
Small firm: 10-49 employees; medium-sized firm: 50-249 employees; large firm: over 250 employees.
Table 2.8: Between vs within sector variance decomposition (Italy, annual earnings)
(a) Change over time
between sector within sector total variance
1985 0.111 0.374 0.486
2018 0.210 0.513 0.723
change 0.099 0.139 0.237
% of total increase 41.59 58.41 100.00
(b) Shares
between sector share within sector share total
1985 22.94 77.06 100.00
2018 29.06 70.94 100.00
99
Table 2.9: Controlling for sector of the firm: between vs within firm variance decomposition
(Italy, annual earnings)
(a) Change over time
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.107 0.267 0.374
2018 0.155 0.358 0.513
change 0.048 0.091 0.139
% of total increase 34.54 65.46 100.00
(b) Shares
between firm share within firm share total
1985 28.61 71.39 100.00
2018 30.22 69.78 100.00
Table 2.10: Sector and firm: full variance decomposition (Italy, annual earnings)
(a) Change over time
between sector between firms within sector within firm total variance
1985 0.111 0.107 0.267 0.486
2018 0.210 0.155 0.358 0.723
change 0.099 0.048 0.091 0.237
% of total increase 41.59 20.17 38.23 100.00
(b) Shares
between sector share between firms within sector share within firm share total
1985 22.94 22.05 55.01 100.00
2018 29.06 21.43 49.51 100.00
Table 2.11: Controlling for sector of the worker: between vs within firm variance decompo-
sition (Italy, annual earnings)
(a) Change over time
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.107 0.267 0.374
2018 0.153 0.358 0.512
change 0.046 0.091 0.137
% of total increase 33.87 66.13 100.00
(b) Shares
between firm share within firm share total
1985 28.57 71.43 100.00
2018 29.99 70.01 100.00
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Table 2.12: Sector of the worker and firm: full variance decomposition (Italy, annual earn-
ings)
(a) Change over time
between sector between firms within sector within firm total variance
1985 0.111 0.107 0.267 0.486
2018 0.211 0.153 0.358 0.723
change 0.100 0.046 0.091 0.237
% of total increase 42.20 19.58 38.22 100.00
(b) Shares
between sector share between firms within sector share within firm share total
1985 22.91 22.03 55.06 100.00
2018 29.24 21.22 49.54 100.00
Table 2.13: Between vs within firm variance decomposition (Italy, weekly wages)
(a) Change over time
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.117 0.123 0.240
2018 0.291 0.156 0.447
change 0.173 0.033 0.207
% of total increase 83.84 16.16 100.00
(b) Shares
between firm share within firm share total
1985 48.85 51.15 100.00
2018 65.03 34.97 100.00
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Table 2.14: Between vs within firm variance decomposition for different firm sizes (Italy,
weekly wages)
(a) Small firms
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.098 0.088 0.185
2018 0.266 0.142 0.409
change 0.169 0.055 0.223
% of total increase 75.55 24.45 100.00
(b) Medium-sized firms
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.111 0.114 0.225
2018 0.255 0.152 0.407
change 0.144 0.039 0.183
% of total increase 78.85 21.15 100.00
(c) Large firms
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.104 0.156 0.260
2018 0.307 0.170 0.477
change 0.203 0.014 0.217
% of total increase 93.52 6.48 100.00
Small firm: 10-49 employees; medium-sized firm: 50-249 employees; large firm: over 250 employees.
Table 2.15: Between vs within sector variance decomposition (Italy, weekly wages)
(a) Change over time
between sector within sector total variance
1985 0.061 0.180 0.240
2018 0.152 0.295 0.447
change 0.092 0.115 0.207
% of total variance increase 44.23 55.77 100.00
(b) Shares
between sector share within sector share total
1985 25.326 74.674 100.00
2018 34.071 65.929 100.00
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Table 2.16: Controlling for sector of the firm: between vs within firm variance decomposition
(Italy, weekly wages)
(a) Change over time
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.057 0.123 0.180
2018 0.138 0.156 0.295
change 0.082 0.033 0.115
% of total increase 71.02 28.98 100.00
(b) Shares
between firm share within firm share total
1985 31.50 68.50 100.00
2018 46.96 53.04 100.00
Table 2.17: Sector and firm: full variance decomposition (Italy, weekly wages)
(a) Change over time
between sector between firms within sector within firm total variance
1985 0.061 0.057 0.123 0.240
2018 0.152 0.138 0.156 0.447
change 0.092 0.082 0.033 0.207
% of total increase 44.23 39.60 16.16 100.00
(b) Shares
between sector share between firms within sector share within firm share total
1985 25.33 23.52 51.15 100.00
2018 34.07 30.96 34.97 100.00
Table 2.18: Controlling for sector of the worker: between vs within firm variance decompo-
sition (Italy, weekly wages)
(a) Change over time
between firm within firm total variance
1985 0.056 0.123 0.180
2018 0.137 0.157 0.295
change 0.081 0.034 0.115
% of total increase 70.29 29.71 100.00
(b) Shares
between firm share within firm share total
1985 31.43 68.57 100.00
2018 46.61 53.39 100.00
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Table 2.19: Sector of the worker and firm: full variance decomposition (Italy, weekly wages)
(a) Change over time
between sector between firms within sector within firm total variance
1985 0.061 0.056 0.123 0.240
2018 0.153 0.137 0.157 0.447
change 0.092 0.081 0.034 0.207
% of total increase 44.40 39.09 16.52 100.00
(b) Shares
between sector share between firms within sector share within firm share total
1985 25.33 23.47 51.20 100.00
2018 34.15 30.69 35.16 100.00
Table 2.20: Song et al. (2019): Between vs within firm variance decomposition (USA, annual
earnings)
(a) Change over time
between firm within firm total variance
1981 0.222 0.430 0.652
2013 0.357 0.489 0.846
change 0.135 0.059 0.194
% of total increase 69.59 30.41 100.00
(b) Shares
between firm share within firm share total
1981 34.05 65.95 100.00
2013 42.20 57.80 100.00
Figures in this table are derived from Table 2 in Song et al. (2019).
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Table 2.21: Song et al. (2019): Between vs within sector variance decomposition (USA,
annual earnings)
(a) Change over time
between sector within sector total variance
1981 0.135 0.517 0.652
2013 0.141 0.705 0.846
change 0.006 0.188 0.194
% of total variance increase 3.09 96.91 100.00
(b) Shares
between sector share within sector share total
1981 20.706 79.294 100.00
2013 16.667 83.333 100.00
Figures in this table are derived from Table 2 in Song et al. (2019).
Table 2.22: Song et al. (2019): Controlling for sector of the firm: between vs within firm
variance decomposition (USA, annual earnings)
(a) Change over time
between firm within firm total variance
1981 0.088 0.429 0.517
2013 0.216 0.489 0.705
change 0.128 0.060 0.188
% of total increase 68.09 31.91 100.00
(b) Shares
between firm share within firm share total
1981 17.02 82.98 100.00
2013 30.64 69.36 100.00
Figures in this table are derived from Table 2 in Song et al. (2019).
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Table 2.23: Song et al. (2019): Sector and firm, full variance decomposition (USA, annual
earnings)
(a) Change over time
between sector between firms within sector within firm total variance
1981 0.135 0.088 0.429 0.652
2013 0.141 0.216 0.489 0.846
change 0.006 0.128 0.060 0.194
% of total increase 3.09 65.98 30.93 100.00
(b) Shares
between sector share between firms within sector share within firm share total
1981 20.71 13.50 65.80 100.00
2013 16.67 25.53 57.80 100.00
Figures in this table are derived from Table 2 in Song et al. (2019).
Table 2.24: Between vs within collective agreement variance decomposition (Italy, annual
earnings)
(a) Change over time
between col. agreement within col. agreement total variance
1985 0.103 0.382 0.486
2018 0.204 0.519 0.723
change 0.101 0.136 0.237
% of total increase 42.64 57.36 100.00
(b) Shares
between col. agreement share within col. agreement share total
1985 21.24 78.76 100.00
2018 28.27 71.73 100.00
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Table 2.25: Collective agreement and firm: full variance decomposition (Italy, annual earn-
ings)
(a) Change over time
between col. agreement between firms within col. agreement within firm total variance
1985 0.103 0.131 0.252 0.486
2018 0.204 0.173 0.345 0.723
change 0.101 0.042 0.094 0.237
% of total increase 42.64 17.90 39.45 100.00
(b) Shares
between col. agreement share between firms within col. agreement share within firm share total
1985 21.24 26.92 51.84 100.00
2018 28.27 23.96 47.77 100.00
Table 2.26: Between vs within collective agreement variance decomposition (Italy, weekly
wages)
(a) Change over time
between col. agreement within col. agreement total variance
1985 0.066 0.174 0.240
2018 0.128 0.319 0.447
change 0.062 0.145 0.207
% of total increase 29.75 70.25 100.00
(b) Shares
between col. agreement share within col. agreement share total
1985 27.61 72.39 100.00
2018 28.60 71.40 100.00
Table 2.27: Collective agreement and firm: full variance decomposition (Italy, weekly wages)
(a) Change over time
between col. agreement between firms within col. agreement within firm total variance
1985 0.066 0.064 0.110 0.240
2018 0.128 0.174 0.146 0.447
change 0.062 0.110 0.035 0.207
% of total increase 29.74 53.15 17.11 100.00
(b) Shares
between col. agreement share between firms within col. agreement share within firm share total
1985 27.61 26.55 45.84 100.00
2018 28.60 38.85 32.55 100.00
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Between vs within firm variance in Italy 1985-2018 (annual earnings).
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(a) Small firms (b) Medium-sized firms
(c) Large firms
Figure 2.2: Different firm sizes: between vs within firm variance in Italy 1985-2018 (annual
earnings).
Small firm: 10-49 employees; medium-sized firm: 50-249; large firm: over 250 employees.
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(a) The correlation coefficient of the between firm
share and the total variance across provinces plotted
over time.
(b) Total variance of log annual earnings for each
province-year pair regressed on year fixed effects.
The resulting residuals regressed on between-firm
variance share.
(c) Total variance of log annual earnings for each
province-year pair regressed on province fixed ef-
fects. The resulting residuals regressed on between-
firm variance share.
(d) Change in the between-firm share and in the
total variance between 1985 and 2018 plotted for
each province.
Figure 2.3: Between-firm variance share and the total variance across Italian provinces and
time(annual earnings).
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Figure 2.4: Between vs within sector variance in Italy 1985-2018 (annual earnings).
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(a) The correlation coefficient of the between sector
share and the total variance across provinces plotted
over time.
(b) Total variance of log annual earnings for each
province-year pair regressed on year fixed effects.
The resulting residuals regressed on between-sector
variance share.
(c) Total variance of log annual earnings for each
province-year pair regressed on province fixed ef-
fects. The resulting residuals regressed on between-
sector variance share.
(d) Change in the between-sector share and in the
total variance between 1985 and 2018 plotted for
each province.
Figure 2.5: Between-sector variance share and the total variance across Italian provinces and
time (annual earnings).
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(a) Controlling for sector of the firm: between vs
within firm variance decomposition.
(b) Sector and firm: full variance decomposition.
Figure 2.6: Sector and firm variance decomposition for the whole of Italy (annual earnings).
Figure 2.7: Between vs within firm variance in Italy 1985-2018 (weekly wages).
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(a) Small firms (b) Medium-sized firms
(c) Large firms
Figure 2.8: Different firm sizes: between vs within firm variance in Italy 1985-2018 (weekly
wages).
Small firm: 10-49 employees; medium-sized firm: 50-249 employees; large firm: over 250
employees.
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(a) The correlation coefficient of the between firm
share and the total variance across provinces plotted
over time.
(b) Total variance of log weekly wages for each
province-year pair regressed on year fixed effects.
The resulting residuals regressed on between-firm
variance share.
(c) Total variance of log weekly wages for each
province-year pair regressed on province fixed ef-
fects. The resulting residuals regressed on between-
firm variance share.
(d) Change in the between-firm share and in the
total variance between 1985 and 2018 plotted for
each province.
Figure 2.9: Between-firm variance share and the total variance across Italian provinces and
time(weekly wages).
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Figure 2.10: Between vs within sector variance in Italy 1985-2018 (weekly wages).
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(a) The correlation coefficient of the between sector
share and the total variance across provinces plotted
over time.
(b) Total variance of log weekly wages for each
province-year pair regressed on year fixed effects.
The resulting residuals regressed on between-sector
variance share.
(c) Total variance of log weekly wages for each
province-year pair regressed on province fixed ef-
fects. The resulting residuals regressed on between-
sector variance share.
(d) Change in the between-sector share and in the
total variance between 1985 and 2018 plotted for
each province.
Figure 2.11: Between-sector variance share and the total variance across Italian provinces
and time (weekly wages).
117
(a) Controlling for sector of the firm: between vs
within firm variance decomposition.
(b) Sector and firm: full variance decomposition.
Figure 2.12: Sector and firm variance decomposition for the whole of Italy (weekly wages).
Figure 2.13: Between vs within collective agreement variance in Italy 1985-2018 (annual
earnings).
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The Aggregate Implications of
Sector-Level vs Firm-Level Wage
Setting in a Frictional Labour Market
3.1 Introduction and Related Literature
In this chapter I examine the degree to which wage dispersion among homogeneous workers
that is driven by firm characteristics varies with different wage setting institutions and the
effects of this type of wage dispersion for firm dynamics and for aggregate outcomes. There
are very large and persistent productivity differences among firms in very narrowly defined
industries (Syverson (2011)) and these productivity differences seem to spill over into wages.
Many studies show that more productive and larger employers systematically pay substan-
tially higher wages than others to workers with similar observable skills performing the same
occupations (Dickens (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988), Lamadon, Mogstad, and Set-
zler (2019)). Studies that use longitudinal data on workers switching between firms typically
find that about 5% to 20% of total wage dispersion can be explained by firms’ pay policies
after controlling for quality of their labour force (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999),
Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), Song et al. (2019)). Furthermore, studies on rent sharing
find elasticities of wages with respect to value added per worker in the range of 0.05–0.15
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(Card, Cardoso, et al. (2018)). In Western European countries typically over 80% of work-
ers are covered by some form of collective wage bargaining (Visser (2016)). In majority of
these countries the main level at which wage bargaining takes place is the sector. However,
there has been a shift towards decentralisation since late 1980s and firm-level bargaining
has gained importance (Ortigueira (2013)). The optimal level at which wages should be
negotiated is a contested issue that is very important for current policy debates.
I build a search model where firms have multiple workers and are heterogeneous in pro-
ductivity whereas workers are homogeneous. There is an endogenous firm entry in the spirit
of Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003). Firms pay a fixed cost of entry and then learn their
time-invariant productivity. They only stay and start producing if the value of the firm,
the discounted sum of future expected profits and losses, is positive. There is a threshold
productivity level which is defined as the level of productivity where a newly created firm is
indifferent between staying or exiting. There are decreasing returns to scale in production.
The costs of recruitment are assumed to be convex. This is supported by empirical stud-
ies that use direct data on recruitment costs (Manning (2006), Blatter, Muehlemann, and
Schenker (2012)). Because the marginal recruitment cost is increasing in the number of hires
in a given time period firms only gradually grow towards their target size. More productive
firms have a larger target size. Thus the model produces dispersion in firm size for two
reasons, time-consuming hiring and differences in permanent firm productivity. The model
is most similar to Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014), but it is in discrete time and contains
fixed costs of production which give rise to the threshold level of firm productivity and a
firm selection mechanism.
Individual wage bargaining in the model follows Stole and Zwiebel (1996). Each worker is
treated as marginal, because the outside option of the worker is unemployment and the out-
side option of the firm is to continue producing with the remaining workers. The individually-
bargained wage is an increasing function of the firm’s marginal product of labour. Individual
wage setting is contrasted with two-tier collective wage bargaining where first a tariff wage
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is set at the sector level and then additional wage premiums are bargained collectively at
the firm level. This section of the model follows closely the framework of collective wage
bargaining in the Scandinavian countries (Barth, Moene, and Willumsen (2014)). Wage is
equal to the tariff wage plus a wage premium. Sector-wide union and employer organisation
negotiate over the tariff wage. The threat point is the possibility of a strike where for one
period firms cannot produce, but they also do not pay wages. Strike is only temporary, both
parties return to the negotiating table in the next period. The tariff wage is an increasing
function of the industry’s average output per worker. Provided that sector-level negotiators
reached an agreement and industry-wide strike had been avoided, firm-level worker represen-
tatives bargain with owners of the firms over the wage premiums. At the firm-level workers
cannot go on a strike, but they can engage in work-to-rule actions where they follow work
instructions in a pedantic manner1. Thus they reduce their effort by a small amount and use
this as a threat to extract wage premiums from the firm. The wage premium is an increasing
function of the firm’s output per worker. The model can capture different degrees of central-
isation of collective wage bargaining by varying the extent to which workers can reduce their
effort during a pay dispute with their firm and thus adjusting the effective worker bargaining
power at firm-level. The greater is the bargaining power of workers at firm-level, the larger
is the dispersion of wages across firms under collective bargaining.
Under both individual bargaining and collective bargaining where workers have some
firm-level bargaining power and thus wage premiums are paid the wage is increasing in the
firm’s permanent productivity and it is decreasing in the firm’s employment level. Because
of decreasing returns to scale, gradual growth in employment and the fact that the firm’s
productivity is time-invariant, in both cases the wage that the firm pays is declining in the
firm’s age and thus younger firms pay a wage premium. This is in line with the empirical
results of Schmieder (2013) and Babina et al. (2019). Once at the target size, more productive
firms are not only larger, but also pay higher wages, as they face a higher cost of replacing
1Thus workers do tasks and duties that are specifically outlined in their contracts, but they do not do
anything extra and they show no initiative.
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a worker due to convexity of the recruitment cost. In both settings a firm with a higher
permanent productivity will face a higher wage rate along its entire growth path.
I explore the aggregate outcomes of reducing the wage dispersion across firms. I am
particularly interested in changes in total value added which is equal to total production of
the final good minus the three types of costs that are a deadweight loss in the model (firm
entry, fixed and recruitment costs). First, there is a Firm Entry Effect. Under firm-level
wage bargaining (either individual or collective) firms face high wage costs when they are
far from their target size and this reduces their profitability in the first periods of their
life. Reducing this young firm wage premium increases firm profitability in the early periods
which due to discounting has a large positive effect on the value of firms. The larger is the
discounting of future profits, the stronger is this effect. More entry raises the stock of firms
as well as total employment and production. This increases total value added. On the other
hand, greater entry and fixed costs lower total value added. Thus the overall effect on total
value added is ambiguous.
Second, there is a Firm selection effect. On one hand, a compression of wage dispersion
across firms reduces the young firm wage premium. This means that firms save on wage
costs in the early periods of their life and that they can afford to grow more slowly, saving
on convex recruitment costs. This boost in profitability of firms of all productivity levels
enables even less productive firms to survive in the sector. On the other hand, under firm-
level wage bargaining, a firm with higher permanent productivity faces a higher wage than
a firm with lower permanent productivity along its entire growth path. Wage compression
means that high and low productivity firms face the same wage rates. This enforces stricter
selection of firms with a higher threshold productivity. Ex ante it is unclear which of the
two opposing effects will dominate.
Third, under firm-level bargaining wage is an increasing function of either marginal prod-
uct of labour (individual bargaining) or average product of labour (collective bargaining).
Due to decreasing returns to scale wages are decreasing in firm size and hence firms can
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lower the wage that they face by hiring more workers. As E. Smith (1999) and Cahuc and
Wasmer (2001) have found for the case of individual wage bargaining and Bauer and Lin-
gens (2013) for the case of firm-level unions, this leads to an over-employment effect. Firms
grow to a larger size than they would if there was perfectly competitive labour market and
wage was independent of firm size. In my model when wage dispersion across firms is reduced
(via greater centralisation of wage bargaining) the relationship between firm size and wage
is weakened and thus firms have smaller incentives to over-hire. This lowers the average
size of firms (Firm size effect). Due to decreasing returns to scale a lower average firm size
raises the average output per worker in the economy. The total value added rises for two
reasons: because firms are smaller they save resources on recruitment costs and the average
output per worker is higher. Therefore we can see that while the decision about when to
stop growing under firm-level wage bargaining is privately efficient for the firm (the firm is
maximising its value) it may be very inefficient from the point of view of a social planner
that is maximising the total value added in the economy.
I solve the model numerically and calibrate it using the method of simulated moments,
thus matching model-generated moments with selected data moments. I present a model
with individual wage bargaining that is calibrated to match US data moments, as well as a
model with two-tier collective wage bargaining calibrated to match Swedish data moments.
I compare the two cases and also run three counterfactual experiments. First, I apply com-
pletely centralised sector-level wage bargaining to the USA. I compare aggregate outcomes
under individually-bargained wages with sector level bargaining for different levels of bar-
gaining power of the sector-level union. I am particularly interested in the model economy
with sector bargaining where the average wage is the same as in the individual wage bar-
gaining case. Second, I take the model economy with individual wage bargaining that is
calibrated to the USA and simultaneously reduce bargaining power of workers in individual
negotiations and increase the worker outside option. I focus on such combinations of the two
parameters where the mean wage remains the same. In this way I am reducing wage disper-
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sion among homogeneous workers while keeping the average wage level the same. Third, I
take the model economy with two-tier collective bargaining that is calibrated to Sweden and
I investigate the effects of changes in the firm-level worker bargaining power.
The main finding from all the counterfactual experiments is that wage compression where
the average wage remains the same tends to have positive effects on total value added as
total production rises by more than the three types of deadweight loss in the model: firm
entry, fixed and recruitment costs. There are two main factors that contribute to this. The
first one is the Firm entry effect. Reducing the young firm wage premium is similar to
lowering the cost of creating firms. Thus there is more firm entry and a larger stock of firms.
The second one is the Firm size effect. Weakening the link between wages and the firm’s
marginal (average) product of labour reduces the incentive for firms to over-hire and thus
results in lower average firm size. Both effects contribute towards a larger total production
of the final good. Lower average firm size leads to lower total recruitment costs while more
entry leads to larger total entry and fixed costs. However, in all of my simulations the net
effect is that total production rises by more than the three types of costs and thus total
value added rises. Finally, this kind of mean-preserving wage compression seems to reduce
the firm productivity threshold.
To sum up, this chapter argues that the wage dispersion driven by firm characteristics via
rent sharing has negative efficiency implications as it discourages firm entry and encourages
over-employment by firms. Furthermore, I show that centralisation of wage bargaining can
reduce wage dispersion across firms and thus result in better aggregate outcomes.
This chapter contributes to four strands of literature. First, there is a new, emerging
literature that identifies young firm wage premium. Babina et al. (2019) use US data and
find that while young firms on average pay lower wages, after controlling for firm and worker
time-invariant heterogeneity using fixed effects there is a statistically significant young-firm
pay premium that is monotonically decreasing with firm age. They find that firms aged
one year or less pay 6.4 log point wage premium compared to firms older than 20 years.
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Schmieder (2013) uses German data and finds that after controlling for establishment and
worker fixed effects, establishments aged one year or less pay on average a wage premium
of 10% compared to establishments over 20 years old. I provide a novel theoretical expla-
nation for these empirical results. When firms are young they have few workers relative to
their target size and thus their marginal product of labour is relatively high. In individual
negotiations a worker can threaten to leave and it takes time and resources to replace him.
When a firm is young each worker is more valuable to the company than when the firm is
older and it had time to grow to its target size.
Second, I contribute to the literature that builds search models with multi-worker firms
that are heterogeneous in productivity. In the seminal paper of Elsby and Michaels (2013)
hiring costs are linear, but there is wage dispersion because of idiosyncratic shocks to firm
productivity. In Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) wages vary across heterogeneous firms be-
cause of convexity of recruitment cost. Both papers assume decreasing returns to scale
in production. There are a number of papers that apply the large-firm search model to
the analysis of international trade or product market deregulation (Felbermayr, Prat, and
Schmerer (2011), Felbermayr and Prat (2011)). These models assume constant returns to
scale in production and generate decreasing marginal revenue product of labour as a result
of monopolistic competition in the product market. Furthermore, they include firm selection
mechanism as a result of the presence of fixed costs of production. However, they assume
linear recruitment cost and there are no firm-level shocks and hence firms of all productivity
levels pay the same wage. Bauer and Lingens (2013) is the only paper that includes firm-level
collective bargaining in a large-firm search model setting. However, firms are assumed to be
homogeneous in productivity and thus there is a single wage rate in the economy and no
firm selection. My paper is the first that includes both variation in wages across firms and
firm selection mechanism.
Third, there are studies that compare the effects of sector-level unions with firm-level
unions and find that equalisation of wages across firms that are heterogeneous in produc-
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tivity leads to a higher threshold level of firm productivity and to a higher average labour
productivity2. The main way in which these papers differ from one another is in the as-
sumptions that they make in order to generate wages that are increasing in firm produc-
tivity. Moene and Wallerstein (1997) use vintage capital model where productivity of a
plant is simply a function of its age and workers use the threat of a strike to extract higher
wages. The main limitation is that the employment level of plants is assumed to be fixed.
The model in Braun (2011) uses variable demand elasticity, but lacks general equilibrium
effects. Pinto (2017) presents a model with monopolistic competition, CES demand and
”rent-sharing motives”. Pinto (2017) assumes that workers have relative preferences where
they compare their wage payments with the profit of the firm at which they are employed. If
the firm’s profits go up and the wages remain unchanged then workers lose utility. Unlike the
studies above, my model includes two-tier wage bargaining which is both a better description
of how collective bargaining works in real life and offers the ability to adjust the degree of
centralisation of collective bargaining in the model.
Fourth, there are models where rent sharing is generated as a result of search frictions
and sector-level wage-setting is compared with individually bargained wages (Boeri and
Burda (2009), Jimeno and Thomas (2013), Vona and Zamparelli (2014)). However, these
models only feature single-worker firms and constant returns to scale. Therefore they are
unable to shed light on how the wage bargaining between a worker and a firm is influenced
by how many other workers the firm has. Furthermore, these models say nothing about firm
dynamics under different wage-setting regimes given that the unit of analysis is a match, not
a firm.
Finally, this paper is the first to introduce collective wage bargaining at different levels
of centralisation into a large firm search model and to compare its aggregate implications
to individual wage bargaining. I provide two novel arguments in favour of sector-level bar-
2This channel has first been proposed by the architects of the ”Scandinavian model” Gösta Rehn and
Rudolf Meidner in the 1950s and it has been influential in debates about the merits of centralised wage
bargaining in the Scandinavian countries (Rehn (1952)).
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gaining. Firstly, centralised wage setting can reduce the young firm wage premium and thus
encourage more firm entry. Secondly, it can weaken the link between firm size and wages
and thus reduce the inefficiencies associated with the over-employment effect which has been
identified by the existing literature.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Model Setting
The model is in discrete time. There is a mass of homogeneous workers equal to N who each
supply one unit of labour inelastically. Both firms and workers are risk-neutral and discount
future at the rate r. Firms produce a homogeneous good with price normalised to 1. All
costs in the model are measured in units of this single good. All firms face the same fixed
cost of operating F p > 03, but they have different productivity levels z. Firm entry is in
the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003). Every period a firm can be created and
enter the market by paying an entry cost F e. When a firm enters, it draws the level of its
idiosyncratic productivity z > 0 from a distribution that has probability density function
f(z) and cumulative density function F(z). z is then constant over the life of the firm4. In
the first period after entry a firm has no workers.
Because of the fixed costs of production not all firms that enter the industry will actually
produce. After the new firm learns its productivity, it will decide to exit if the value of
the firm (the sum of discounted future profits and losses) is negative. This happens if the
productivity draw is too low. Hence there will be a minimum level of productivity z∗ that a
3I think of F p as the costs that a firm has to pay in order to simply continue existing such as the costs
of red tape. When calibrating the model I use an estimate of administrative costs of government regulation
as a target for F p > 0.
4There are very large productivity differences among firms in very narrowly defined industries and these
differences are very persistent across time. For example within 4-digit industries in the US manufacturing
sector the plant at the 90th percentile of the productivity distribution makes almost twice as much output
with the same measured inputs as the 10th percentile plant. Secondly, regressing a producer’s current TFP
on its one-year lagged TFP yields autoregressive coefficients on the order of 0.6 to 0.8 (Syverson (2011)).
For this reason the model focuses on time-invariant productivity differences between firms.
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firm needs to have in order to operate in the market.
Labour is the only input in production. Production function y(n, z) exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. I assume the standard Cobb-Douglas form.
y(n, z) = znα (3.1)
where α ∈ (0, 1). At every point in time, firm’s employment level n is predetermined and
cannot be increased instantaneously due to the search friction.
The cost of posting vacancies c(v) is assumed to be convex and thus marginal cost of
vacancy posting c′(v) is increasing in the number of vacancies posted in the same time period:




c′(v) = λ+ γv
(3.2)
where λ captures the linear component of hiring cost and γ captures the convex part.
I assume that the recruitment cost is convex and not linear for the following three reasons.
First, empirical studies that use direct information on firm recruitment costs (includes the
cost of posting vacancies, advertising and screening) show that recruitment costs are convex
in the number of hires for a given time period (Manning (2006),Blatter, Muehlemann, and
Schenker (2012)). They also find that larger firms face higher average hiring costs. Addi-
tionally, Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker (2012) find that while the degree of convexity
is smaller in the large firms (over 100 employees), because they hire so many workers they
still pay approx. 4 times more per worker hired than the smallest firms. Second, with linear
vacancy cost firms post very large number of vacancies in very short time and they jump
straight to their target size n∗(z). With convex recruitment cost firms only gradually grow
towards their target size. Third, due to convexity of recruitment cost, larger firms face
higher cost of replacing a worker. Because of this even when firms had time to adjust their
employment to the desired level (every firm is at its target size n∗(z)) marginal products
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of labour are not equalized across firms and thus more productive firms are paying higher
wages than less productive firms in equilibrium with individual wage bargaining.
Matching is random. The number of matches between workers and firms per unit time
is given by the aggregate matching function M(u, vtot). N is an increasing, concave function
of the measure of total vacancies vtot and the measure of total unemployed workers u and it
has constant returns to scale. Each firm meets a worker at a Poisson rate v q(θ) = v M(u,vtot)
vtot
that is proportional to v, the number of vacancies that it posts. In other words the time it
takes to hire one worker is lower the more vacancies you post. An unemployed worker meets
some firm at a Poisson rate θq(θ) = M(u,vtot)
u
that is identical across workers. The market
tightness is given by θ = vtot
u
.
Individual matches between firms and workers are destroyed at an exogenous Poisson
rate s ∈ (0, 1). This ensures that firms have to post vacancies even if they only want to
stay at their current size, because they have to replace the workers that they are losing
due to exogenous separation. Firms themselves are destroyed at an exogenous Poisson rate
δ ∈ (0, 1). This ensures that in equilibrium there is continuous firm entry and exit. Every
period some firms are entering and some firms are exiting the industry. In the steady-state
the inflows and outflows of firms are equal to each other such that the stock of firms is
constant. When a firm is destroyed all of its workers become unemployed. These two shocks
are independent across firms and across employed workers.
Let us consider firm dynamics in the model. A new firm has very few employees and thus
it has a high marginal product of labor. Therefore the firm chooses to post many vacancies
and to grow quickly. However, because of the convex hiring cost, its speed of growth is finite.
As the firm grows, its marginal product of labour falls and it reduces the intensity of hiring.
The firm is growing towards its target size n∗ which is defined as the level of employment
where the new hires are only large enough to offset the departing workers that the firm is
losing because of exogenous separations. I show in later section that under both individual
and collective wage bargaining firms with larger time-invariant productivity z have a larger
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target size n∗(z). In equilibrium there is firm size dispersion for two reasons: 1.) differences
in firm productivity implying different target sizes and 2.) time-consuming hiring that leads
to firms of different age being at different distance from their respective target sizes.
3.2.2 Firm and Worker Value Functions
Each firm chooses a path for vacancies to maximize the sum of discounted future expected
profits while taking the macroeconomic variables (e.g. the labor market tightness), and the
law of motion of its workforce as given. Firms open as many vacancies as necessary to hire
in expectation the desired number of workers next period.
The value of a firm with productivity z and employment n, Π(n, z), is given by the
following Bellman equation:
Π(n, z) = max
v
{




subject to n′ = n− sn+ q(θ)v
(3.3)
where firm’s size n and time-invariant productivity z are the firm’s state variables and
the number of vacancies v is the firm’s control variable.
Size of the firm next period n’ is equal to the workers that stay with the firm (1 − s)n
plus the new hires q(θ)v. Profits in any given period are given by firm’s revenues y(n, z)
minus wage costs nw(n, z), fixed cost of production F p and the cost of posting vacancies
c(v). I allow for the fact that the wage can be a function of firm size and productivity.
The first-order condition of (3.3) characterizing the optimal vacancy-posting strategy of










The number of posted vacancies is chosen optimally, so that the discounted increase in
the value of the firm as a result of hiring one extra worker is equal to the expected cost of
hiring an extra worker.
Let us consider timing in the model. Wages are renegotiated every period. I assume that
workers and firms cannot commit to future wages. Hence the choice of vt and wt takes place
simultaneously, but they are independent. First, vt has no impact on nt and thus it has no
impact on wt. In other words, because hiring is a time-consuming process, employment is
predetermined when wage bargaining takes place. The firm has an existing workforce at any
given time and it is not able to adjust its size instantaneously. Second, wt has no effect on
vt. vt only depends on the expected wt+1. This is because the number of vacancies is chosen
in a forward-looking way. The firm at t knows how its choice of vt affects nt+1 and thus wt+1.
The firm takes into account the way in which its hiring decision today influences the size
of the its workforce and thus also its bargaining position the next period. Differentiating the
maximised Bellman equation for firm value with respect to current employment n, using the














Hence hiring a marginal worker not only means that the firm produces more output and
that it has to pay a wage to another worker, but it may also affect the wage that the firm has
to pay to its existing workers. I show in Section 3.2.4.1 that with individual wage bargaining
the wage is decreasing in the size of the firm. Thus the firm can lower the wage that it faces
by hiring more workers - there is wage externality from employment5.
The value of a worker employed at a firm with productivity z and employment n, W(n,z),
5This is not a new result. E. Smith (1999) and Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) show that in a large firm search
model with individual wage bargaining modelled as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) firms tend to over-employ
compared to the benchmark of a perfectly competitive labour market.
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is given by:




(s+ δ − sδ)U + (1− s− δ + sδ)W (n′, z)
}
where n′ = n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z)
(3.6)
An employed worker receives wage w(n,z) that can potentially depend on the size and
productivity of his employer. The worker can lose his job when hit by a job separation shock
s or when the firm that he is employed at is destroyed which takes place at rate δ. Otherwise
the worker stays employed at the same firm next period where the firm’s productivity is the
same, but its size may change.












An unemployed worker receives b every period. This can be thought of as the value of
leisure, the value of home production or the unemployment benefit. The probability that
an unemployed worker becomes employed next period is given by the job-finding-rate θq(θ).
The worker is randomly matched with a certain firm from the pool of vacancies. Therefore
the value of an unemployed worker depends on the distribution of vacancies by firm size and
productivity. This in turn depends on the joint distribution of firm size and productivity and
on the intensity of vacancy posting of different kinds of firms. Only firms with productivity z
greater than z∗ are active and the largest firm size for a given z is the firm target size n∗(z).

















where vtot is the total number of vacancies, v(n,z) gives the number of vacancies posted by
firms with size n and productivity z and h(n,z) gives the number of firms with productivity





where x is the total number of firms, f(z) and F(z) are respectively the pdf and the cdf of
the distribution from which a new firm draws its productivity, g(n|z) gives the probability
that firm size takes value n given that firm productivity is equal to z.
















n h(n, z) dn dz
(3.10)
3.2.3 Firm Entry
Firm Entry Condition: There is free entry in every period and thus it must hold in equilib-
rium that before observing the productivity, expected profits are equal to entry costs:
∫ ∞
z∗
Π(0, z) f(z) dz = F e (3.11)
where F e denotes fixed cost of entry. However, successful firm entry occurs only if the draw
of z is above the threshold z∗.
Minimum Productivity Condition: Right after learning its productivity z, a firm decides
to exit the market if it’s value, the sum of discounted future profits, is negative. This defines
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z∗, the productivity level where the firm is indifferent between staying and exiting.
Π(0, z∗) = 0 (3.12)
Firms will generally make losses in the first periods of life as they are hiring intensely which
is costly and they have to pay the fixed costs of production while they are producing below
their optimal size. As firms become older and larger they hire less intensely and the fixed
costs per unit of output decline. The fact that profits are rising in the firm’s age seems to
be a good fit for real-world firm dynamics. Discounted profits in the later periods have to
be large enough to offset the losses in the early periods for a firm to have a positive value
and to successfully enter the industry.
The level of firm entry every period e > 0 is implicitly determined by the firm entry
condition (3.11). An increase in entry leads to a larger x, the mass of firms in the steady
state, as can be seen from (3.13).








As a consequence of a larger number of producing firms, more vacancies are posted and the
aggregate employment is higher, increasing labour market tightness. This reduces the rate at
which vacancies are filled and thus makes hiring more costly for firms. As a result the value
of a new firm with no workers Π(0, z) falls for every level of productivity z. Thus expected
profits from entry fall in the level of entry. The left-hand-side of (3.11) is decreasing in e,
while the right-hand-side is constant.
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3.2.4 Wage Bargaining
3.2.4.1 Individual Wage Bargaining
The firm bargains with each individual worker separately as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
Therefore each worker is treated as the marginal worker. Worker’s outside option is the
value of unemployment. Firm’s outside option is the value of the firm without that worker.
Therefore the worker’s surplus is W (n, z)−U and the firm’s surplus is equal to the increase
in the value of the firm from hiring the marginal worker, ∂Π(n,z)
∂n
. Due to symmetry the firm
will pay the same wage to all its workers. Wage satisfies the following surplus-splitting rule:
(1− β)(W (n, z)− U) = β∂Π(n, z)
∂n
(3.14)
where the parameter β ∈ (0, 1) captures the bargaining power of the worker. Stole and
Zwiebel (1996) show that condition (3.14) can be micro-founded either by cooperative or
non-cooperative game theory.
Proposition 1 The bargained wage, wI(n, z), solves the differential equation:








The proof of Proposition 1 as well as proofs of all the Lemmas are in the Appendix.
The expression above shows that, as in the standard search model, wage is increasing in the
worker’s outside option rU, in the marginal product of labour ∂y(n,z)
∂n
and in worker bargaining
power β. However, there is an additional term, ∂w(n,z)
∂n
n. This captures the fact that changes
in the size of the firm’s labour force have effect on the wage that it pays. Consider a firm’s
negotiations with a given worker. If these negotiations break down, the firm will have to
pay its remaining workers a higher wage. This is because the fall in the number of workers
implies that the marginal product of labour will be higher and thus each of the remaining
workers is more valuable to the firm. The stronger is this effect, the more the firm loses from
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a breakdown of negotiation with a particular worker and thus workers can obtain a higher
wage.
Lemma 1 The solution to the differential equation of Proposition 1 is given by:








I find that holding employment constant, wage is increasing in firm productivity. Addi-
tionally, holding firm productivity constant, wage is decreasing in employment. We can see
this graphically on Figure 3.16.
Figure 3.1: Wage for different permanent productivity and firm size levels
Corollary 1 Under individual bargaining, as a firm grows towards its target size, the wage
that it pays is declining. Therefore a young firm pays a wage premium compared to an old
firm with the same time-invariant productivity z.
A firm starts life with no workers. It then gradually grows in size via costly hiring. Firm
6Figures 3.1, 3.2(a) and 3.2(b) come from the model economy with individual wage bargaining that is
calibrated to match US data moments and is discussed in Section 3.3.1.1.
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productivity is constant over the life of the firm. Therefore the wage rate that the firm faces
is declining over time as the firm is growing towards its target size. For firms with the same
time-invariant productivity z, wage is decreasing in firm age because older firms are larger
and are closer to the target size for that z. Thus young firms pay a wage premium.
This is supported by data. Schmieder (2013) uses linked employer-employee data from
Germany and shows that controlling for establishment and worker fixed effects, wages are
monotonically declining in firm age up to the age of 20 years when the effect disappears
(equivalent of the target size in my model). Controlling for establishment time-invariant
heterogeneity and worker composition, wages in establishments aged 1 year or less are
on average 10 percent higher than in the establishments that are more than 20 years
old. Schmieder (2013) also presents evidence that this difference is not a compensation
for higher unemployment risk or slower future wage growth in young establishments. Babina
et al. (2019) use data for the USA and show that while young firms on average pay lower
wages, after controlling for firm and worker heterogeneity using firm and worker fixed effects,
young firms actually pay more. They find a statistically significant young-firm pay premium
that is monotonically decreasing with firm age. Specifically, firms aged one year or less pay
6.4 log point wage premium compared to firms older than 20 years.
Lemma 2 Under individual wage bargaining the flow value of unemployment (reservation
wage) is given by:












The flow value of unemployment rU which acts as the reservation wage is increasing in
the value of leisure b, in the job-finding-rate θq(θ) and in the size of the average surplus from
employment relationship in the economy.













n∗ − 1− δ
r + δ
α(1− β)
αβ + 1− β
zn∗(α−1) = 0 (3.18)
The firms with larger time-invariant productivity grow towards a larger target size; n∗(z) is
increasing in z.
Even with rent-sharing, more productive firms find it optimal to grow towards a larger
size. This is simply the result of differences in time-invariant productivity between firms and
decreasing returns to scale. This positive relationship is displayed on Figure 3.2(a).
We can see from Lemma 3 that faster decreasing returns to labour (lower α) lead to a
smaller target size for a given z, holding everything else constant. The more costly is the
vacancy posting (larger λ and γ) the smaller is the target size for a given z. The higher
is the rate of exogenous job destruction (larger s), the lower is the target size for a given
z. Higher labour market tightness θ increases the cost of hiring and thus lowers the target
size for any z. Larger flow value of unemployment increases the outside option of workers in
wage bargaining and pushes up wages and thus reduces the target size for each level of z.




















Thus, more productive firms pay higher wages at their respective target size.
We can see from Lemma 4 that the firm continues to grow until the wage that it pays
equals the outside option of the worker, plus an extra term that is the result of the fact that







captures the cost of hiring the marginal
worker when the firm is at its target size.
The intuition for the result in Lemma 4 is straightforward. A firm with a larger time-
invariant productivity z will grow towards a larger target size, as shown in Lemma 3. Because
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of its larger size, it will be losing more workers due to exogenous separations of matches.
Thus it has to hire more workers every period just to stay at its target size. Given that
hiring cost is convex, the marginal cost of hiring is higher for a larger firm. Thus the cost
of replacing the marginal worker is higher for a firm with larger z. Under individual wage
bargaining where each worker is treated as the marginal worker, this produces the outcome
that at their respective target sizes the more productive firms pay higher wages. This can
be seen graphically on Figure 3.2(b).
We can see from Lemma 4 that holding everything else constant, the wage at the target
firm size is increasing in the rate of exogenous firm destruction δ. The wage is also increasing
in the cost of vacancy posting (λ and γ) and in the rate of exogenous job destruction
s. Furthermore, larger flow value of unemployment, rU, and worker bargaining power in
individual negotiations, β, also each increase the wage at the target firm size.
Corollary 2 Under individual bargaining, a high z firm faces a higher wage than a low z
firm for all levels of n from 0 up to n∗(z).
The proof of this is straightforward. Each firm starts life with no workers and then
gradually grows towards its target size. We can see from Lemma 1 and Figure 3.1 that for
the same firm size, wages are increasing in permanent firm productivity z and that holding
permanent firm productivity constant, wages are monotonically decreasing in firm size. A
firm with a higher z grows towards a larger target size (Lemma 3), but even at the target
size where its wage rate is the lowest it still faces a higher wage rate than a firm with a lower
z at its respective target size (Lemma 4). Hence we can conclude that a firm with a higher
permanent productivity z will face a higher wage rate along its entire growth path than a
firm with a lower z.
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(a) Target firm size for different productivity levels (b) Wages at firm target sizes
Figure 3.2: A numerical example of how target firm size and wage at the target size evolve
with firm productivity.
3.2.4.2 Two-tier Collective Wage Bargaining
I assume that the model economy has a single sector. Therefore sector-wide and economy-
wide wage setting are equivalent in this model7. Analysis of interactions between wage
bargaining in different sectors is beyond the scope of this paper.
The wage under two-tier collective wage bargaining is given by:
wC(n, z) = T + p(n, z) (3.20)
Wage in the centralised case is composed of two parts: tariff wage T that is bargained
at the sector level and applies to all the homogeneous workers; and wage premium p(n,z)
that is bargained at the firm-level and therefore depends on the firm’s characteristics (size
and productivity). This set up follows closely the real world where sector-level employer
organisations and unions bargain over minimum wages for each occupation. Firms and firm-
level unions are then free to agree to wages that are higher than the minimum. However,
bargaining power of workers at the local level is limited by the fact that they cannot go on
7I could equivalently assume that there are Z identical sectors in the economy producing the single
homogeneous good. Because of symmetry one could then focus on just one sector without loss of generality.
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strike, only the sector-level union has a right to call a strike.
Timing: Every period, the sector-level bargaining over the tariff wage takes place before
the firm-level bargaining over the wage premiums. Firm-level bargaining only takes place if
the parties at the sector-level reach an agreement. Otherwise, there is a sector-wide strike















Figure 3.3: Two-tier collective wage bargaining
How are the wage premiums determined? If the bargaining parties at the sector-level
reach an agreement and there is no sector-wide strike, then firm-level worker representatives
bargain with owners of the firms over the wage premiums. This section of the model follows
closely the framework of collective wage bargaining in the Scandinavian countries, especially
in Sweden and Norway. At the firm level workers cannot go on a strike, but they can engage
in work-to-rule actions where they follow work instructions in a pedantic manner (Barth,
Moene, and Willumsen (2014)). Thus they reduce their effort by a small amount while still
not breaking their contract and thus keeping their job. Workers can use this as a threat to
extract wage premiums from the firm (Moene (1988), Moene, Wallerstein, and Hoel (1993)).
During such local conflicts workers still receive the tariff wage T, but they no longer get the
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premiums p(n,z). Firms produce less output.
Individual wage bargaining is banned in the model, workers can only negotiate with the
firm collectively via their representatives. However, each worker can choose to stay or leave
the firm. Therefore in equilibrium all employed workers must be better off staying with their
firm during a local conflict over pay rather than leaving and becoming unemployed. Later I
present an equilibrium condition that must hold for this to be true and I restrict attention
to only those combinations of parameter values where this condition holds.
Value of the firm in the case of an agreement:
Π̄(n, z) = max
v̄≥0
{




subject to n′ = n− sn+ q(θ)v̄
(3.21)
Value of the firm in the case of a local disagreement:
Π̃L(n, z) = max
ṽ≥0
{




subject to n′ = n− sn+ q(θ)ṽ
(3.22)
where
Π(n, z) = max
[
Π̄(n, z), Π̃L(n, z)
]
= Π̄(n, z) (3.23)
and ε ∈ (0, 1). Thus during a local conflict workers reduce their level of effort and output is
reduced by a fraction (1 - ε). The local disagreement over pay only lasts one period. At the
beginning of the next period the firm and the workers come back to the negotiating table. A
local conflict over pay has no permanent effects, it does not make disagreement next period
more or less likely. Hence the value next period is the same in (3.21) and (3.22).
I assume that both the firm and the worker expect that in the next period an agreement
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at sector level about the tariff wage will be reached and thus an industry-wide strike will
be avoided. This expectation is correct in equilibrium. In the next period the firm and the
worker can again either reach an agreement or not. However, there is no benefit to either
party from the disagreement outcome, as the firm loses the fraction (1-ε) of its output and
the worker loses the wage premium. Thus both sides expect to be in the agreement state
Π̄(n, z) next period.
















Vacancies are chosen in a forward-looking way such that the expected benefit from having
one extra worker tomorrow is equal to the cost of hiring that extra worker. Given that a
conflict over pay is temporary and does not change the expected state tomorrow, firms will
post the same number of vacancies in both the agreement and the disagreement states.
v̄(n, z) = ṽ(n, z) = v(n, z) (3.25)
The maximised value functions of the firm in the two states are thus given by:






n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)






n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)
(3.26)
Firm’s gain from an agreement is given by: Π̄(n, z)− Π̃L(n, z) = (1− ε)y(n, z)− np
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Value of the worker in the case of an agreement:




(s+ δ − sδ)U
+ (1− s− δ + sδ)W
(
n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)} (3.27)
Value of the worker in the case of a local disagreement:




(s+ δ − sδ)U
+ (1− s− δ + sδ)W
(
n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)} (3.28)
where
W (n, z) = max
[
W̄ (n, z), W̃L(n, z)
]
= W̄ (n, z) (3.29)
Thus the surplus of each worker is given by: W̄ (n, z)− W̃L(n, z) = p. I assume that all the
workers at a particular firm are members of the firm-level union and that the union cares
about all of its members equally. Therefore the union’s gain from reaching an agreement
(union surplus) is: np







(1− ε)y(n, z)− np
)1−ω
(3.30)
where ω ∈ (0, 1) represents bargaining power of workers at the firm-level. Thus the wage
premium is given by:
p(n, z) = (1− ε)ωy(n, z)
n
(3.31)
We can see that the wage premium is an increasing function of output per worker of the firm.
Holding employment constant, wage premium is increasing in firm productivity. Holding firm
productivity constant, wage premium is decreasing in employment. The effective bargaining
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power of workers at the local level is captured by (1− ε)ω, thus an increase in ω or a fall in
ε imply greater wage premiums.
How is the tariff wage determined? The tariff wage T is the result of Nash bargaining
between a union representing all the employed workers in the sector and an employer or-
ganisation representing all the firms in the sector. The threat point is the possibility of a
sector-wide strike, for one period there is no production. Both parties take up the negotia-
tion again in the next period. During the strike workers continue to be employed, but they
do not receive the tariff wage or wage premiums. Instead they receive the value of leisure b.
Firms cannot produce for one period, they are not paying out wages, but they still have to
pay the fixed cost and the vacancy cost.
I do not assume that the outside option during sector-level wage bargaining is destruction
of all employment relationships, i.e. all workers leaving firms or firms firing all the workers.
This is because it would not be a credible threat. Employment relationships generate a joint
surplus that glues the negotiating parties together (Hall and Milgrom (2008), Jimeno and
Thomas (2013)). In the model hiring is a costly process and value of the firm is generally
increasing in the size of its labour force. Losing all workers would mean that each firm would
have to go through the slow and expensive process of re-hiring them and it would end up
where it started. Workers receive the value of leisure under both a strike and unemployment.
Thus a more realistic threat is that of a temporary strike. In equilibrium strikes never happen
as the parties always find it beneficial to reach an agreement. However, the possibility of a
strike enables workers to extract a share of the joint surplus.
Employer organisation is assumed to be maximising the stock market value (the value of
all firms) in a steady state8. The employer organisation’s surplus from an agreement is the





SF (n, z) h(n, z) dn dz (3.32)
8In future work I want to investigate stability of this steady state.
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where SF (n, z) is the surplus from an agreement of a firm with size n and productivity z and
h(n,z) gives the measure of firms with employment n and productivity z in the steady state
and is defined in (3.9).
Value of a firm in the case of an agreement:
Π(n, z) = max
[
Π̄(n, z), Π̃L(n, z)
]






n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)
(3.33)
Value of a firm in the case of a sector-wide strike:





n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)
(3.34)
First, I assume that the sector-level union and employer organisation expect that if
an agreement about the tariff wage is reached then the firm-level negotiations about wage
premiums will always end up in an agreement i.e. the value of the firm will be Π̄(n, z) and
not Π̃L(n, z). This expectation is correct in equilibrium.
Second, I assume that the industry-wide strike is temporary and it has no effect on the
likelihood of a strike next period. Therefore hiring is unaffected by a potential strike (the
same argument as in the derivation of wage premiums).
Third, I assume that the sector-level negotiators are aware of the fact that the choice of
T will be followed by bargaining over wage premiums at every firm and that they understand
the structure of these negotiations and the size of the effective bargaining power of workers
at local level. Therefore they can correctly predict the size of the wage premiums9.
9Because workers receive the tariff wage during both firm-level states: an agreement or conflict, the
choice of T has no impact on the determination of wage premiums p(n,z). The level of the tariff wage might
affect what kind of firms (in terms of size and permanent productivity) exist in the steady state, but not the
size of the wage premium for a particular firm size and productivity combination.
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Finally, a firm’s gain from an agreement is given by:
SF (n, z) = Π̄(n, z)− Π̃S(n, z) = y(n, z)− n(T + p(n, z)) (3.35)






y(n, z)− n(T + p(n, z))
)







y(n, z)− nT − (1− ε)ωy(n, z)
)







(1− (1− ε)ω) y(n, z)− nT
)
h(n, z) dn dz
= (1− (1− ε)ω)Y − TL
(3.36)












n h(n, z) dn dz
(3.37)
I assume that all employed workers are members of the sector-level union and that the
union cares about all of its members equally. Thus surplus of the sector-level union is the





SW (n, z) n h(n, z) dn dz (3.38)
Value of a worker in the case of an agreement:




(s+ δ − sδ)U
+ (1− s− δ + sδ)W
(
n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)} (3.39)
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Value of a worker in the case of a sector-wide strike:




(s+ δ − sδ)U
+ (1− s− δ + sδ)W
(
n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)} (3.40)
Surplus from an agreement of a worker employed at firm with size n and productivity z:
SW (n, z) = W̄ (n, z)− W̃S(n, z) = T + p(n, z)− b (3.41)






T + p(n, z)− b
)











n h(n, z) dn dz
= TL+ (1− ε)ωY − bL
(3.42)





TL+ (1− ε)ωY − bL
)µ (
(1− (1− ε)ω)Y − TL
)1−µ
(3.43)
where µ ∈ (0, 1) represents bargaining power of the sector-level union. I assume that the
sector-wide union and the employer organisation take the aggregate output Y and aggregate
employment L as given. Thus they do not internalize the effect that the choice of the tariff











Thus we can see that holding Y
L
constant, the tariff wage is increasing in the worker
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power at sector-level, µ, and it is decreasing in worker power at firm-level, (1− ε)ω. Larger
wage premiums imply a smaller tariff wage, holding everything else constant. As long as
µ > (1− ε)ω the tariff wage is increasing in the average output per worker of the sector. It
is also increasing in the worker outside option, b.
Admittedly, the fact that the sector-level union and the employer organisation are taking
aggregate employment and output as given is a strong assumption. In a more realistic setup
the sector-level negotiators would take into account how the choice of the tariff wage affects
aggregate outcomes. A higher tariff wage reduces firm’s profits in the current period as well
as the value of firms. As a result some firms might have negative value and choose to close
down. The threshold firm productivity level, z∗, will be higher. This will affect aggregate
employment and output.
In the case that sector-level negotiators internalise the effects of the wage setting on
aggregate outcomes the tariff wage is given by:










Y (T )− TL(T )
)1−µ
(3.45)
In the remainder of the chapter I use the simpler expression (3.44) for two reasons. First,
it greatly reduces the computational complexity of solving the model. Second, my main
interest in this chapter is to explore the aggregate effects of reducing wage dispersion across
firms while keeping the average wage level the same. The exact way in which the tariff wage
is determined affects the wage level, but not the dispersion. Therefore it does not affect the
main findings of this chapter10.
Lets come back to the issue of the correct outside option during firm-level wage bar-
gaining. The expression for wage premium in (3.31) was derived assuming that the credible
threat of employed workers is to reduce their effort and stay with the firm rather than to
permanently separate from the firm. In order for this to hold it must be that in equilibrium
10However, I do plan to incorporate (3.45) into the model’s analysis in future work.
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the value of being an employed worker during local conflict over pay, W̃L(n, z), at any ex-
isting firm is always larger than the value of unemployment U. Thus the following has to
hold:
W̃L(n, z) ≥ U ∀n, z (3.46)
This will hold as long as even at the lowest-paying firm workers prefer to stay with the firm






First, wages are increasing in firm productivity z. Second, for a given productivity level,
wages are decreasing in firm size. So for a certain z, wage is the lowest at the target size for
that z, n∗(z). Therefore, the lowest wage and thus the lowest value of an employed worker
will be at the firms that have the lowest productivity level in the steady state, z∗, and have
reached their target size n∗(z∗).
When there is complete centralisation of wage bargaining, (1− ε)ω = 0 and wC = T , all
firms are paying only the tariff wage. Hence wages are completely equalised across firms. In
this case workers will accept employment when matched with a firm as long as the single
wage rate wC is larger than the value of leisure, b. Given that workers receive the value of
leisure during an industry-wide strike and µ ∈ (0, 1), wC > b and thus workers always accept
employment. In this case all firms pay the same wage given by wC = (1 − µ)b + µY
L
, so a
worker has no reason to reject a job offer and keep looking for a better match.
However, when ε < 1 and ω > 0, there are wage premiums being paid and wages vary
across firms. Then a worker matched with a low-wage firm might want to leave that firm,
become unemployed and try to match with a better firm. The fact that workers can not only
go on a strike, but can also leave their firms then puts a limit on how much wage dispersion
there can be in the steady state. For the two-tier collective wage bargaining above to be
credible it must be that even a worker at the lowest-paying firm is better off than being
152
unemployed.
I deal with this issue in the following way. While calibrating the model I check that the
condition (3.46) holds. I restrict attention to only those combinations of parameters and the
resulting set of equilibria where (3.46) is satisfied.
In Nash bargaining each party always gets at least their outside option. Given that ω > 0
workers also receive some share of the surplus. So if workers prefer staying with the firm
during a local conflict over pay then it must be true that they are strictly better off being
employed at the firm, working and receiving wage premiums, than being unemployed.
W (n, z) > U ∀ n, z (3.48)
Hence workers always accept employment when matched with a firm.
Lemma 5 Wage under two-tier collective bargaining is given by:
wC(n, z) = T + p(n, z)











+ (1− ε)ω z
n1−α
(3.49)
The model is able to capture different degrees of centralisation of collective wage bar-
gaining. When ε = 1 or ω = 0 there are no wage premiums being paid and wC = T =
(1 − µ)b + µY
L
, we have complete centralisation, a single wage. When the effective worker
bargaining power at firm-level is positive, (1 − ε)ω > 0, then wage premiums are being
paid and the wage under collective bargaining varies with firm size and permanent firm
productivity.
The idea behind centralisation of wage bargaining is to put restrictions on industrial
actions at the firm-level, i.e. to limit the ability of workers to reduce their level of effort and
thus lower output while remaining employed. In the model greater centralisation of wage
bargaining is represented by a fall in the effective bargaining power of workers at the local
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level, (1− ε)ω. As a result the component of the wage that depends on firm characteristics,
the wage premium, is reduced in size. However, the base rate paid to all the homogeneous
workers, the tariff wage, is likely to rise. This is because the sector-level negotiations where
the tariff wage is determined take place first and the negotiators take into account the size
of the wage premiums. Holding aggregate employment and output constant, a reduction in
(1− ε)ω (smaller wage premiums) leads to a bigger joint surplus to be shared at the sector
level, as can be seen from (3.43). Intuitively, a fall in (1− ε)ω also reduces wage dispersion
across firms.
Decentralisation of wage bargaining has the opposite effects. A rise in (1− ε)ω increases
wage premiums and tends to reduce the tariff wage. Wages vary more with firm character-
istics and thus the wage dispersion among homogeneous workers grows.
As ε → 0 the two-tier collective bargaining model becomes very similar to a model of
firm-level unions (in the Appendix), because workers are able to reduce their level of effort
to zero which is equivalent to a firm-specific strike. Under firm-level unions ε = 0 and T=0,
collective bargaining is completely decentralised in the sense that there are no negotiations at
sector-level and instead firm-level unions are able to call a strike during which no production
takes place at that particular firm for one period (the level of effort falls to zero) and no
wages are paid. Therefore this general model of two-tier collective bargaining nests the
model of firm-level unions and the model of bargaining only at the sector-level (complete
centralisation) as two extreme cases.
Corollary 3 Under two-tier collective wage bargaining with (1 − ε)ω > 0, as a firm grows
towards its target size, the wage that it pays is declining. Therefore a young firm pays a wage
premium compared to an old firm with the same time-invariant productivity z.
The logic here is exactly the same as for Corollary 1 in the case of individual wage bar-
gaining. Wage under both individual wage bargaining and two-tier collective bargaining with
(1− ε)ω > 0 is an increasing function of the firm’s output per worker. Given decreasing re-
turns to scale, output per worker and the wage are decreasing in firm size. Firm productivity
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is constant over the life of the firm. Therefore the wage rate that the firm faces is declining
over time as the firm is growing towards its target size. For firms with the same permanent
productivity z, wage is decreasing in firm age because older firms are larger. Thus young
firms pay a wage premium.










T − (1− δ)(1− ω(1− ε))α
r + δ
z(n∗)α−1 = 0 (3.50)
The firms with larger time-invariant productivity grow towards a larger target size; n*(z) is
increasing in z.
Similarly as under individual bargaining, the firm target size n∗ is increasing in the level
of time-invariant firm productivity z. The combination of decreasing returns to scale and
productivity heterogeneity means that more productive firms choose to stop growing at a
larger size than less productive firms.
Lemma 7 Under two-tier collective wage bargaining with (1 − ε)ω > 0, the wage at the




















Thus, firms with larger permanent productivity z pay higher wages at their respective target
size.
In the section on individual wage bargaining I show that firms with higher permanent
productivity z pay higher wages at their respective target sizes (Lemma 4). Lemma 7 shows
that the same thing holds under two-tier collective wage bargaining with (1− ε)ω > 0. The
intuition for this finding is the following. A firm with a larger time-invariant productivity
z will grow towards a larger target size, as shown in Lemma 6. Because of its larger size,
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it will be losing more workers due to exogenous separations of matches. Therefore it has
to hire more workers every period just to stay at its target size. Given that hiring cost is
convex, the marginal and average cost of hiring is higher for a larger firm. Therefore firms
with high permanent productivity will grow to a smaller size than they would if recruitment
costs were linear. When looking at firms that are at their respective target size, the ones
with larger z have higher output per worker and they pay higher wages.
Corollary 4 Under two-tier collective wage bargaining with (1−ε)ω > 0, a high z firm faces
a higher wage than a low z firm for all levels of n from 0 up to n∗(z).
This is the same finding as for the case of individual wage bargaining. The proof of
Corollary 4 is straightforward. We can see from Lemma 5 that for the same firm size n,
wages are increasing in permanent productivity z and that holding z constant, wages are
decreasing in firm size. A firm with a larger z grows towards a larger target size (Lemma 6),
but even at that target size where its wage rate is the lowest it still faces a higher wage rate
than a firm with a lower z at its respective target size (Lemma 7). Hence we can conclude
that a firm with a higher permanent productivity z will face a higher wage rate along its
entire growth path than a firm with a lower z.
3.2.4.3 Comparing Individual and Collective Wage Bargaining
Let us now contrast the wage under the two bargaining regimes.





















We can see that under both individual wage bargaining and two-tier collective wage bargain-
ing where (1 − ε)ω > 0, the wage is a function of firm size and productivity. Thus there is
rent-sharing and homogeneous workers are paid different wages at different firms under both
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regimes. However, I will next show that under a reasonable parametrisation wages under






(αβ + 1− β)
∂wC(n, z)
∂APL
= (1− ε)ω (3.53)
We can see from (3.53) that the derivative of individually-bargained wage with respect to
average product of labour of the firm is a function of α and β. The derivative is increasing
in β and decreasing in α. Hence wages under individual bargaining vary more with output
per worker of the firm when bargaining power of workers in the individual negotiations is
higher and when returns to scale decline more slowly.
The derivative of wage under collective bargaining with respect to average product of
labour is decreasing in ε and increasing in ω. Thus wages under collective bargaining vary
more with output per worker of the firm when workers can reduce their effort by a greater
proportion during a disagreement about wage premiums and when the share of the joint
surplus at firm-level that goes to workers is higher.
Wages under collective bargaining will respond to the firm’s average product of labour
less than under individual bargaining as long as the following holds.
(1− ε)ω < αβ
(αβ + 1− β)
(3.54)
Empirical studies find estimates of α, the elasticity of output with respect to labour, around
0.6411. For β let us take the value from Shimer (2005) and set it equal to 0.72. Then we
obtain the following condition for the effective bargaining power of workers at the local level.
(1− ε)ω < 0.622 (3.55)
11Whether targeting aggregate labour share or looking at estimates of plant-level labor demand models
the value of α is around 0.64 (Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004), Elsby and Michaels (2013)).
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The fraction of the normal effort that workers deliver during a local dispute over pay, ε, is
likely to be very close to 1, because workers cannot go on a strike and they still have to
perform all the tasks that are specifically written in their contracts. Say that workers reduce
their effort by 10% during a dispute with their firm and thus ε = 0.9. In that case even if
the bargaining power of workers at the firm level (their share of the surplus) was extremely
high, say ω = 0.99, then (1− ε)ω = 0.099 < 0.622. Therefore we can conclude that as long
as firm-level unions cannot organise a strike, their effective bargaining power is limited and
the relationship between output per worker and the wage will be weaker under collective
bargaining than under individual bargaining.
As ε→ 0 workers are able to reduce their level of effort down to zero during a dispute over
wage premiums which is equivalent to a firm-level strike. Now the effective bargaining power
of workers at firm-level is given by (1−ε)ω = ω. Using (3.55) we can see that wages vary less
with output per worker under collective bargaining than under individual bargaining as long
as ω < 0.622. This requires that ω < β = 0.72, so the share of the joint surplus acquired
by workers is lower when workers bargain collectively than when they negotiate individually.
This is unrealistic. Hence it is quite likely that the relationship between wages and output
per worker is stronger under firm-level collective bargaining where workers can threaten a
strike than under individual bargaining. This highlights the importance of centralisation of
collective bargaining, i.e. putting limitations on industrial actions at firm-level.
3.2.5 Equilibrium
Definition 1 A tuple {Π(n, z), v(n, z), wI(n, z), rU I , z∗, θ, h(n, z) and e } is a steady
state equilibrium under individual wage bargaining if the following holds:
• The value of a firm Π(n, z) satisfies (3.3) and the vacancy function v(n,z) is given by
the FOC of the firm optimisation problem (3.4).
• The productivity cutoff z∗ is given by the Minimum Productivity Condition (3.12).
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• Wage equation wI(n, z) is given by Lemma 1 and the flow value of unemployment rU I
is given by Lemma 2.
• The joint distribution of firm size and productivity h(n,z) is given by (3.9).
• The labour market tightness θ is given by (3.10).
• The level of entry e > 0 is implicitly determined by the firm entry condition (3.11).
Definition 2 A tuple {Π(n, z), v(n, z), wC(n, z), z∗, θ, h(n, z) and e } is a steady state
equilibrium under two-tier collective wage bargaining if the following holds:
• The value of a firm Π(n, z) satisfies (3.3) and the vacancy function v(n,z) is given by
the FOC of the firm optimisation problem (3.4).
• The productivity cutoff z∗ is given by the Minimum Productivity Condition (3.12).
• Wage equation wC(n, z) is given by Lemma 5.
• The joint distribution of firm size and productivity h(n,z) is given by (3.9).
• The labour market tightness θ is given by (3.10).
• The level of entry e > 0 is implicitly determined by the firm entry condition (3.11).
3.2.5.1 Income Accounting in the Model
In this section I define some aggregate objects that I will be using later to compare a cali-
brated economy with individual bargaining with one that contains collective wage bargaining.
In the model households act as both workers and investors, supplying labour and owning
firms. Thus they receive income from two sources: wages and firm profits.






w(n, z) n h(n, z) dn dz (3.56)
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π(n, z) h(n, z) dn dz (3.57)





However, households have to create just enough new firms every period to offset the
exogenous firm destruction at rate δ and to keep the number of firms in the steady state
constant. The size of the investment into creation of new firms is given by: e F e.
I define Total value added of the economy as the units of the final good that can be
consumed by households. This is equal to the income that the households receive, net of the
cost of firm creation.
V A = WB + π̄ − eF e (3.58)
Firm entry costs F e, firm fixed costs F p, and firm recruitment costs c(v) are all expressed
in terms of units of the final good. I assume that resources spent on these three costs are
wasted i.e. these units of the final good cannot be consumed. If I assumed that resources
spent on firm entry count towards total value added then from the point of view of a social
planner that is maximising total value added the ideal equilibrium would be one with infinite
firm entry. This is because there would be no cost to firm entry, only benefit. Similarly,
if units of the final good spent on firm fixed costs counted towards total value added then
there would be no cost (in terms of value added) to having a larger stock of firms in the
economy. Finally, if resources spent on recruitment counted towards total value added then
there would be no cost to having extremely high number of vacancies and incredibly high
market tightness. Therefore total value added in the model is equal to total production
minus total firm entry costs, total firm fixed costs and total search (recruitment) costs.
Total value added is given by:









h(n, z) dn dz (3.59)
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where Y is the total production of the final good defined by (3.37), eF e gives total firm entry









h(n, z) dn dz are total recruitment
(search) costs.






Π(n, z) h(n, z) dn dz (3.60)
3.3 Analysis
In this section I solve the model numerically and analyse the implications of different wage
setting institutions for wage dispersion among homogeneous workers and for aggregate out-
comes. I present a model with individual wage bargaining that is calibrated to match US
data moments, as well as a model with two-tier collective wage bargaining calibrated to
match Swedish data moments. I compare the two cases and also run three counterfactual
experiments.
First, I apply completely centralised sector-level wage bargaining to the model economy
calibrated to US data moments. Hence I compare aggregate outcomes under individually-
bargained wages with the case of a single wage rate that is set at sector level. I do this
comparison for different levels of bargaining power of the sector-level union. However, I
pay special attention to the case where the single sector-level wage is equal to the average
wage under individual bargaining. In this way I investigate the aggregate effects of removing
all wage dispersion across firms while keeping the mean wage constant. Second, I take
the model economy with individual wage bargaining that is calibrated to the USA and I
simultaneously reduce bargaining power of workers in individual negotiations and increase the
value of leisure and thus the worker outside option. However, I focus on such combinations
of the two parameters where the mean wage remains the same. In this way I am reducing
wage dispersion among homogeneous workers while keeping the average wage level the same.
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Third, I investigate the effects of changes in the effective worker bargaining power at firm-
level in the calibrated economy with two-tier collective bargaining. Hence I am analysing
the effects of varying the degree of centralisation of wage setting in a Swedish-style economy.
In all three cases my primary focus is to explore the implications of mean-preserving wage
compression for aggregate outcomes12.
A detailed description of the numerical methods of solving the model is in the Appendix,
the case of individual wage bargaining is discussed in Section 3.5.3.1, the case of two-tier col-
lective wage bargaining is in Section 3.5.3.2 and the case of sector-only collective bargaining
is in Section 3.5.3.3. Here I present the functional form assumptions that I use.
I assume that the aggregate matching function is Cobb-Douglas with efficiency parameter
m0 and elasticity parameter ε.
m(u, vtot) = m0 u
ε (vtot)
1−ε (3.61)
The underlying distribution from which a new firm draws its permanent productivity is
Pareto with shape parameter k and minimum value zmin. Its cumulative distribution function
is given by:





As outlined in Section 3.2.1 the production function is Cobb-Douglas given by y(n, z) = znα
where α ∈ (0, 1) captures the decreasing returns to scale. The cost of posting vacancies is
given by c(v) = λv + 1
2
γv2 where λ captures the linear part of the recruitment cost and γ
captures the convex part.
12It is important to separate changes in the level of wages to changes in the dispersion.
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3.3.1 Calibration
3.3.1.1 Model with individual wage bargaining
The time period is a month. The model with individual wage bargaining is calibrated to the
USA. The first set of parameters either come from empirical studies or have a direct target.
Their values and sources are displayed in Table 3.1. The elasticity of output with respect to
labour, the parameter α, is set equal to 0.64 to match the estimates of plant-level labor de-
mand models (Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004)). The interest rate is 0.417% monthly
or 5% annually (Shimer (2005)). Total separation rate at monthly frequency is 3.33% in the
US (Shimer (2005))13. Furthermore, one sixth of separations are due to establishment closure
(Davis, J.C. Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)). Therefore the exogenous match destruction
rate s is 2.83% and the exogenous firm destruction rate δ is 0.547%. The elasticity of sub-
stitution in the matching function, parameter ε, is set as 0.72 (Shimer (2005)). I target
monthly job finding rate of 45% and labour market tightness of 0.72 (Shimer (2005))14. This
implies m0, the technology parameter in the aggregate matching function, equal to 0.4934
15.
N, the size of the labour force is normalised to 100. The minim value of z, zmin is normalised
to 1 (as in Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014)). For the reasons of computational complexity I
set the linear part of the recruitment cost, λ, equal to zero. This means I have one fewer
parameter to estimate.
The second group of parameters are jointly calibrated using the method of simulated
moments. The parameters are chosen optimally in order to minimize the loss function which
is a weighted average of squared proportional deviations of model-generated moments from
the data moments. There are 6 parameters and 11 targets. The jointly estimated parameters
are γ, which captures the degree of convexity in recruitment cost, F e, fixed cost of firm entry,
F p, fixed cost of production, b, the value of leisure, k, the shape parameter of the Pareto firm
13The figure is 10% quarterly and it is an average for the period 1951-2003.
14These are long-term averages for the USA based on the period 1951-2003.
15Job finding rate = m(u,vtot)u = m0u
ε−1v1−εtot = m0θ
1−ε. We know the job finding rate, θ and ε and thus
we can find m0.
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Symbol Meaning Value Target
α the extent of DRS in production function 0.64 empirical estimates
r interest rate 0.00417 5% annual rate, Shimer(2005)
s exogenous match destruction rate 0.0283 total separation rate in US is 10% quarterly and ...
δ exogenous firm destruction rate 0.005466 1/6 of separations are due to establishment closure
ε elasticity of substitution in m(u, v̄) 0.72 Shimer (2005)
m0 technology parameter in m(u, v̄) 0.4934 job finding rate=45%, θ=0.72 in the US
N size of the labour force 100 normalisation
zmin minimum value of f(z) 1 normalisation
λ the linear part of recruitment cost 0 simplifying assumption
Table 3.1: Model parameters at monthly frequency (USA)
Symbol Meaning Calibrated Value
γ captures the degree of convexity in recruitment cost 0.055
F e fixed costs of firm entry 315.711
F p fixed costs of production 0.381
b value of leisure 0.850
k the shape parameter of f(z) 1.917
β worker bargaining power 0.481
Table 3.2: Parameters calibrated jointly at monthly frequency (USA)
productivity distribution and finally β, worker bargaining power. Their calibrated values are
shown in Table 3.2.
The joint targets at monthly frequency are displayed in Table 3.3. First, as mentioned
above, I target labour market tightness equal to 0.72. Second, I target average firm size of
24.03 which comes from the 2016 issue of the Longitudinal Business Database of the Census
Bureau. Third, I target average per-worker hiring costs in the model economy to be equal
to 102% of the average monthly wage. The average cost-per-hire of US companies is $4,129
according to a 2016 report by the Society for Human Resource Management16. The National
Average Wage Index of the Social Security Administration was $48,642 in 2016. I take this
as a measure of annual mean wage in the USA. Thus I find that the average cost-per-hire in
16This is based on surveys of companies in 2015-2016. Other organisations have reported similar figures
for the average hiring costs.
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Target Value Source
labour market tightness 0.72 Shimer(2005)
average employment per firm 24.03 Longitudinal Business Database
per-worker hiring costs as % of mean monthly wage 102% Society for Human Resource Management
elasticity of wages w.r.t. firm size 0.021 Bloom et al (2018)
average wage difference first year of the firm vs at target size 6.61% Babina et al (2019)
firm size distribution (6 points) Longitudinal Business Database
Table 3.3: The joint targets at monthly frequency (USA)
the US is 8.49% of the annual wage or 102% of the monthly wage17.
My fourth target is that the elasticity of wages with respect to firm size is equal to 0.021
i.e. doubling of firm size is on average associated with 2.1% higher wage. I take this estimate
from Bloom et al. (2018) who use US social security data for the period 2007–2013. Crucially,
they control for the differences in worker quality between firms using worker fixed effects.
This is important because in my model there are no differences in worker quality across
firms. As discussed in Section 3.2.4.1 the model with individual wage bargaining predicts
that firms will face higher wages at the beginning of their life than when they are older. In
order to put a reasonable limit on this dimension of the model-generated wage dispersion
I introduce my fifth target. On average in the model economy the difference between the
average wage of a firm in the first year of its life and its wage at the target size should be
equal to 6.61%. This estimate comes from Babina et al. (2019) who find using US data that
after controlling for firm and worker time-invariant heterogeneity firms aged one year or less
pay 6.4 log point wage premium compared to firms older than 20 years. Finally, I target the
US firm size distribution. Longitudinal Business Database provides me with 6 points of the
firm size distribution to target.
Let us consider the fit of the calibration. Table 3.4 presents a comparison of the model-
generated moments and data moments. The model does a very good job of fitting labour
17In Elsby and Michaels (2013) the vacancy cost is targeted to match per-worker hiring cost equal to just
42% of monthly worker pay. However, they follow Silva and Toledo (2009) who cite an estimate of the cost
of posting vacancies from the human resources consulting firm, the Saratoga Institute. My target includes
other recruitment costs, not just the cost of posting vacancies.
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Target Model Moment Data Moment
labour market tightness 0.68 0.72
average employment per firm 22.99 24.03
per-worker hiring costs as % of mean monthly wage 97.29% 102.00%
elasticity of wages w.r.t. firm size 0.006 0.021
average wage difference first year vs at target size 7.84% 6.61%
Table 3.4: Fit of the Calibration (USA)
market tightness, average firm size and per-worker hiring cost. Market tightness is 0.68 in
the model and 0.72 in the data. Average firm size is 22.99 in the model and 24.03 in the
data. Per-worker hiring cost as a percentage of mean monthly wage is 97.29% in the model
and 102.00% in the data. The model does also quite a good job fitting the average difference
in wages that a firm is paying in the first year of its life compared to when it is at its target
size. This young-firm wage premium is 7.84% in the model and 6.61% in the data.
However, the model fails to match the elasticity of wages with respect to firm size. The
elasticity is 0.021 in the data, but only 0.006 in the model. The model is capable of generating
larger firm size wage premium, but only at the expense of substantially overshooting the
target for the young firm pay premium. It seems that the model in its current form is
incapable of meeting both targets, only one of them18. The model’s fit of the firm size
distribution is displayed in Figure 3.4. We can see that compared to the empirical distribution
the model generates too many firms with size of 1-4 workers and too few firms with sizes 5-9
and 10-19. For larger firm size categories the model does a good job19.
Table 3.5 presents some untargeted moments. Standard deviation of log wages across
homogeneous workers is 0.041 in the model. The empirical estimates of log wage dispersion
in the US accounted for by firm heterogeneity after controlling for worker heterogeneity with
fixed effects range from 0.024 to 0.11320. It is very encouraging that the model-generated
18For this reason I plan on adding shocks to firm-level productivity to the model. I believe that this would
improve the model’s ability to match the data moments.
19Except that the model generates slightly more of the very large firms (100 workers and more) than the
empirical distribution.
20The empirical estimates of the share of annual earnings variance in the USA that can be explained by
firm policies (firm fixed effects) range from 3% to 14%. Studies using the AKM approach (worker and firm
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Figure 3.4: Fit of the US firm size distribution (blue:model, red:data)
wage dispersion that is driven by differences in firm characteristics via rent-sharing is well
within the range of empirical estimates without it being targeted at all. Another untargeted
moment that I examine is the ratio of the value of leisure b that unemployed workers receive
every period to the average wage in the economy. This ratio is equal to 0.52 in the model.
The US replacement ratio in other search and matching models and in empirical studies
is typically between 0.4 and 0.6. However, in these cases b is usually thought of as an
unemployment benefit. Therefore the b / mean wage ratio in my model is perhaps too large,
but it is not unreasonable.
fixed effects model, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)) report the following share of earnings dispersion
accounted for by firm policies in the USA: 12% Song et al. (2019), 14% Sorkin (2018) and 9% Lamadon,
Mogstad, and Setzler (2019). However, it has been demonstrated that the AKM method suffers from limited
mobility bias, there are not enough conditionally independent observations for each worker and firm. This
leads to an upward bias in the estimate of the variance of firm fixed effects and a downward bias in the
estimate of covariance of worker and firm fixed effects (Andrews et al. (2008), Lamadon, Mogstad, and
Setzler (2019)). Alternative approaches that account for the limited mobility bias provide much smaller
estimates of the US earnings dispersion accounted for by firm heterogeneity: 3% in Lamadon, Mogstad, and
Setzler (2019), 5% in Andrews et al. (2008) and Kline, Saggio, and Sølvsten (2019). All of the studies above
used annual earnings whereas my model generates dispersion of wages. I make the assumption that the share
of wage dispersion that is due to firm heterogeneity is the same as the equivalent share for annual earnings.
Using data from the Luxemburg Income Study I calculate that the standard deviation of log gross hourly
wages in the USA in 2014 was 0.808. Combining this figure with the highest and the lowest percentages
reported above gives me an interval that is reported in Table 3.5.
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Target Model Moment Data Moment
standard deviation of log hourly wages 0.041 0.024-0.113
b / average wage 0.52 0.4-0.6
Table 3.5: Untargeted Moments (USA)
3.3.1.2 Model with two-tier collective bargaining
The time period is again a month. The model with two-tier collective bargaining is calibrated
to Sweden. The first set of parameters, displayed in Table 3.6, come from empirical studies
or can be identified individually using some data moment(s). I set the exogenous firm
destruction rate δ equal to 0.16% per month. I obtain the figure by dividing the number of
people employed in exiting firms by the total employment in all active firms in Sweden and
calculating average for the period 2008-2017 (using Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics
database). Knowing the average unemployment rate in Sweden (7.37%) and the average
monthly job finding rate (12.41%) for the period 2005-2020 based on data from Statistics
Sweden I use the Beveridge curve to calculate the implied monthly total separation rate
(0.99%). Given the value of δ and of the total separation rate, I find the exogenous match
destruction rate s to be equal to 0.83% at monthly frequency. Knowing the average labour
market tightness in Sweden (0.203) and the average monthly job finding rate in the period
2005-2020, I find that the implied value of the efficiency parameter in the matching function,
m0, is 0.194. Finally, I keep the extent of decreasing returns to scale α, the interest rate
r, the elasticity of substitution in the aggregate matching function ε, the size of the labour
force N, minimum value of firm productivity distribution zmin and the linear part of the
recruitment cost λ the same as in the case of individual wage bargaining.
The second group of parameters are calibrated jointly in order to minimize the difference
between model moments and selected data moments. However, I also ensure that the con-
dition (3.46) holds, i.e. in equilibrium the value of being an employed worker during local
conflict over pay, W̃L(n, z), at any existing firm is always larger than the value of unemploy-
ment U. Hence I am minimizing the gap between model and data moments subject to the
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Symbol Meaning Value Target
α the extent of DRS in production function 0.64 empirical estimates
r interest rate 0.00417 5% annual rate, Shimer(2005)
s exogenous match destruction rate 0.0083 total separation rate in Sweden is 0.987% monthly
δ exogenous firm destruction rate 0.0016 Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics database
ε elasticity of substitution in m(u, v̄) 0.72 Shimer (2005)
m0 technology parameter in m(u, v̄) 0.1938 monthly job finding rate=12.41%, θ= 0.2033 in Sweden
N size of the labour force 100 normalisation
zmin minimum value of f(z) 1 normalisation
λ the linear part of recruitment cost 0 simplifying assumption
Table 3.6: Model parameters at monthly frequency (Sweden)
Symbol Meaning Calibrated Value
γ captures the degree of convexity in recruitment cost 1.125
F e fixed costs of firm entry 121.936
F p fixed costs of production 2.166
b value of leisure 1.235
k the shape parameter of f(z) 2.079
µ sector-level union’s bargaining power 0.546
(1− ε)ω effective bargaining power of workers at firm-level 0.115
Table 3.7: Parameters calibrated jointly at monthly frequency (Sweden)
fact that the credibility of local bargaining condition holds. There are 7 parameters and 9
joint targets. The jointly estimated parameters are γ, the degree of convexity in recruitment
cost, F e, fixed cost of firm entry, F p, fixed cost of production, b, the value of leisure, k,
the shape parameter of the Pareto firm productivity distribution, µ, bargaining power of
sector-level union and finally (1− ε)ω, the effective bargaining power of workers at the firm
level. Their calibrated values are shown in Table 3.7.
Table 3.8 shows the joint targets at monthly frequency. First, I target labour market
tightness equal to 0.203 which is calculated with Statistics Sweden data for the period 2005-
2020. Second, I target average firm size equal to 17.85 which is calculated by dividing
total employment in all firms i Sweden by the total number of firms (data comes from the
Structural Business Statistics database). Third, I think of the fixed costs that firms face
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Target Value Source
labour market tightness 0.203 Statistics Sweden
average employment per firm 17.85 Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics database
fixed costs of production as % of average firm revenue 3.2% OECD (2001)
per-worker hiring costs as % of mean monthly wage 102% Society for Human Resource Management
elasticity of wages w.r.t. firm size 0.013 Arai (2003)
average wage difference first year of the firm vs at target size 6.61% Babina et al (2019)
firm size distribution (3 points) Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics database.
Table 3.8: The joint targets at monthly frequency (Sweden)
every period as reflecting administrative costs. I target aggregate fixed costs in the economy
to be 3.2% of aggregate firm revenue. This is based on OECD (2001) report which finds
that administrative costs of regulatory compliance have very large fixed cost component
and it estimates that in Sweden a typical SME firm faces regulatory costs equal to 3.2% of
its revenue21. Next, I target average per-worker hiring costs to be equal to 102% of mean
monthly wage which is exactly the same as in the case of individual wage bargaining. Hence
I assume that typical hiring costs do not significantly vary between the USA and Sweden. I
make this assumption because I have not been able to find an equivalent empirical estimate
for Sweden. Next, I target the elasticity of wages with respect to firm size to be equal to
0.013 (this estimate for Sweden comes from Arai (2003)). This is much smaller than for the
US. My sixth target is that on average in the model economy the difference between the
average wage of a firm in the first year of its life and its wage at the target size should be
equal to 6.61%. Here again no empirical estimate exists for Sweden and thus I use the US
estimate, so that I can put a realistic limit on the size of this kind of wage dispersion in
the model. Finally, I target Swedish firm size distribution. Eurostat’s Structural Business
Statistics database provides me with 3 points of the firm size distribution to target.
Let us now consider fit of the calibration. A comparison of the model-generated and
data moments is presented in Table 3.9. We can see that the model does a brilliant job
of matching all the moments except the elasticity of wages with respect to firm size. The
21Unfortunately, I have not been able to find an equivalent estimate for the US.
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Target Model Moment Data Moment
labour market tightness 0.206 0.203
average employment per firm 17.18 17.85
fixed costs of production as % of average firm revenue 2.8% 3.2%
per-worker hiring costs as % of mean monthly wage 105.53% 102.00%
elasticity of wages w.r.t. firm size 0.0007 0.0130
average wage difference first year vs at target size 6.37% 6.61%
Table 3.9: Fit of the Calibration (Sweden)
Figure 3.5: Fit of the Swedish firm size distribution (blue:model, red:data)
calibrated economy has market tightness of 0.206, average size of firms is 17.18, the total
fixed costs are equal to 2.8% of total firm revenue, per-worker hiring costs are 105% of mean
monthly wage and on average firms pay 6.37% young firm wage premium. However, doubling
firm size is only associated with 0.07% rise in the wage rate, whereas the empirical target
implies 1.3% rise in the wage rate. Therefore the model again fails to match the stylized fact
that larger firms generally pay higher wages. Finally, the model fits the Swedish firm size
distribution reasonably well (Figure 3.5).
Table 3.10 displays some model and data moments that were not targeted in the cali-
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bration. Standard deviation of log wages across homogeneous workers is 0.013 in the model.
The empirical estimate of log wage dispersion accounted for by firm heterogeneity after con-
trolling for worker heterogeneity in Sweden is 0.00822. Therefore the model-generated wage
dispersion is very close to the empirical estimate without it being targeted at all. The sec-
ond moment that I examine is the ratio of the value of leisure b to the average wage in the
economy. This ratio is 0.41 in the calibrated model with two-tier collective wage bargaining
which is a reasonable value.
Target Model Moment Data Moment
standard deviation of log hourly wages 0.013 0.008
b / average wage 0.41 0.4-0.6
Table 3.10: Untargeted Moments (Sweden)
3.3.2 Results
Let us now compare the aggregate outcomes (defined in section 3.2.5.1) under individual and
two-tier collective wage bargaining. Just to reiterate, I ensure that in the the model economy
with two-tier collective bargaining the condition (3.46) holds and thus the value of being an
employed worker during local conflict over pay, W̃L(n, z), at any existing firm is larger than
the value of unemployment U. The first column in Table 3.11 shows outcomes for the model
economy with individual wage bargaining calibrated to the USA, whereas the second column
displays outcomes for the model economy with two-tier collective wage bargaining calibrated
to Sweden. First, we can see that total value added in the collective bargaining economy is
more than twice as high as in the individual bargaining economy. The size of labour force
22To the best of my knowledge Bonhomme, Lamadon, and Manresa (2019) is the only study that estimates
the share of annual earnings that are accounted for by firm heterogeneity (while controlling for worker
unobservable heterogeneity) in Sweden. They find that 2.6% of variance of log earnings is accounted for by
firm fixed effects. Their method accounts for limited mobility bias and generally produces estimates of the
firm share of earnings dispersion that are on the lower end. Using Structure of Earnings Survey I find that
in 2014 the standard deviation of log gross hourly wages in Sweden was 0.308. Assuming that the share of
wage dispersion accounted for by firm effects is the same as the share of earnings dispersion and combining
the two estimates above I obtain the figure in Table 3.10.
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is the same in both cases and thus value added (or consumption) per capita is more than
twice as high in the collective bargaining economy. Average wage is also almost twice as
high in the collective bargaining economy than in the US-style economy. Unemployment
rates are approximately equal while wage dispersion among homogeneous workers in the
collective bargaining economy is less than a third of the level in the individual bargaining
economy. Furthermore, the threshold level of firm productivity z∗ is about 2.5 times higher
and the amount of firm entry every period is more than three times larger in the collective
bargaining economy. In the collective bargaining case there are more firms which are on
average smaller and output per worker (labour productivity) is about twice as large as in
the individual bargaining case. Total wage bill, total firm profits and total value of firms
(the value of the stock market) are twice, three times and four times larger, respectively, in
the collective bargaining case. Let us now return to the question of why total value added
is so much larger in the collective bargaining case. The economy calibrated to Swedish data
moments produces both higher total production and overall higher costs (entry, recruitment,
fixed) that are assumed to be a deadweight loss. However, the increase in total production
is larger than in the costs and thus it has larger total value added.
From the above comparison it looks like the Swedish-style model economy with two-
tier collective wage bargaining produces clearly superior aggregate outcomes compared to
individual bargaining economy calibrated to the US. However, it is very important to note
that here we are varying both the type of wage bargaining and the model parameters given
that the two cases were calibrated to different targets. Hence this is not a fair comparison
of the relative merits of the two wage setting institutions. In order to better understand the
aggregate effects of centralisation of wage bargaining I present a counterfactual experiment
in the next section where I apply sector-level wage bargaining to an economy calibrated to
the US data moments.
Lets now explore the nature of wage dispersion in the model economy with individual wage
bargaining. I draw a random sample of 10 000 firms from the model and plot the relationship
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Wage-setting Individual (USA) Two-tier collective (Sweden)
Total value added 171.66 367.94
Average wage 1.647 3.006
Unemployment rate 7.06% 7.35%
Market tightness 0.679 0.206
Standard deviation of log wages 0.041 0.013
Firm productivity cutoff z∗ 1.933 5.170
Firm entry 0.078 0.265
Successful entry 0.022 0.009
Measure of firms 4.042 5.392
Output per worker 2.206 4.482
Average size of firms 22.994 17.183
Total production 205.03 415.22
Total wage bill 153.10 278.49
Total firm profits 43.26 121.77
Total cost of entry 24.70 32.32
Total search cost 7.13 3.27
Total fixed costs 1.54 11.68
Total value of firms 4 927 21 561
Table 3.11: USA vs Sweden: Individual bargaining vs Two-tier collective wage bargaining
between log wages and log permanent productivity, log firm size and the relative distance
from the target size in Figures 3.6(b) - 3.6(d). We can see that firms with higher permanent
productivity do generally pay higher wages, but there is a very large wage variance for any
given firm productivity level caused by differences in firm age and thus firms being different
distance from the target size for that level of productivity (Figure 3.6(b)). We can also
see that in any given cross-section most firms are at or very near their target size23 (as the
density on the plots is the highest there) and that wages at target sizes are increasing in
firm productivity. There is also an overall positive association between firm size and wages
23Even though in a cross-section only very few firms are far from their target size, from time-series
perspective every firm starts life with no workers and only gradually grows towards its target size and
therefore high wages at the beginning of the firms life have a large effect on its profitability and its value.
174
(Figure 3.6(c)). This is the result of two opposing forces. On one hand, firms with higher
permanent productivity grow towards larger target sizes and at those sizes more productive
(larger) firms pay higher wages. On the other hand, firms that are young and far from their
target size and thus generally smaller pay a wage premium. This is shown on Figure 3.6(d)
where relative distance is defined as the ratio of the current firm size to its target size.
(a) Firm Size Distribution (b) Wages and Permanent Firm Productivity
(c) Wages and Firm Size (d) Wages and the Relative Distance from the Tar-
get Size
Figure 3.6: Wages and Firm Size Under Individual Bargaining
Next I explore the nature of wage dispersion in the model economy with two-tier collective
wage bargaining. We can see that the relationship between permanent productivity and
wages is much weaker than in the model economy with individual wage bargaining calibrated
to the USA (Figure 3.7(b)). The same thing is true for the relationship between firm size and
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wages (Figure 3.7(c)). This is in line with the fact that the calibrated model is very far from
the target for the elasticity of wages with respect to firm size (Table 3.9). The individual
bargaining economy also undershoots this target, but to a much smaller degree. The weak
association between firm size and wages is driven mainly by the fact that at target size,
wages vary less with firm productivity than in the individual bargaining economy (the dense
area in Figures 3.7(b) and 3.7(c) is less steep than in Figures 3.6(b) and 3.6(c)). However,
wages are still declining as firms grow towards their target sizes (Figure 3.7(d)).
Finally, we can see from Figures 3.6(a) and 3.7(a) that firm size distribution has a Pareto
shape in both model economies with many small firms and very few large firms. This is
mainly the result of assuming that firm productivity distribution is Pareto.
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(a) Firm Size Distribution (b) Wages and Permanent Firm Productivity
(c) Wages and Firm Size (d) Wages and the Relative Distance from the Tar-
get Size
Figure 3.7: Wages and Firm Size Under Two-tier Collective Bargaining
3.3.3 Experiment 1: Applying sector-level wage setting to the
USA
In this section I run a counterfactual experiment of applying completely centralised sector-
level collective wage bargaining to the USA i.e. there is a single sector-wide wage rate
paid out to all the homogeneous workers. I take the model with complete centralisation of
collective wage bargaining where (1 − ε)ω = 0 and wC = T = (1 − µ)b + µY
L
. I solve the
model for various levels of µ, the bargaining power of sector-level union, while all the other
parameters come from the calibration of an economy with individual wage bargaining to
the US data moments. I compare aggregate outcomes under the two different wage setting
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regimes: individual and sector-level. My main focus is on total value added defined by (3.59),
as it captures the total amount of the good produced that can be consumed. As discussed
in Section 3.2.5.1 I assume that the costs of entry, firm fixed costs and search (recruitment)
costs are a deadweight loss, the units of the final good spent on these expenses cannot be
consumed. Therefore total value added in the model is equal to total production minus total
firm entry costs, total firm fixed costs and total search (recruitment) costs.
What are the effects of equalising wages across firms? First, there is a Firm entry effect.
Wage costs in the beginning of the firm’s life are reduced and therefore expected profits
from firm entry rise. The bigger is the discounting of future profits (the higher is r and
δ), the stronger is this effect. More entry raises the number of firms in the steady state as
well as total employment and production. This increases total value added. On the other
hand, greater costs of firm entry and greater fixed costs of production (because there are
more firms) lower total value added. Thus the overall effect on total value added is a priori
ambiguous.
Second, there is a Firm selection effect. Switching from individually-bargained wages to
sector-level bargaining has two opposing effects on firm selection. On one hand, because
wages are no longer a function of the firm’s marginal product of labour, firms do not face
very high wages when they have few employees. This means that they save on wage costs in
the early periods of their life and that they can afford to grow more slowly, saving on convex
recruitment costs. Given that firms discount future profits, changes in their profitability
in the early periods can have large effects on the value of firms. This boost in firm values
enables even less productive firms to survive in the marketplace - see Minimum Productivity
Condition (3.12). Thus the threshold firm productivity level, z∗, might fall as selection of
firms is less strict.
On the other hand, under individual wage bargaining, a firm with higher permanent
productivity faces higher wages than a firm with lower permanent productivity along its
entire growth path (for all levels of firm size up to each firm’s target size). Equalisation of
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wages across firms that comes with sector-level wage bargaining lowers wage costs of firms
with high permanent productivity and increases their profitability relative to firms with lower
permanent productivity. This enforces stricter selection of firms with a higher z∗, minimum
level of productivity necessary for survival.
Ex ante it is unclear which of the two opposing effects will dominate. The overall effect
on firm selection depends on the level of the wage set under sector-level bargaining. The
higher it is, the higher will be z∗. The level of the common wage rate in turn depends on
sector-level union’s bargaining power µ. If z∗ does increase then average firm productivity
will be higher and this contributes towards larger total value added. The greater selection
pressures on firms would then result in reallocation of output and employment from less to
more productive producers and in higher average labour productivity.
Third, there is a Firm size effect. Given that under complete centralisation of wage
setting the wage is fixed and not decreasing in firm size, firms no longer have an incentive
to over-hire in order to push down wages. This lowers the average size of firms. Due to
decreasing returns to scale in production a lower average firm size raises the average output
per worker in the economy. Here total value added rises for two reasons: because firms are
smaller they save resources on (convex) recruitment costs and the average output per worker
is higher.
The above is a qualitative analysis of the channels through which compression of wages
across firms might affect aggregate outcomes. The general equilibrium effects of centralisa-
tion of wage bargaining can only be found numerically.
The first column in Table 3.12 shows aggregate outcomes of the model economy with
individual wage bargaining calibrated to the USA. Columns 2-4 show aggregate outcomes
of this model economy with completely centralised sector-level wage bargaining for different
levels of µ, union bargaining power. The second column displays outcomes in the case where
I set µ such that the average wage in the economy is the same as under individual wage
bargaining. I do this because I am interested in the effects of reducing wage dispersion among
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homogeneous workers (in this case down to 0) while keeping the average wage level the same.
Comparing the first two columns, we can see that sector bargaining results in significantly
higher total value added (171.66 vs 192.32) as well as substantially lower unemployment
(7.06% vs 4.97%) while keeping the mean wage the same (1.647 vs 1.649).
Let us dig deeper to understand this headline result. We can see that there is a very
powerful Firm entry effect. There is twice as much firm entry (0.078 vs 0.160) and twice
as many active firms (4.042 vs 8.693) under sector bargaining compared to individual bar-
gaining. We can also see that the threshold productivity z∗ is actually lower under sector
bargaining (1.933 vs 1.881). Hence the overall Firm selection effect is to reduce selection
pressures24. The reduction in wages faced by firms in the beginning of their life and the
resulting boost to the value (the sum of expected discounted profits) of firms of all produc-
tivity levels seem to outweigh the fact that both high and low permanent productivity firms
now face the same wage. We can also see very strong Firm size effect. Firms are on average
smaller under sector bargaining (22.99 vs 10.93) which results in higher average output per
worker (2.206 vs 2.804) because of decreasing returns to scale. Total production of the final
good is significantly higher under collective bargaining (205.03 vs 266.51). This is because
output per worker is higher and there are more employed workers than in the baseline case.
While total wage bill is only slightly larger in the sector-level bargaining case (153.10 vs
155.45), total firm profits are twice as large (43.26 vs 87.31). Given the massive gap in
total profits it is unsurprising that the total value of firms (essentially the value of the stock
market) is twice as large under sector bargaining than in the baseline economy (4 927 vs
10 264). Due to the amount of entry and the mass of firms being about twice as large, the
total costs of entry and the total fixed costs are also twice as large as in the baseline case.
Total recruitment costs are almost three times larger in the collective bargaining case. This
is mainly driven by the fact that the labour market tightness is almost four times larger
in the sector bargaining case. Despite much larger costs (entry, fixed and recruitment) the
24However, this result may be sensitive to the fact that the model fails to meet the target on the elasticity
of wages with respect to firm size.
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Wage-setting Individual-level Sector-level Sector-level Sector-level
Union bargaining power µ - 0.405 0.440 0.490
Average wage 1.647 1.649 1.737 1.888
Total value added 171.66 192.32 203.82 206.09
Unemployment rate 7.06% 4.97% 5.67% 11.91%
Market tightness 0.679 2.579 1.569 0.087
Standard deviation of log wages 0.041 0 0 0
Firm productivity cutoff z∗ 1.933 1.881 1.965 2.043
Firm entry 0.078 0.160 0.164 0.165
Successful entry 0.022 0.048 0.045 0.042
Measure of firms 4.042 8.693 8.201 7.679
Output per worker 2.206 2.804 2.871 2.969
Average size of firms 22.994 10.932 11.503 11.472
Total production 205.03 266.51 270.88 261.55
Total wage bill 153.10 155.45 163.85 166.30
Total firm profits 43.26 87.31 91.68 92.00
Total cost of entry 24.70 50.44 51.72 52.21
Total search cost 7.13 20.44 12.23 0.33
Total fixed costs 1.54 3.31 3.12 2.92
Total value of firms 4 927 10 264 10 232 9 657
Table 3.12: Applying sector-level bargaining to a model economy calibrated to the US
increase in the total production is so large that the model economy with sector bargaining
(where the average wage is the same as in the baseline case) still generates larger total value
added. Hence it seems that reducing wage dispersion while keeping the average wage level
the same results in an improvement in welfare (as measured by the units of the final good
that can be consumed).
Let us now consider the effects of increasing the bargaining power of the industry-level
union, µ. Comparing columns 2-4 we can see that quite intuitively a higher µ results in sig-
nificantly higher average wage in the economy, but also in higher unemployment rate. The
relationship between µ and unemployment seems to be convex where initially the unemploy-
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ment rate rises only slightly, but for higher values of µ it rises much sharply. Interestingly,
a higher µ also results in higher total value added. However, the relationship seems to be
concave in the sense that increases in µ have larger effects on total value added for lower
levels of µ than for higher ones. This suggests that there probably exists a value of µ ∈ (0, 1)
that maximizes total the value added in this economy, holding all other parameters constant.
Let us now look at the other aggregate effects of raising µ in order to better understand
why higher µ can deliver larger total value added. By increasing the tariff wage, a rise in
union bargaining power enforces tougher firm selection and results in larger productivity
cutoff z∗. As a result average firm productivity is larger. Interestingly, the amount of firm
entry stays approximately the same. Firm entry depends on expected profits from entry
which are decreasing in both the tariff wage and in labour market tightness. Higher µ
raises the tariff wage, but it also reduces the market tightness. It seems that the two effects
broadly offset each other so that the expected profits from firm entry and thus the amount
of firm entry are unaffected. However, the amount of firms successfully entering (firms that
enter and draw z above z∗ and thus stay and produce) is falling in µ. This is because z∗ is
monotonically increasing in µ. As a consequence of declines in successful entry, the stock of
firms declines in µ as well. Average size of firms first rises and then falls in µ. Output per
worker is increasing in µ, this is most likely the consequence of higher average productivity
level of surviving firms.
Total production first rises and then falls in µ. Increases in the union bargaining power
have two opposing effects on the total production. On one hand, a higher µ leads to a
higher average productivity of firms. On the other hand, a higher µ leads to lower employ-
ment. Thus each employed worker is more productive, but there are fewer employed workers.
Initially, the first effect dominates, but for higher values of µ the second effect dominates.
Total wage bill and total firm profits are increasing in µ, but at a decreasing rate. Total
value of firms first rises, but then slightly declines. Total costs of entry map the development
of firm entry and are broadly stable. Total fixed costs follow the trajectory of the stock of
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firms and thus they are decreasing. Finally, total search costs decline massively as µ rises.
This is because the labour market tightness also declines very sharply in µ.
Total value added is equal to total production minus the three types of costs. While total
search and fixed costs monotonically decline in µ, total production first rises and then falls
in µ. This gives rise to a positive, but concave relationship between total value added and
the union’s bargaining power µ.
Lets come back to the issue of why sector-level collective bargaining with µ set such that
the tariff wage is equal to the average wage in the individual bargaining case delivers higher
total value added than the baseline individual bargaining economy. There are two main
reasons for this. The first one is the existence of young firm wage premium in the baseline
economy and the fact that firms discount future profits. Firms face high wage costs when
they are far from their target size and this reduces their profitability in the first periods of
their life. The young firm wage premium makes it more costly to grow a firm to its target
size. This seems to have a large effect on the sum of future expected discounted profits, i.e.
the value of firms. This is because a firm takes into account an exogenous death rate δ as
well as the standard discount rate r. Removing the young firm pay premium has a large
positive effect on expected profits from entry which gives rise to more entry and to a larger
stock firms in the steady state (Firm entry effect). This leads to higher employment and
output.
The second reason why sector-level bargaining delivers higher total value added at the
same average wage level seems to be the Firm size effect. Under individual wage bargaining
firms can lower the wage that they face by hiring more workers and thus reducing their
marginal product of labour. This encourages them to grow to a larger size than they would
if the wage rate was independent of firm size. While the decision about when to stop growing
is privately efficient for the firm (the firm is maximising its value) it may be very inefficient
from the point of view of a social planner that is maximising total value added in the economy.
This is because a higher average firm size in the economy leads to more resources being spent
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on (convex) recruitment costs which are assumed to be a deadweight loss. Furthermore, a
higher average firm size leads to a lower average output per worker due to decreasing returns
to scale. Therefore a social planner maximising the amount of output that can be consumed
would generally choose an allocation with smaller firm sizes than is the case in the model
economy with individual wage bargaining.
3.3.4 Experiment 2: Reducing Individual Worker Bargaining Power
While Increasing Worker Outside Option
We have seen in the previous section that in the model economy calibrated to the USA
reducing wage dispersion (in that case down to 0) while keeping the average wage the same
results in a higher total value added. In this section I investigate whether this kind of
mean-preserving wage compression can be achieved by adjusting some parameters within the
context of a model with individual wage bargaining. Specifically, I simultaneously reduce β,
worker bargaining power in individual negotiations, and increase b, the value of leisure, thus
raising the worker outside option25. I restrict my attention to such combinations of the two
parameters where the average wage is the same as in the original model economy calibrated
to the USA. The outcomes for different combinations of β and b are displayed in Table 3.13.
We can see that as we reduce β and increase b, standard deviation of log wages is
gradually falling. It starts at 0.041 in Column 1 and ends at just 0.003 in Column 4. As we
make these parameter changes, unemployment rate is monotonically decreasing, from 7.06%
to 4.94%. Furthermore, this mean-preserving wage compression results in higher total value
added which rises from 171.66 to 192.49. The wage compression also results in lower firm
productivity cutoff z∗, higher firm entry, larger stock of firms that are on average smaller
and in higher output per worker. The smaller is the standard deviation of log wages, the
larger is the total production. Total entry, fixed and recruitment costs are also rising as
25b can also be thought of as unemployment benefit. In this case more generous welfare in the unemployed
state would increase the outside option of the workers. The increase in worker outside option is important,
because without it a reduction in β would lower the average wage level in the economy.
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wage dispersion is reduced. However, total production is rising faster and thus the mean-
preserving wage compression results in larger total value added. In conclusion, I demonstrate
that we can replicate the aggregate effects of switching to centralised wage bargaining (where
the average wage remains the same) in the context of a model economy with individual wage
bargaining by reducing worker bargaining power (share of surplus) and increasing worker
outside option.
Wage-setting Individual Individual Individual Individual
Parameters b=0.85 β=0.481 b=1.1 β=0.16 b=1.45 β=0.06 b=1.57 β=0.02
Average wage 1.647 1.645 1.654 1.642
Standard deviation of log wages 0.041 0.020 0.008 0.003
Total value added 171.66 186.51 192.25 192.49
Unemployment rate 7.06% 5.16% 5.06% 4.94%
Market tightness 0.679 2.240 2.410 2.632
Firm productivity cutoff z∗ 1.933 1.861 1.878 1.872
Firm entry 0.078 0.132 0.152 0.157
Successful entry 0.022 0.040 0.045 0.047
Measure of firms 4.042 7.350 8.282 8.637
Output per worker 2.206 2.634 2.771 2.804
Average size of firms 22.994 12.904 11.464 11.006
Total production 205.03 249.85 263.07 266.54
Total wage bill 153.10 155.98 157.04 156.10
Total firm profits 43.26 72.28 83.09 86.03
Total cost of entry 24.70 41.75 47.87 49.64
Total search cost 7.13 18.79 19.79 21.13
Total fixed costs 1.54 2.80 3.15 3.29
Total value of firms 4 927 8 555 9 753 10 130
Table 3.13: The Effects of Increasing Worker Outside Option and Reducing Worker Bar-
gaining Power in Individual Negotiations
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3.3.5 Experiment 3: Changing the Degree of Centralisation of
Collective Wage Bargaining in Sweden
In this counterfactual experiment I take the model economy with two-tier collective wage
bargaining that is calibrated to Sweden and I investigate the effects of changing the effective
worker bargaining power at firm-level, (1 − ε)ω. I check and confirm that in all model
economies presented in this section the condition (3.46) holds and thus workers are better
off staying with the firm during a local disagreement over wage premiums than becoming
unemployed, W̃L(n, z) > U .
Table 3.14 shows outcomes when collective bargaining is gradually centralised i.e. (1−ε)ω
is decreased. We can see that as wage bargaining is centralised, total value added first
rises and then falls. This is mainly because total production first increases and then falls.
Standard deviation of log wages is falling massively as firm wage premiums become less
dispersed (wages vary less across firms) due to the lower bargaining power of workers at
firm-level.
Interestingly, despite the smaller wage premiums, the average wage in the economy ac-
tually grows modestly as (1 − ε)ω declines. The first reason for this is that the tariff wage
rises. Negotiators at the sector level can correctly predict the size of the wage premiums
that will be agreed at firm-level and they take this into account when setting the tariff wage.
We can think of the sector-level negotiations as determining the share of output that will go
to workers and the bargaining power of workers at the firm level then determines how much
of this will be paid out in wage premiums as opposed to the tariff wage. The second reason
is that the size of the joint surplus that firms and workers are splitting at the sector level
increases, as the falling (1− ε)ω causes a change in the aggregate endogenous objects. The
threshold firm productivity level z∗ rises and hence only more productive firms (that pay
higher wages) can survive in the industry.
Thus the overall Firm selection effect here is to increase the selection pressures. There
is also the Firm entry effect, firm entry rises as (1 − ε)ω falls. This is because young firm
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wage premium is reduced which increases firm profitability in the early periods of a firms life
which due to discounting tends to affect strongly the overall value of the firm. The higher
expected profits from entry then encourage more entry. As collective bargaining becomes
more centralised, there are more firms that are on average smaller. This is the Firm size
effect, wage is less tied to the firm’s output per worker and thus there is a smaller incentive
for firms to grow to a larger size in order to lower the wage rate that they face. Because
of stricter selection of firms and the fact that firms are on average smaller (and there are
decreasing returns to scale) average labour productivity (output per worker) is higher. On
the other hand, unemployment rate is increasing quite sharply in the degree of centralisation.
The fact that labour productivity is increasing, but employment is decreasing in the degree
of centralisation gives rise to total production and total value added first rising and then
falling as firm-level worker bargaining power is restricted. This implies some positive level
of (1− ε)ω where total value added is maximised, holding all other parameters constant.
Table 3.15 shows the aggregate outcomes as collective bargaining is gradually decen-
tralised i.e. firm-level worker bargaining power (1 − ε)ω is increased. The patterns are
exactly the same as in the analysis above just with opposite sign.
We have seen in the analysis above that when firm-level worker bargaining power is
reduced, wage dispersion falls, but the average wage actually increases. This is different from
Experiments 1 and 2 where I was exploring the implications of wage compression where the
mean wage remains the same. Table 3.16 shows the aggregate implications of such a mean-
preserving wage compression in the context of the calibrated economy with two-tier collective
bargaining. In order to keep the average wage the same, I am reducing µ, the sector-level
union’s bargaining power, as I reduce (1− ε)ω, the firm-level worker bargaining power. Each
column displays aggregate outcomes for a different combination of µ and (1− ε)ω where the
average wage is the same.
We can see that as standard deviation of log wages falls and average wage remains the
same, total value added is monotonically rising. Hence I find the same pattern as in the
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Wage-setting Two-tier collective Two-tier collective Two-tier collective Two-tier collective
Parameters (1− ε)ω = 0.115 (1− ε)ω = 0.100 (1− ε)ω = 0.090 (1− ε)ω = 0.080
Tariff wage 2.492 2.586 2.659 2.732
Average wage 3.006 3.041 3.074 3.105
Standard deviation of log wages 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.003
Total value added 367.94 370.27 371.32 366.47
Unemployment rate 7.35% 8.00% 9.04% 11.31%
Market tightness 0.206 0.148 0.092 0.037
Firm productivity cutoff z∗ 5.170 5.202 5.228 5.263
Firm entry 0.265 0.275 0.281 0.283
Successful entry 0.0087 0.0089 0.0090 0.0089
Measure of firms 5.392 5.525 5.586 5.550
Output per worker 4.482 4.543 4.605 4.662
Average size of firms 17.183 16.649 16.282 15.977
Total production 415.22 417.98 418.93 413.46
Total wage bill 278.49 279.81 279.60 275.40
Total firm profits 121.77 124.01 126.00 125.60
Total cost of entry 32.32 33.55 34.28 34.53
Total search cost 3.27 2.18 1.22 0.42
Total fixed costs 11.68 11.97 12.10 12.02
Total value of firms 21 560 22 036 22 180 21 995
Table 3.14: The Effects of Decreasing Effective Worker Bargaining Power at Firm Level
previous two experiments. There is the Firm entry effect as the reduced young firm wage
premium encourages more firm entry. The net Firm selection effect is to to slightly reduce
the threshold firm productivity level, thus relaxing selection pressures. Finally, there is also
the Firm size effect. There are more firms which are on average smaller because wages vary
less with firms’ output per worker thus reducing the incentive to over-hire.
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Wage-setting Two-tier collective Two-tier collective Two-tier collective Two-tier collective
Parameters (1− ε)ω = 0.115 (1− ε)ω = 0.13 (1− ε)ω = 0.14 (1− ε)ω = 0.15
Tariff wage 2.492 2.395 2.335 2.273
Average wage 3.006 2.969 2.947 2.922
Standard deviation of log wages 0.013 0.017 0.019 0.022
Total value added 367.94 363.91 361.09 357.91
Unemployment rate 7.35% 6.90% 6.69% 6.49%
Market tightness 0.206 0.263 0.295 0.331
Firm productivity cutoff z∗ 5.170 5.130 5.107 5.078
Firm entry 0.265 0.255 0.249 0.243
Successful entry 0.0087 0.0085 0.0083 0.0082
Measure of firms 5.392 5.281 5.208 5.138
Output per worker 4.482 4.414 4.372 4.327
Average size of firms 17.183 17.626 17.912 18.195
Total production 415.22 410.95 407.95 404.62
Total wage bill 278.49 276.43 274.98 273.26
Total firm profits 121.77 118.62 116.54 114.31
Total cost of entry 32.32 31.15 30.43 29.66
Total search cost 3.27 4.44 5.14 5.91
Total fixed costs 11.68 11.44 11.28 11.13
Total value of firms 21 560 21 102 20 793 20 466
Table 3.15: The Effects of Increasing Effective Worker Bargaining Power at Firm Level
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Wage-setting Two-tier collective Two-tier collective Two-tier collective Two-tier collective
Parameters (1− ε)ω = 0.115 (1− ε)ω = 0.100 (1− ε)ω = 0.090 (1− ε)ω = 0.080
µ = 0.546 µ = 0.539 µ = 0.535 µ = 0.530
Tariff wage 2.492 2.552 2.598 2.636
Average wage 3.006 3.004 3.008 3.001
Standard deviation of log wages 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.009
Total value added 367.94 370.79 372.74 374.49
Unemployment rate 7.35% 7.20% 7.19% 7.01%
Market tightness 0.206 0.222 0.224 0.247
Firm productivity cutoff z∗ 5.170 5.165 5.167 5.157
Firm entry 0.265 0.271 0.276 0.281
Successful entry 0.0087 0.0089 0.009 0.009
Measure of firms 5.392 5.544 5.639 5.754
Output per worker 4.482 4.520 4.549 4.572
Average size of firms 17.183 16.730 16.456 16.157
Total production 415.22 419.50 422.24 425.19
Total wage bill 278.49 278.83 279.19 279.12
Total firm profits 121.77 125.13 127.31 129.68
Total cost of entry 32.32 33.16 33.76 34.32
Total search cost 3.27 3.52 3.51 3.91
Total fixed costs 11.68 12.01 12.21 12.46
Total value of firms 21 560 22 170 22 548 23 000
Table 3.16: The Effects of Decreasing Effective Worker Bargaining Power at Firm Level
While Keeping Average Wage Constant
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3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I compare individual wage bargaining with two-tier collective bargaining
where first a common tariff wage is set at sector-level and then additional wage premiums
are bargained collectively at firm-level. The model can vary the extent of centralisation
of wage bargaining by adjusting the ability of workers to reduce their level of effort during
firm-level disagreement over pay. Under both wage setting regimes there is a wage dispersion
among homogeneous workers driven by rent sharing and the wage is an increasing function
of the firm’s output per worker. Because of convex hiring costs firms only gradually grow
towards their target size. Given that firm productivity is constant over the life of the firm
and there are decreasing returns to scale, wage is declining in firm age. Firms with higher
permanent productivity face higher wages along their entire growth path.
My first contribution is to provide a novel explanation for the recent empirical finding
of a young firm wage premium. Babina et al. (2019) and Schmieder (2013) find that after
controlling for employer and worker time-invariant heterogeneity using fixed effects there is
a statistically and economically significant young-firm pay premium that is monotonically
decreasing with firm age. In my model when firms are young they have few workers relative
to their target size and thus their marginal product of labour is relatively high. In individual
negotiations a worker can threaten to leave and it takes time and resources to replace her.
When a firm is young each worker is more valuable to the company than when the same
firm is older and it had time to grow to its target size. Hence workers are able to negotiate
a higher wage when the firm is young.
My second contribution is to identify the aggregate implications of equalising wages for
homogeneous workers across heterogeneous firms. My main finding is that reducing wage
dispersion while holding the average wage the same leads to a higher total value added.
There are two main reasons for this. The first one is the existence of the young firm wage
premium and the fact that firms discount future profits. Under firm-level wage bargaining
(either individual or collective) firms face high wage costs when they are far from their target
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size and this reduces their profitability in the first periods of their life. Reducing the young
firm wage premium increases firm profitability in the early periods which due to discounting
has a large positive effect on the value of firms. Higher expected profits from entry lead to
more entry and to a higher stock of firms. This leads to higher employment and output.
The second reason is that when wages are increasing in the firm’s marginal (or aver-
age) product of labour firms can lower the wage that they face by hiring more workers (E.
Smith (1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001)). This encourages them to grow to a larger size
than they would if the wage rate was independent of firm size. While the decision about
when to stop growing is privately efficient for the firm (the firm is maximising its value) it
may be very inefficient from the point of view of a social planner that is maximising the
total value added in the economy. This is because a higher average firm size in the economy
leads to more resources being spent on (convex) recruitment costs which are assumed to be a
deadweight loss. Furthermore, a higher average firm size leads to a lower average output per
worker due to decreasing returns to scale. Therefore a social planner maximising the amount
of output that can be consumed would generally choose an allocation with smaller firm sizes
than is the case in the model economy with firm-level wage bargaining (either individual or
collective).
In all of my simulations mean-preserving wage compression leads to a higher total pro-
duction of the final good, as there are more employed workers and labour productivity is
higher. While the sum of the three types of costs that are assumed to be a deadweight loss
(entry, fixed and recruitment) also rises, the increase in total production is larger and thus
total value added is increased.
In conclusion, this chapter argues that the wage dispersion driven by firm characteristics
via rent sharing has negative efficiency implications, as it discourages firm entry and encour-
ages over-employment by firms. Furthermore, I show that centralisation of wage bargaining,
i.e. moving wage bargaining to the level of the sector and reducing the effective bargaining
power of workers at the firm level, can reduce this kind of wage dispersion and thus result
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Proof of Proposition 1: First, substitute the expression for the value of an employed
worker (3.6) into the surplus-splitting equation (3.14).
wI(n, z) +
s+ δ − sδ
1 + r
U +
1− s− δ + sδ
1 + r





The surplus-splitting rule gives





























Differentiating the maximised firm value equation (3.3) with respect to current employ-































Next, in (3.66) substitute for ∂Π(n,z)
∂n
from (3.68) and for ∂Π(n
′,z)
∂n′
from (3.4). After simpli-
fying this gives








Proof of Lemma 1: From Proposition 1 wage under individual bargaining is the solution
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to the following differential equation:








If we think of z as a constant then the above is a linear ordinary differential equation of
first order and thus it is possible to solve it analytically. Using the fact that the production
function is Cobb-Douglas and following the usual procedure for solving differential equations
of the form dy
dx











Notice that if c > 0 then as n → 0, c
n1/β
→ +∞ which means that w(n) → +∞. Following
Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) I assume that as n → 0 the wage does not grow to infinity,
it is still finite and hence I set c=0. Then I obtain:








We can confirm that this is indeed the solution to the differential equation by using (3.72)
as w(n,z) in (3.70) and solving.



























































+ θq(θ)U + (1− θq(θ))U
} (3.75)


































Proof of Lemma 3: Value of the firm at the target size is given by the following.
Π(n∗, z) = y(n∗, z)− n∗wI(n∗, z)− F p − c(v(n∗, z)) + 1− δ
1 + r
Π(n∗, z) (3.78)





y(n∗, z)− n∗wI(n∗, z)− F p − c(v(n∗, z))
]
(3.79)









































Next we have to substitute for c′(v(n∗, z)), ∂y(n
∗,z)
∂n∗
, wI(n∗, z) and ∂w
I(n∗,z)
∂n∗
. We know that
the marginal vacancy cost takes the form:
c′(v(n, z)) = λ+ γv(n, z) (3.83)
The law of motion of firm size is given by:
n′ = (1− s)n+ v(n, z)q(θ) (3.84)
Target firm size n∗ is defined as n = n′ = n∗.
n∗ = (1− s)n∗ + v(n∗, z)q(θ) (3.85)





Combining (3.83) and (3.86)




Given that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, y(n∗, z) = z(n∗)α, marginal product of




Wage under individual bargaining is given by Lemma 1. Its derivative with respect to firm
size is given by
∂wI(n∗, z)
∂n∗
= (α− 1) αβ
αβ + 1− β
z(n∗)α−2 (3.89)












(αβ + 1− β)
z(n∗)α−1−n∗(α−1) αβ















n∗ − 1− δ
r + δ
α(1− β)
αβ + 1− β
zn∗(α−1) = 0 (3.91)
This is an implicit function for the target size n∗(z). I prove that n∗(z) is increasing in z by
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αβ + 1− β
(n∗)α−1 < 0 (3.92)
Given that δ ∈ (0, 1), r > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1) the derivative above is negative. The










αβ + 1− β
z(n∗)α−1 > 0 (3.93)
Given that γ > 0, s > 0, r > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1), the derivative above is
positive. Hence the left-hand side of (3.91) is increasing in n∗.
Therefore there is a positive relationship between z and n∗. More productive firms grow
towards a larger target size.
Proof of Lemma 4: Per-period profit of a firm is given by:
π(n, z) = y(n, z)− wI(n, z)n− F p − c(v(n, z)) (3.94)






− wI(n, z)− n∂w
I(n, z)
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= αznα−1 − (1− β) rU
1 + r
− αβ
αβ + 1− β
znα−1 − n (α− 1)αβ
αβ + 1− β
znα−2 (3.96)
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1 + r
rU + (1− β)
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Taking the expression for wage under individual bargaining from Lemma (1) and rearranging
it:
αβ
(αβ + 1− β)








= −β 1− β
1 + r
rU + (1− β)
(














Thus wage is increasing in the worker outside option and in the firm’s surplus from employing
the marginal worker.



















































































Finally, substituting (3.105) into (3.100) evaluated at n = n∗(z) and using the fact that
at n∗(z) every period the number of workers hired is equal to the number of workers that






















Proof of Lemma 5: The chosen wage premium maximizes the weighted product of the






(1− ε)y(n, z)− np
)1−ω
(3.107)
where ω ∈ (0, 1) represents bargaining power of workers at the firm-level.



















w((1− ε)y(n, z)− np)− (1− ω)np = 0 (3.109)
Solving the above for p we obtain the expression for wage premium:
p(n, z) = (1− ε)ωy(n, z)
n
(3.110)
Assuming Cobb-Douglas production function y(n, z) = znα:
p(n, z) = (1− ε)ω z
n1−α
(3.111)





TL+ (1− ε)ωY − bL
)µ (
(1− (1− ε)ω)Y − TL
)1−µ
(3.112)
where µ ∈ (0, 1) represents bargaining power of the sector-level union. I assume that the
sector-wide union and the employer organisation take the aggregate output Y and aggregate
employment L as given. Thus they do not internalize the effect that the choice of the tariff
wage has on these variables.
The first-order condition of the above maximisation problem is given by:
µ
(








TL+ (1− ε)ωY − bL
)µ(












TL+ (1− ε)ωY − bL
)
= 0 (3.114)











Putting the above two results together:










+ (1− ε)ω z
n1−α
(3.116)
Proof of Lemma 6: We can use (3.82) from the proof of Lemma 3 because all the steps














The wage under two-tier collective bargaining is given by (5). Evaluated at firm target size:
wC(n∗, z) = T + (1− ε)ωz(n∗)α−1 (3.118)
Its derivative with respect to firm size is given by:
∂wC(n∗, z)
∂n
= −(1− α)(1− ε)ωz(n∗)α−2 < 0 (3.119)
Next in (3.117) we substitute for c′(v(n∗, z)) from (3.87), for ∂y(n
∗,z)
∂n
from (3.88), for wC(n∗, z)
from (3.118) and for ∂w
C(n∗,z)
∂n










αz(n∗)α−1 − T − (1− ε)ωz(n∗)α−1 + n∗(1− α)(1− ε)ωz(n∗)α−2
]
(3.120)










T − (1− δ)(1− ω(1− ε))α
r + δ
z(n∗)α−1 = 0 (3.121)
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I prove that n∗(z) is increasing in z by showing that the left-hand-side of this expression is
decreasing in z, while it is increasing in n∗.
∂LHS
∂z
= −(1− δ)(1− ω(1− ε))α
r + δ
(n∗)α−1 < 0 (3.122)
Given that δ ∈ (0, 1), α ∈ (0, 1), ε ∈ (0, 1) and ω ∈ (0, 1) the derivative above is negative.







(1− α)(1− δ)(1− ω(1− ε))α
r + δ
z(n∗)α−2 > 0 (3.123)
Given that γ > 0, r > 0, s ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1), α ∈ (0, 1), ε ∈ (0, 1) and ω ∈ (0, 1), the
derivative above is positive. Hence the left-hand side of (3.121) is increasing in n∗.
Therefore there is a positive relationship between z and n∗. More productive firms grow
towards a larger target size.
Proof of Lemma 7: Per-period profit of a firm is given by:
π(n, z) = y(n, z)− wC(n, z)n− F p − c(v(n, z)) (3.124)






− wC(n, z)− n∂w
C(n, z)
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= αznα−1 − T − (1− ε)ωznα−1 − n
(
− (1− α)(1− ε)ωznα−2
)
(3.126)







αznα−1 − T (3.127)










Substituting (3.128) into the expression for wage under two-tier collective bargaining:







































































































Finally, substituting (3.135) into (3.130) evaluated at n = n∗(z) and using the fact that
at n∗(z) every period the number of workers hired is equal to the number of workers that






















We know from Lemma 6 that the firms with larger time-invariant productivity grow towards
a larger target size; n*(z) is increasing in z. Hence the number of vacancies posted by a
firm at its target size, sn
∗(z)
q(θ)
, is increasing in z. Marginal cost of posting vacancies c′(v)










is increasing in z. Firms with larger permanent productivity z pay higher
wages at their respective target size.
3.5.2 Wage Bargaining with Firm-level Unions
In this case collective bargaining is completely decentralised in the sense that there are no
negotiations at sector-level and instead negotiations take place between a firm-level union
and a particular firm. The threat point is the possibility of a strike, for one period there is
no production. Both parties take up the negotiation again the next period. During the strike
workers continue to be employed, they do not receive any wages, but they get the value of
leisure, b. The firm cannot produce for one period, it is not paying out wages, but it still
has to pay vacancy cost and the fixed cost. The choice of vacancies is forward-looking and
thus it is unaffected by whether there is a strike today or not. Wage is the result of bilateral
Nash bargaining.
Value of the firm in the case of an agreement:






n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
) (3.137)
Value of the firm in the case of a strike:





n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)
(3.138)
Firm’s gain from an agreement: ΠFL(n, z)− Π̃FL(n, z) = y(n, z)− nwFL(n, z)
Value of the worker in the case of an agreement:





(s+ δ − sδ)U
+ (1− s− δ + sδ)W
(
n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)} (3.139)
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Value of the worker in the case of a strike:




(s+ δ − sδ)U
+ (1− s− δ + sδ)W
(
n− sn+ q(θ)v(n, z), z
)} (3.140)
Surplus of each worker: WFL(n, z)− W̃FL(n, z) = wFL(n, z)− b
Union’s gain from an agreement (surplus): n(wFL(n, z)− b)









where ω captures bargaining power of the firm-level union.
Wage under firm-level unions is given by:
wFL(n, z) = (1− ω) b+ ω y(n, z)
n
(3.142)
Wage is an increasing function of the value of leisure b and of average product of labour
of the firm. Assuming Cobb-Douglas production function y(n, z) = znα the wage under
firm-level unions becomes:
wFL(n, z) = (1− ω) b+ ω z
n1−α
(3.143)
Holding employment constant, wage is increasing in firm productivity. Holding firm produc-
tivity constant, wage is decreasing in employment.
3.5.3 Solving the model numerically
3.5.3.1 Model with individual wage bargaining
The critical endogenous variables are: the labour market tightness θ, the flow value of
unemployment rU and the level of firm entry e. All other endogenous objects of the model
are just a function of these three variables and constant parameters. First, I solve a system
of 2 non-linear equations and 2 unknowns: θ and rU. Once I know the equilibrium values
of θ and rU, I solve for e. Finally, I can solve for all the endogenous objects of the model,
generate model moments and compare them with data moments and calibrate parameters.
205
The following is a system of 2 equations that are functions of θ and rU only (not of e)26.




















Π(0, z) f(z) dz − F e = 0 (3.145)
I solve the above system of two non-linear equations using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 Solving for θ and rU:
1. Guess θ and rU.
2. Apply value function iteration on (3.3) to solve for the value function Π(n, z), the
policy function n’(n) and v(n,z).
3. Calculate the firm target size n∗(z) which is given by Lemma 3.
4. Solve for z∗ using the Minimum Productivity Condition (3.12).
5. Given v(n,z), θ, n∗(z) and z∗, find the joint distribution of firm size and productivity
h(n,z) - steps in Appendix 3.5.3.4.
6. Check how close equations (3.144-3.145) are to zero. If sufficiently close, stop. We
found θ∗ and rU∗. If not, go to Step 1 and update the guess of θ, rU .
Once I have found the equilibrium θ∗ and rU∗ I solve for the level of entry, e. Given that





δ + (1− δ)s
δ + (1− δ)s+ θ∗q(θ∗)
(3.146)
Hence I can calculate the aggregate employment in the steady state, L∗.
L∗ = N(1− u∗) (3.147)
26In (3.144) both h(n,z) and vtot include x, the total measure of firms which is a function of e as shown in
(3.13). However, the x terms cancel out so (3.144) is independent of e. Additionally, (3.145) is independent of
e because Π(n, z) is not a function of e. Entry can only affect the value of firms indirectly via θ. Controlling
for θ and rU, (3.145) is independent of e.
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Finally, while keeping θ = θ∗ and rU = rU∗, I search for such a value of e where the
following holds:





n h(n, z) dn dz = 0 (3.148)




. Thus I obtained θ∗, rU∗ and e∗. As a result of finding e∗ I have the correct
joint distribution of firm size and productivity h(n,z) and thus I can find all the aggregate
endogenous objects such as total output, total wage bill or total vacancies27.
3.5.3.2 Model with two-tier collective wage bargaining
In this version of the model the wage is given by:









+ (1− ε)ω z
n1−α
The critical endogenous variables are: the labour market tightness θ, the tariff wage T and
the level of firm entry e. All other endogenous objects of the model are just a function of
these three variables and constant parameters.
First, I solve a system of 2 non-linear equations and 2 unknowns: θ and T. The following
two equations are functions of θ and T only (not of e)28.
27These I could not calculate with only knowing θ∗ and rU∗.
28In (3.149) the only term that is a function of e is h(n,z), but it is both in the numerator and in the
denominator. Thus e terms cancel out and (3.149) is independent of e. Additionally, (3.150) is independent
of e because Π(n, z) is not a function of e. Entry can only affect the value of firms indirectly via θ. Controlling
for θ and T, (3.150) is independent of e.
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Π(0, z) f(z) dz − F e = 0 (3.150)
I solve the above system of two non-linear equations using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 2 Solving for θ and T:
1. Guess θ and T.
2. Apply value function iteration on (3.3) to solve for the value function Π(n, z), the
policy function n’(n) and v(n,z).
3. Calculate the firm target size n∗(z) which is given by Lemma 6.
4. Solve for z∗ using the Minimum Productivity Condition condition (3.12).
5. Given v(n,z), θ, n∗(z) and z∗, find the joint distribution of firm size and productivity
h(n,z) - steps in Appendix 3.5.3.4.
6. Check how close equations (3.149-3.150) are to zero. If sufficiently close, stop. We
found θ∗ and T ∗. If not, go to Step 1 and update the guess of θ, T .
Once I have found the equilibrium θ∗ and T ∗ I solve for the level of firm entry, e in exactly
the same way as in the case of individual wage bargaining. Thus I obtain θ∗, T ∗ and e∗ and
using these I solve for all endogenous objects of the model.
3.5.3.3 Model with complete centralisation of collective wage bargaining
Here I assume that ε = 1, workers have zero local bargaining power. In that case wC = T ,
we have complete centralisation, there is a single wage rate applying to all the firms in the
industry and it is equal to the tariff wage T.
208
First, I solve a system of 2 non-linear equations and 2 unknowns: θ and T. The following
two equations are functions of θ and T only (not of e)29.
Tguess − Tnew = 0
Tguess −
(


















Π(0, z) f(z) dz − F e = 0 (3.152)
I solve the above system of two non-linear equations using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 3 Solving for θ and T:
1. Guess θ and T.
2. Apply value function iteration on (3.3) to solve for the value function Π(n, z), the
policy function n’(n) and v(n,z).
3. Calculate the firm target size n∗(z) which is given by Lemma 6 where (1− ε)ω = 0.
4. Solve for z∗ using the Minimum Productivity Condition condition (3.12).
5. Given v(n,z), θ, n∗(z) and z∗, find the joint distribution of firm size and productivity
h(n,z) - steps in Appendix 3.5.3.4.
6. Check how close equations (3.151-3.152) are to zero. If sufficiently close, stop. We
found θ∗ and T ∗. If not, go to Step 1 and update the guess of θ, T .
Once I have found the equilibrium θ∗ and T ∗ I solve for the level of firm entry, e in exactly
the same way as in the case of individual wage bargaining. Thus I obtain θ∗, T ∗ and e∗ and
using these I solve for all endogenous objects of the model.
29In (3.151) the only term that is a function of e is h(n,z), but it is both in the numerator and in the
denominator. Thus e terms cancel out and (3.151) is independent of e. Additionally, (3.152) is independent
of e because Π(n, z) is not a function of e. Entry can only affect the value of firms indirectly via θ. Controlling
for θ and T, (3.152) is independent of e.
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3.5.3.4 Calculating joint distribution of firm size and productivity
I calculate the joint distribution of firm size and productivity h(n,z) in the following way.
All firms start their life with no workers. All firms with the same time-invariant productivity
z make the same discrete jumps in firm size as they grow towards their target size. Except
that some of them die (with probability δ every period) and they differ in age. Still, firm
growth is completely deterministic. Therefore I can calculate all the steps or ”islands” that
firms with a particular z will take.
Firm size ”islands” for a given z:
ni+1 = (1− s)ni + v(ni, z)q(θ) for i = 1, 2, 3....∞
n0 = 0
(3.153)
Mass of firms at every island mi is given by the condition that every period inflow is equal to
the outflow, thus the mass of firms jumping in size from the previous island must be equal
to the mass of firms that leave this firm size island, either because of firm growth or due to
firm death. In fact, outside of the target size, no firms remain at the same employment level
for more than one period.
For island n0 = 0 and certain z:
e f(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflow
= δm0︸︷︷︸
outflow due to firm death
+ (1− δ)m0︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to firm growth
m0 = e f(z)
(3.154)
For island n1 and certain z:
e f(z)(1− δ) = δm1 + (1− δ)m1
m1 = e f(z)(1− δ)
(3.155)
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For island ni and certain z:
mi = e f(z)(1− δ)i (3.156)
We can see that the mass at each island is monotonically decreasing in the order i. The total




e f(z)(1− δ)i (3.157)
In the model firms initially grow very fast and then the growth slows down as they get closer
to the target size n∗(z). Thus initially firms are making big jumps, the firm size islands are
far from each other. However, close to n∗(z) the islands are closely clustered together. Firms
only approach n∗(z) in the limit. Hence the firm mass sequence is an infinite geometric










G(n∗(z)) gives the measure of all the firms that have time-invariant productivity equal to z
(firms of all sizes). As a check, I can also find this sum in another way. The mass of firms
with productivity z is equal to the share of firms that have productivity z, f(z)
1−F (z∗) , multiplied








Lets discuss how I use the results above to numerically calculate h(n,z), the joint distri-
30An infinite geometric series A+AR+AR2 +AR3 + ... where |R| < 1 has a sum given by S = A1−R .
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bution of firm size and productivity. I have a grid of values of z. For every z in the grid
I calculate the firm size islands ni using (3.153). I stop when ni − ni−1 < ζ where ζ > 0
arbitrarily small. I add the last element to each sequence which is n∗(z), the target firm
size for that z (defined by Lemma 3 for individual bargaining case and by Lemma 6 for the
collective bargaining case). Next for each z in the grid I calculate the sequence of cumulative
mass values G(ni) corresponding to every firm size island ni using (3.157). I add the final
element to each sequence, G(n∗(z)) = e f(z)
δ
which is the mass of all firms for that value of z.
Using linear interpolation I convert the sequences above into continuous functions. Next
I need to put all of them on the same grid of firm size n. For each value in the grid of firm
size, I calculate the cumulative mass implied by the continuous function. I do this for every
value of z. Thus I have a matrix where each column represents a different value of z in the
firm productivity grid and each row represents a different value of n in the firm size grid.
A value in the matrix for a particular (n,z) combination gives the cumulative mass of firms
with productivity equal to z and firm size up to n.
I use numerical differentiation to convert this matrix of cumulative values into a matrix
where each element gives the mass of firms for a particular (n,z) combination. Finally, I use
linear approximation to convert this matrix into a function of two variables, n and z. Thus
I obtain the joint distribution of firm size and productivity h(n,z) which gives the mass of
firms for each (n,z) combination.
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